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An End to ISIS?
Feisal al- Istrabadi and Sumit Ganguly
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS throughout this volume) seemed to rise dramatically in 2014, taking over Iraq’s second-largest 
city, Mosul, in four hours. A frenzy of activity and hand-wringing en-
sued, both amongst the ranks of policymakers in vari ous capitals and in 
the media. Indeed, no major observer of the region, in or out of govern-
ment, had seen this rise coming, and U.S. officials, starting with the pres-
ident, had been openly dismissive of ISIS while touting what they 
deemed to be their far more impor tant success against al Qaeda. Yet  here 
was ISIS achieving what al Qaeda had never even aspired to do in the 
course of its existence: taking over territory through military means from 
two governments that had previously controlled it. Overnight, ISIS erased 
the internationally recognized border between Iraq and Syria and pro-
claimed the existence of its so- called caliphate and named its amir 
al- muminin— commander of the faithful—an Iraqi, Ibrahim Awad 
 al- Badri, known by his nom de guerre, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi.
The backdrop to  these events, however, was far less dramatic. ISIS had 
been building for years. Particularly in Iraq, as the Sunni insurgency was 
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largely defeated—or at least reduced in size—in the wake of the surge of 
U.S. troops in 2007 and subsequently, what was then known as the Is-
lamic State in Iraq  rose to displace al Qaeda. The organ ization that was 
to become ISIS began to grow and metastasize. ISIS’s leadership initially 
sought refuge in Syria as the regime of Bashar al- Assad began to lose its 
iron- fisted control over much of the country, especially in parts of the 
predominantly Sunni areas. In the meantime, the Baghdad government, 
 under the leadership of Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki, began to renege 
on promises made to Iraq’s Sunni population that had been negotiated 
by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker during the 
surge, promises to which Baghdad had agreed.
As the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, 
many in the Sunni community  were seething with anger at Maliki, and 
a genuine sense of Sunni disenfranchisement began to take root. This 
sense of disenfranchisement became the vehicle of the initially slow in-
filtration of ISIS from across the Syrian frontier back into Iraq, especially 
in Anbar Governorate, as Maliki sent troops violently to disperse what 
had largely been peaceable demonstrations. It was this infiltration that set 
the groundwork for the dramatic rise of ISIS from Mosul southward in 
June 2014. By then, however, ISIS had controlled significant territory in 
Syria and had controlled Raqqah, its nominal capital, for two years. To 
borrow a phrase from a dif er ent context, the surprise to the policymak-
ing class in the United States and the region occasioned by the “sudden” 
rise of ISIS in 2014 seems to have been occasioned by yet another failure 
of imagination. Tensions in Iraq  were sufficiently high by the beginning 
of 2013 that one of the authors of this introduction predicted the reigni-
tion of a civil war.1 Even if the particulars of ISIS’s rise might not have 
been precisely predictable, that  there would be a palpable and significant 
response to provocation of the Sunnis was eminently predictable.
This volume fills a niche not hitherto occupied by other publications 
on ISIS: the lessons learned and pitfalls to be avoided in the  future. The 
express intention of the book is to deal with ISIS as a strategic issue  going 
forward, from the perspectives of the regional powers as well as the United 
States and its engagement in the region. The book is primarily intended 
for policymakers and policy analysts. Equally, however, in that it brings 
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together internationally renowned experts from the acad emy, most of 
whom have significant real- world experience, its analy sis is also targeted 
to other academics and their students.
The book is divided into five parts, each consisting of two chapters. 
Part I, which includes this introduction, looks at ideologies and exter-
nalities. Part II examines intelligence failures and ponders  whether the 
rise of ISIS in so spectacular a fashion, especially in Iraq in 2014, beto-
kens an inability on the part of U.S. intelligence ser vices to assess the real 
threat ISIS posed at a discrete moment in history. Part III examines issues 
relating to local actors, focusing especially on Syria and Af ghan i stan. 
Part IV assesses the often divergent agendas of the powers combating ISIS 
in Syria and Iraq. Part V concludes with an examination of U.S. interests 
in the fight against ISIS.
A final note on nomenclature: The extent of the territory ISIS claimed 
was dramatic. The En glish translation of the second “S” in ISIS as “Syria” 
fails adequately to convey the original Arabic. In the context of this ter-
rorist organ ization, the use of the word “Sham” in Arabic does not merely 
denote modern- day Syria. Instead, as any native speaker of Arabic un-
derstands, al- Dawlah al- Islamiyyah fil al- Iraq wa al- Sham refers to 
Bilad al- Sham— that is, Greater Syria. Thus ISIS’s claim is for dominion 
over a large swath of territory that encompasses all of modern- day Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine. It was thus a  matter of 
negotiation between the editors of this volume and the publisher as to 
 whether the second “S” should be more accurately translated as Levant or 
Syria. In the end, it was agreed that Syria is the more commonly used 
translation.
Chapter Summaries
 After this introduction, Nukhet Sandal considers the vexed and elusive 
issue of ISIS’s ideology and governance using the public theology frame-
work. Too many commentators on ISIS glibly assert that it attempts to 
return Islam to its past, failing to note how thoroughly modern a phe-
nomenon it actually is, especially in its utter totalitarianism, but also in 
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its engagement with modern media. Sandal divides her inquiry into four 
analytical dimensions: substantive, spiritual, spatial, and temporal. She 
begins by rejecting the trope that ISIS is merely a terrorist organ ization, 
noting that, at the very least, it can and should be considered a revolu-
tionary and revanchist pseudo- or emerging state (irrespective of its 
ultimate fate of having lost the territory it once controlled). Indeed, she 
notes that it sees itself as the “ultimate po liti cal unit for the Muslims” and 
behaves like a state to the extent that it provides ser vices such as health 
care and other public ser vices.
Sandal dismisses the argument over  whether ISIS is Islamic or un- 
Islamic. She notes that, analytically, it suffices to note that it acts in the 
name of religion—as other groups from other religions also do— and that 
it is able to rally followers and adherents. She convincingly traces the de-
velopment of ISIS from its roots in Salafi jihadism through al Qaeda. 
Still, she argues that the issue of  whether to place ISIS within or outside 
Islam should not be taken up by policymakers and politicians. Rather, 
she argues that it should be left to theologians and scholars of Islam. She 
notes, however, the rise of ISIS as a phenomenon occurring in light of 
interventions in Islamic countries and the need, therefore, for policymak-
ers to consider such second- order consequences when setting policy. She 
concludes by noting that a principal  factor contributing to the rise of such 
organ izations as ISIS and its fellow travelers is the lack of good gover-
nance in states where such groups do occur. To Sandal, it is axiomatic 
that promotion of good governance and building capacity should consti-
tute an impor tant part of the fight against such groups arising in the  future.
Erik J. Dahl begins the consideration of intelligence failures in Part II. 
He notes, to begin with, that some have argued that  there  were no intel-
ligence failures in the lead-up to June  2014.  These voices assert that 
warnings  were given, but that se nior administration officials simply failed 
to heed them. Although  there may be some truth to this line of argu-
ment, Dahl observes that se nior intelligence officials have conceded that 
they did indeed underestimate ISIS’s strength and its ability to challenge 
the post-2003 dispensation in Iraq. Dahl himself argues that the intelli-
gence community (IC) did fail properly to assess the threat that ISIS con-
stituted. Dahl’s chapter adds insight to the scholarly lit er a ture about 
6 al-Istrabadi and Ganguly 
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 these failures, which, as he notes, has too often ignored them. He does 
so in part by analyzing the statements of public officials about what went 
amiss and examines a controversy about the management of intelligence 
by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Disturbingly, he con-
cludes that the failures attendant to the failure to appreciate the danger 
actually posed by ISIS in 2014 are not isolated but are indicative of a larger 
set of challenges as the IC assesses the dangers posed by nonstate actors.
Dahl traces the failures that culminated in the losses of territory in 
June 2014 back to February 2011, ten months before the United States 
withdrew its forces from Iraq. At that time the director of national intel-
ligence publicly testified that, while al Qaeda in Iraq would continue to 
be a security prob lem, he believed it would be unable to control “terri-
tory from which to launch attacks.”  Others, most notably Defense Intel-
ligence Agency Director Michael Flynn, did eventually warn of rising 
risks, but the warnings from other administration officials  were general 
and contained such pap as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Brett Mc-
Gurk’s statement in November 2013 that “the next year may be pivotal.” 
Dahl argues that  there  were two principal failures. They are (1) that the 
United States lacked a physical presence in Iraq to assess adequately the 
virtue of the U.S. withdrawal, and (2) that what assets  were pres ent on 
the ground  were focused on military operations and  were simply unavail-
able to contribute to an understanding of the greater threat that was 
gathering. He concludes his chapter by noting that the ultimate failure 
to predict the rise of ISIS may well be structural, to the extent that it is 
extremely difficult to understand and forecast “intangible events” such as 
the rise of social movements or regional instability.
Part II concludes with James J. Wirtz’s consideration of the issue. He 
asks what it means to say that the failure to predict the rapid rise of ISIS 
was an intelligence failure; like Dahl, he notes that the IC did warn 
generally of a deteriorating situation. Wirtz notes the inherent tension 
between, on the one hand, the need for intelligence analysts to be at a 
remove from policymakers and thus to ensure the objectivity of their 
analyses. On the other is the imperative for the IC to be able to provide 
“actionable intelligence” to  those same policymakers. In the context of 
the rise of ISIS in 2014 he argues that it would have required the ability 
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of an analyst to connect de- Baathification by the U.S. administrator in 
Iraq in 2003 with the rise of ISIS a de cade  later—in efect having to pre-
dict the rise of ISIS by recognizing “the impetus it received from U.S. 
policy.” Indeed, given the manner in which briefings are conducted, he 
observes that an analyst would only make this connection if he  were “di-
rectly asked this question by public officials,” something he says “defies 
credulity.”
Significantly, Wirtz argues that, although officials  were warning of al 
Qaeda– like threats, ISIS in fact represents a qualitatively dif er ent type 
of threat. This new threat involves taking and holding territory and de-
claring emirates that could provide safe haven for its operatives, all while 
wearing down the United States and weakening its resolve to fight. 
Among the new tactics developed by ISIS was to take  children from cap-
tive territories and train them in ISIS’s ideology and combat methods as 
a way of increasing its numbers.  These tactics made ISIS not a “normal” 
clandestine actor, in Wirtz’s view, and made detection difficult. Its use of 
social media and the Internet for recruiting also made its actions extremely 
difficult to track. Like Dahl, Wirtz concludes that this confluence of events 
may well recur in the  future with re spect to other, similar actors, mak-
ing the “intelligence failure” with re spect to ISIS a pos si ble “harbinger 
of  things to come.”
Part III is an examination of local actors. Kevin Martin assesses Syria 
and Iraq, placing the events that occurred  there in their historical and 
regional contexts, particularly the vari ous regional conflicts. He argues 
that,  because organ izations such as ISIS did not arise ex nihilo, prevent-
ing the rise of similar organ izations  will also have to consider the his-
torical and regional contexts. In Syria he identifies a number of ongoing 
prob lems that  will have an impact on  future attempts to restore peace. 
Perhaps most disturbing is the regime’s current practice of “demographic 
reengineering”— that is, limiting the return of certain refugee popula-
tions to par tic u lar areas. Exacerbating the prob lems in Syria are the 
number of armed militias, both internal militias and  those from Leba-
non, Iraq, and Iran, that are taking part in the fighting. The fact that so 
many dif er ent groups are fighting the Syrian regime— many supported 
by regional states— has benefited the government, as none seems capable 
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of genuinely challenging it in areas where it is in control. That is also 
true of the cacophonous po liti cal opposition.
Martin sees ISIS as “very much the product of Iraq- specific histori-
cal experiences,” including de cades of personalized tyranny, militarism, 
sectarianism, and foreign intervention. Iraq, like Syria, has internal and 
regional militias supporting the government, including the popu lar 
mobilization units (PMUs), many of which are supported by Iran. Iran 
aside, Martin notes that Iraq and Syria have moved much closer since 
2011, including by sharing intelligence information. Iraq, too,  faces 
myriad Sunni insurgent groups of varying significance and with vari ous 
degrees of support from the region. Both Iraq and Syria must balance 
power among the diverse groups in the country and fend of regional 
interference.
Amin Tarzi’s chapter discusses a group often overlooked in the lit-
er a ture on ISIS and is this volume’s only specific consideration of Af-
ghan i stan and Pakistan. Tarzi notes that several disgruntled groups  there 
began pledging allegiance to ISIS in 2013 and 2014, leading to a formal 
announcement of Islamic State– Khurasan Province (ISKP) in 2015. The 
 causes of their disgruntlement ranged from personal grievances to theo-
logical disputes, though  others  were simply “awed” by the evident success 
ISIS achieved in both Syria and Iraq. Like ISIS, ISKP seeks the erasure of 
international bound aries. Khurasan, in its conception, encompasses Af-
ghan i stan, Pakistan, the Central Asian republics, parts or all of Iran, and 
even parts or all of India. According to Tarzi, ISKP has successfully re-
cruited sympathizers from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) in Pakistan, as well as from among Afghans, and by 2015 U.S. 
commanders had noted that the group was “operationally emergent” in 
Af ghan i stan. Tarzi warns that, as Taliban members become disenchanted 
with that organ ization, ISKP may well come to fill the vacuum; in the 
event, it already had 3,000 members by 2016, though estimates at this 
writing (in 2017) are that they number some 2,000.
Just as Martin does for Syria and Iraq, Tarzi underscores the impor-
tance of understanding the indigenous  factors that gave rise to ISKP by 
exploring the mythologies surrounding Khurasan and the troubled his-
tory of Af ghan i stan over the past four de cades. As in the  Middle East 
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proper, vari ous groups contest the ground in Af ghan i stan, such as the Tal-
iban, al Qaeda, and ISKP. Interestingly, he notes that instances of sectar-
ian vio lence in Af ghan i stan have been relatively few. Indeed, the Taliban 
has rejected ISKP’s targeting of Shia, but the familiar alignment of re-
gional players  will take its toll in Af ghan i stan, too. Tarzi suggests intrigu-
ingly that, if the Kabul government loses its grip on what ever territory it 
now controls, Iran might well calculate that the Taliban are its least threat-
ening alternative. He cautions that, as ISIS loses territory in Iraq, its fol-
lowers might seek refuge amongst ISKP fighters in Af ghan i stan. Much 
of the solution lies in the hands of Pakistan, which has failed to secure 
the vacuum in the FATA, where ISKP germinated. Improving relations 
between Kabul and Islamabad would also assist in keeping ISKP mar-
ginalized, though better relations have been elusive in the post-2001 era.
Part IV examines the U.S. and regional powers. Hussein Banai be-
gins his chapter with a discussion of the U.S.- led efort against ISIS in 
Syria and Iraq. He notes that the United States created a sixty- eight- 
member co ali tion to combat the group, though some prominent coun-
tries are excluded from this neoco ali tion of the (ostensibly) willing.  Those 
excluded include Rus sia, China, Iran, and the Syrian government itself. 
Of course, both Rus sia and Iran have intervened, the latter through elite 
units of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, which have provided ground troops 
alongside their Iraqi counter parts. (It might be added that, operationally, 
the United States may have been efectively providing air cover for Ira-
nian troops in Iraq, a truly bizarre set of afairs, if true.) Banai identifies 
the five pillars of the co ali tion’s strategy as: military; stopping recruit-
ment and flow of foreign fighters; cutting of funding sources to ISIS; 
humanitarian assistance and stabilizing liberated areas; and countering 
ISIS’s propaganda. He evaluates the co ali tion’s success in the areas as 
generally positive, though he says that attempts to stabilize newly liber-
ated cities and towns have had mixed results. This latter conclusion is, 
of course, worrying, as stabilization  will be a sine qua non for winning 
the peace, as it  were.
Banai notes that a major weakness of the co ali tion is that many Sunni 
states regard ISIS as at base a check, however much of an unpleasant one, 
on Iran and its regional hegemonic aspirations. Similarly, Turkey has its 
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own objectives in the fight against ISIS, particularly respecting Kurdish 
aspirations in the region. He quotes prior scholarship to the efect that 
 these divergent regional responses to ISIS should be evaluated according 
to the “jolts” that the  Middle East has received, including the 2003 war 
and the reform movements that began in 2011. In the event, he places 
the blame for the rise of ISIS on regional state failure and “institutional 
ineptitude.”
Reminiscent of Sandal’s prescription for avoiding a recurrence of ISIS, 
Banai advocates renewed emphasis on state- building in the region, even 
while noting the unpopularity of such eforts. He acknowledges that such 
endeavors cost billions of dollars, but  counters that the failure to engage 
in them has resulted in  great  human costs also, including death and de-
struction throughout the region. He concludes by recommending that 
an international commission be established to explore the reasons  behind 
the rise of ISIS and to make policy recommendations designed to pre-
vent its ability to thrive. He also recommends the establishment of a 
“regional trusteeship” among some of the leading regional players to 
promote cooperation between them.
In his chapter, Feisal al- Istrabadi writes that several  factors have 
limited the ability of the United States to defeat ISIS, especially in 
Iraq. He argues that one of  those is the failure of the United States to 
articulate or intermediate a vision amongst Iraqis for what would consti-
tute the post- ISIS dispensation. While it is self- evident that the all- Iraqi 
forces have been fighting against ISIS,  there is no vision of what it is 
they have been fighting for. He also argues that the current adminis-
tration has inherited a complex and, at times, incoherent alliance 
structure that hampers the ability of the United States to articulate a 
convincing narrative of its goals in fighting ISIS. Each of its major re-
gional allies has its own interests, and many of them regard the fight 
against ISIS as secondary to other national interests. Thus the United 
States is allied with Iraq in the fight against ISIS  there, but Iraq is allied 
with Iran both in Iraq (meaning the United States is de facto allied 
with Iran) and Syria, where the United States has been nominally sup-
porting groups fighting Iran’s ally, Bashar al- Assad. In Syria, where the 
United States has never had a positive policy, Rus sia has stepped in, 
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first cautiously to ensure that Assad did not fall, then more vigorously 
with the evident intention of supporting his efort to recapture as much 
territory as reasonably pos si ble. Istrabadi concludes that this morass of 
competing interests has made a coherent U.S. policy in  either Iraq or 
Syria exceptionally difficult.
Istrabadi argues that the continued presence of ISIS threatens U.S. in-
terests and that its defeat once and for all is essential to the preservation 
of  those interests. He cautions against the possibility of  future incarna-
tions of ISIS- like organ izations rising if the po liti cal outcome in Iraq and 
Syria post- ISIS does not result in genuine power- sharing and a sense of 
enfranchisement on the part of a broad mass of the respective popula-
tions. He argues the United States  ought to resist the temptation to 
disengage once the  battle is won; it must instead continue to use its influ-
ence in  favor of a decent and mutually acceptable settlement. Combating 
corruption and reconciliation must top the agenda, along with po liti cal 
reform. Istrabadi agrees with Banai that state institutions must be recon-
stituted, but he notes specifically the need to reform the armed and secu-
rity ser vices so that professional cadres, rather than po liti cal hacks, are 
promoted and integrated as the best protection against ethno- confessional 
strife. Although he acknowledges that the United States cannot dictate 
 these terms in  either country, Istrabadi believes that the United States 
 ought to use its considerable influence— particularly in Iraq—in this 
direction.
Part V, on U.S. interests, concludes this book. Risa Brooks begins her 
chapter by noting that an overarching imperative of U.S. policy since the 
September 11 attacks has been to deny terrorist organ izations sanctuary 
from which they can plot attacks on the United States. Although she ac-
cepts this efort as legitimate, she also cautions against overestimating the 
threat that ISIS constitutes in carry ing out “complex attacks” within the 
United States. She distinguishes between “lone- wolf” attacks and “com-
plex attacks” by noting that the latter involve networks of operatives, 
aim at targets that are hardened by security defenses, involve phased or 
simultaneous attacks or a campaign of clustered attacks, and employ le-
thal and technically sophisticated weapons. Holding territory, as ISIS did 
in Iraq and Syria, promotes a group’s ability to carry out complex attacks, 
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since camps facilitate building training facilities and the cultivation of 
“specialized expertise,” such as engineering skills. Still, the remoteness 
of the territory ISIS controls means that its ability to launch complex at-
tacks is attenuated. Brooks notes that the spatial separation can be over-
come, as was done on September 11, but planning for  those attacks took 
years, and it is far less likely that ISIS- like groups could infiltrate the 
United States in the post-2001 security environment. Moreover, she 
notes the lack of “community sanctuaries” in the United States, where 
such plotters could hide.
Brooks concludes her analy sis by pointing out that the threat of ISIS 
is “more qualified” than it is “sometimes characterized.” Importantly, she 
says that her analy sis has two policy implications. First, law enforcement 
agencies should be careful not to employ counterproductive strategies in 
dealing with local Muslim populations that have demonstrated their will-
ingness to expose suspected extremists. Second, regarding U.S. policy in 
the  Middle East, she suggests that the U.S. provision of air support to 
local militaries shows “promise,” as distinct from maintaining a large U.S. 
footprint in the region.
Peter Krause ends this book. He begins his analy sis with a good news/
bad news paradigm. The good news in this view is that ISIS does not 
threaten the most crucial U.S. regional interests, namely the rise of a re-
gional hegemon or the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The bad news 
is that it does constitute a threat to other U.S. interests, such as the stabil-
ity of regional allies and the prevention of terrorist attacks. Krause iden-
tifies the central difficulty in fighting ISIS as the fact that it is in efect a 
three- headed monster. It is at once a state that, at its peak, controlled ter-
ritory the size of Indiana; a transnational insurgency that seeks to spread 
chaos and overrun established regimes; and a revolutionary movement 
that works to “reshape socie ties and spread an extreme ideology.” To fail 
to fight it on any one of  these fronts, in Krause’s view, means a long and 
frustrating “ future of tactical victories and strategic defeats.” Still, he 
maintains that  there is a paradox in the threat- to- interest calculation that 
ISIS poses to the United States. The most significant U.S. interests are 
the ones that ISIS is least capable of harming (regional hegemony, nu-
clear proliferation), while what he identifies as secondary interests are the 
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ones ISIS is most capable of harming (democracy promotion and regional 
peace and stability).
Krause posits a strategy for defeating ISIS that begins with defeating 
the forces of sectarianism and polarization. (It could be noted parentheti-
cally that, in fact, far from defeating sectrarianism, the United States has 
embraced one side of the sectarian divide, rather than finding ways of 
bridging it.) Krause supports a policy of rolling back ISIS’s territorial 
acquisitions in the region. As other contributors to this book have al-
luded, especially Martin, Banai, and Istrabadi, Krause agrees that good 
governance would constitute an impor tant front in the fight against ISIS, 
especially, one presumes, as an efective ideology. Fi nally, Krause argues 
that, to defeat ISIS, it  will be necessary to match “needs with ends,” call-
ing therefore for an end to announcing lofty policy goals without devis-
ing the means to achieve them.
Two interrelated themes emerge from virtually  every chapter in this 
book, and they are quite timely viewed from the perspective of the first 
year  and  a  half of the Trump administration. The first is that U.S. pol-
icy has focused on military confrontations in its fight against radical 
Islamic militant movements in the  Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Thus, 
for instance, the United States surged its forces in Iraq in 2006 and 2007 
to confront al Qaeda, but once the spike in vio lence subsided, U.S. forces 
went home. The Bush administration negotiated an agreement to with-
draw all U.S. forces from the country by the end of 2011, and the Obama 
administration was in no mood to extend the presence of its forces  there. 
(In fairness, neither did Prime Minister Maliki, who sensed he could wrest 
domination of the country without the interference of U.S. forces.)
The military withdrawal itself had several ramifications. Intelligence 
sharing between the sides declined perilously. Equally significant, the en-
gagement of U.S. diplomats in Iraq substantially decreased, particularly 
during the Obama administration. Critical irritants between the compet-
ing po liti cal camps  were dismissed as internal politics and of no conse-
quence to U.S. policy in the region, even as Maliki began issuing arrest 
warrants for his po liti cal rivals and surrounding their  houses with 
tanks. In the end, al Qaeda gave way to the rise of ISIS and the need for 
yet another buildup of U.S. forces in the region.
14 al-Istrabadi and Ganguly 
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 These considerations, then, lead to the second overarching theme that 
emerges from this book: the need for sustained U.S. diplomatic engage-
ment in confronting the under lying  causes that give rise to organ izations 
such as ISIS. Organ izations such as ISIS have arisen in vari ous countries 
throughout the  Middle East and elsewhere in part owing to a breakdown 
of ordinary politics in  those countries. In Syria, for instance, the despotic 
regime of Bashar al- Assad failed to engage with critics or adequately re-
spond to reasonable demands of demonstrators for reform. It chose, in-
stead, to fire on unarmed civilians. Although the United States lacked 
the requisite influence in Damascus to mediate between Assad and his 
critics, the United States had such an ability in Iraq but simply chose not 
to use its good offices. Where the United States failed to engage in diplo-
macy, it was forced to rely on a military response instead.
 These lessons should not be lost on a new administration still finding 
its sea legs. The announced policy of increasing reliance on the U.S. mili-
tary capability at the expense of diplomacy augurs ill for vital U.S. inter-
ests. As the president has surrounded himself by retired and active- duty 
generals, experienced U.S. diplomats are leaving the State Department 
in droves, as the agency’s bud get sufers dramatic cuts hitherto unseen. 
One of the lessons of Iraq, for instance, should have been that the military 
surge would have been inefficacious by itself had U.S. officials not en-
gaged in diplomacy with the belligerents and brokered a po liti cal solu-
tion to the grievances of the parties. It is  because  those solutions broke 
down that ISIS emerged.
At this writing, ISIS has sufered devastating military defeats, losing 
control of virtually all the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria. 
Yet even in  these two countries, military operations continue to root out 
cells of the organ ization. It is almost certain that such cells  will continue 
to exist into the indefinite  future, and that is to say nothing of franchi-
sees of ISIS in Africa and parts of Asia, including Af ghan i stan and South 
Asia. For the United States to continue to rely primarily (or even exclu-
sively) on its military options means that new life  will be continually 
breathed into  these groups. To deprive such groups of the oxygen they 
need to exist, Amer i ca’s diplomats  will need to be engaged, again, to help 
mediate the politics away from extremism  toward creating a modus 
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vivendi between elites. Other wise, the  peoples of the region— and 
American ser vice men and  women— will be condemned to repeat the 
cycle of the past de cade and a half.
Note
 1 “Iraq seems now to be perched on yet another Fearonian precipice. The 
Sunna, perhaps convinced their power in Baghdad has waned permanently, 
are poised to unleash yet another round of vio lence. . . .  They are no doubt 
calculating, as Maliki rounds up the representatives they voted for, that in 
another five years, he  will have been able to consolidate power even more 
efectively, making now the relatively optimal time to re- ignite their in-
surgency.” Feisal Amin Rasoul al- Istrabadi, “Sectarian Visions of the Iraqi 
State: Irreconcilable Diferences?,” in Social Difference and Constitutionalism 
in Pan- Asia, edited by Susan H. Williams (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), pp. 225–26. This analy sis was written in 2013 and published in 
February 2014.
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Revolutionary Revanchism of ISIS
Nukhet Sandal
As I was writing this chapter in late 2017, the Iraqi forces had just re-taken the last ISIS- held town. ISIS might be facing its end, but it is 
too early to claim that we  will not witness its branches or its new mani-
festations in the near  future. It is certain that new jihadi organ izations 
 will continue to emerge, and existing ones  will change shape in response 
to the changing global po liti cal landscape. This is therefore a critical 
moment to look back at ISIS and discuss vari ous ele ments of the organ-
ization’s ideology to prepare for what might be next.
 There are many debates surrounding the ideology of ISIS. Through 
reports, articles, and books, scholars and prac ti tion ers have tried to cap-
ture exactly what the group stood for. It is not pos si ble to make predictions 
about  future jihadi organ izations or to fight against this par tic u lar type 
of radicalism and savagery without understanding the ideology ISIS es-
poused. However, it is also impor tant to recognize that the group’s mul-
tiple characteristics cannot be reduced to just one word. ISIS was not 
like al Qaeda or any other jihadi organ ization we have seen before. So 
how can we have a meaningful conversation about the ideology of ISIS 
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if it was not something we had seen before, and if  there  were many  factors 
that led to its birth and evolution?
Analyzing ISIS’s governance and ideology using the public theology 
framework, this chapter investigates the religious, po liti cal, and territo-
rial  factors involved in the organ ization’s operations. This framework is 
useful, especially for analysts who are not scholars of Islamic studies, to 
navigate through the complex map of doctrines and aspirations of ISIS. 
Public theology is a perspective on an issue, such as governance, that is 
produced or publicly advocated by a religious institution or authority, that 
is expressed by a group of  people who distinguish their practice and per-
spective from other traditions, and that informs the public discussions of 
 these issues in multiple ways, including po liti cal opposition, violent or 
nonviolent protest, and publications.1 The public theology of a par tic u-
lar issue includes  human interpretation of what is relevant and to what 
extent par tic u lar religious premises are evident in the public arena. In 
the context of ISIS, it is not a judgment of what is “ really” Islamic or 
jihadi, but how the group has redefined  these notions in its  every day 
practice. International relations scholar Fawaz Gerges, for example, 
calls Salafi jihadism “a traveling ideology,” and as such it is “nourished 
on the ideas that can be tailored to fit the predilections and whims of 
 every wave, providing nourishment, sustenance and motivations to new 
adherents.”2 Public theology is an organ izing framework for understand-
ing the “ISIS version” of this “traveling ideology” and its implications for 
governance.
The chapter also assumes an epistemic lens and emphasizes how ISIS 
reformulated the existing understandings of Islamic governance and ji-
hadism. This is not an entirely new position; in their edited book, Chris-
tina Hellmich and Andreas Behnke frame the discussion of al Qaeda’s 
origins and strategy  under “the epistemology of terrorism.”3 An epistemic 
lens encourages the analyst to question what remains constant, what has 
changed, and what networks made a difference in the understanding of 
this new form of jihadism. With their reframing of the conventional Salafi 
jihadi ideology, ISIS leaders and preachers devised new interpretation of 
jihadism and Islamic governance.4 They  shaped the conventional ideolo-
gies of jihadi governance within the po liti cal par ameters delineated 
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by the territory they control and the time frame they operate in. Their 
attempts to reformulate jihadi doctrines of governance and warfare can 
be seen in the numerous speeches, publications, treatises, and even syl-
labi written specifically for the jihadis.5
Elsewhere, I have formulated the dimensions of the public theology 
framework as substantive, spiritual, and spatial. In line with  these com-
ponents of public theology, the chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section covers essential questions regarding the identity of ISIS. Was 
it a state, as it called itself? Was it just another terrorist group? The second 
section focuses on the theological aspects of the organ ization’s ideology. 
What did the organ ization mean when it declared it was Islamic? How 
do con temporary scholars view its religious identity? The third section 
focuses on the territorial aspects of the group’s governance and warfare. 
What difference does it make that the organ ization was primarily located 
in the Levant, and not in South Asia or sub- Saharan Africa? What kind 
of territorial  factors and legacies  shaped the group’s public theology of 
governance? While reviewing  these dimensions, the chapter maintains a 
forward- looking stance and examines what each  factor means for jihadi 
movements in general.
Substantive Dimension: ISIS, Statehood, and the Caliphate
Was ISIS  really a state, as it claimed to be? Or was it a group of thugs and 
wannabes, as President Obama once casually implied?6 The question does 
not have a  simple answer, but many analysts agree that ISIS was more than 
a terrorist organ ization. Audrey Kurth Cronin, professor of international 
security, argues that ISIS was not a terrorist organ ization but a “pseudo- 
state led by a conventional army.”7 In a provocative article, po liti cal 
scientist Stephen Walt agrees with Cronin’s diagnosis and reminds read-
ers that state- building has been a brutal enterprise for centuries (he gives 
multiple examples that include the Bolsheviks, the Maoists, and the cre-
ation of the United States among  others), and “movements that  were 
once beyond the pale sometimes end up accepted and legitimized, if they 
manage to hang onto power long enough.”8 From  these perspectives, ISIS 
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was not an anomaly; it operated like just another emerging state, regard-
less of its ideology.
What ISIS was engaged in at the height of its power, however, was 
not traditional state- building. The group followed what it called “pro-
phetic methodology,” which was based on an attempt to closely follow 
prophet Muhammad’s and early Muslims’ example in governance and 
warfare. In this spirit, ISIS revived the institution of the caliphate (khila-
fah) when, in a June 2014 audio recording, it declared its leader, Abu Bakr 
al- Baghdadi, to be caliph. A caliph is the supreme religious and civil ruler 
in the Islamic tradition. The last caliph was the heir to the Ottoman 
throne, Abdülmecid II. In March 1924, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the 
founder of the Republic of Turkey, and the new po liti cal elite abolished 
the caliphate post in Turkey in an attempt to make the country secular. 
The Muslim world has not had a caliph since then. Even when the post 
was in existence a caliph did not fully function as the leader of the Mus-
lim world; the post lost its influence and became merely symbolic within 
a  couple of centuries of Islam’s birth. ISIS took pride in giving life to a 
long-defunct po liti cal and religious institution, and its leaders emphasized 
that a caliphate does not have any ethnic, racial, or regional allegiance 
and occasionally exploits the nationalist, ethnic, and racial tensions in the 
West.9
The declaration of a caliphate was not a straightforward pro cess even 
within jihadi circles. ISIS had its roots in al Qaeda in Iraq, and the group’s 
evolution as an in de pen dent organ ization had already disturbed al Qae-
da’s leadership. Declaring the caliphate further strained existing relations. 
Al Qaeda’s and the Taliban’s spiritual leader was Mullah Mohammad 
Omar  until 2015. The designation of Baghdadi as caliph in 2014 chal-
lenged both the spiritual leadership of Mullah Omar and undermined al 
Qaeda’s po liti cal authority. The fact that Mullah Omar was away from 
the public eye for a long time contributed to the challenges associated 
with the leadership competition. Mullah Omar was so removed from the 
day- to- day politics of al Qaeda that in 2015, when the Afghan govern-
ment announced that Mullah Omar had died in 2013, the news was not 
received with much surprise. ISIS found ers and leaders always regarded 
al Qaeda as lackadaisical, and they wanted to create the ultimate Islamic 
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po liti cal unit with a leader who would have authority over the Muslim 
world. The desire for this utmost power led them to claim the caliphate, 
the only po liti cal entity that would give them the legitimacy they desired.
Seeing itself as the ultimate po liti cal unit for Muslims, ISIS behaved 
like a state and boasted about providing health care and public ser vices in 
the territories it commanded. Its glossy publications featured photos of 
street- cleaning ser vices, cancer treatment for  children, and care homes 
for the el derly. The group issued its own currency system “in an effort to 
disentangle the Ummah from the corrupt interest- based global financial 
system.”10 It called on Muslims to move to the caliphate and told them 
that it was a sin to live in any other setting (Dar al- Kufr) now that  there 
was a purely Islamic entity (Dar al- Islam).
Since ISIS encouraged hijrah (religious migration to the land of Islam), 
it came as no surprise that it attracted many foreign fighters. Fighters from 
more than eighty countries joined the organ ization. Members had dif-
fer ent incentives and reasons for joining ISIS. The religious knowledge 
of  these fighters, for the most part, was rudimentary. According to the 
organ ization’s jihadi employment documents submitted by 4,030 foreign 
recruits, which  were acquired by the Syrian opposition site Zaman al- 
Wasl and shared with the Associated Press, 70  percent of recruits defined 
themselves as having just “basic” knowledge of sharia (the lowest level the 
recruits could pick), around 24  percent  were categorized as having an 
“intermediate” knowledge, and just 5   percent considered themselves 
advanced students of Islam.11 In other words, most of the recruits joined 
ISIS for po liti cal reasons or for adventure, not  because they had a solid 
grasp of and wanted to follow a coherent religious ideology. Governing 
 these  people within a pseudo- state structure proved to be challenging. 
ISIS leadership had concerns about how foreign fighters from diff er ent 
backgrounds and their families would adjust to the new lifestyle and their 
expectations. Being a terrorist organ ization operating from  behind the 
scenes and trying to govern territories are two diff er ent proj ects. Although 
ISIS had significant resources, it still needed to meet the expectations of 
the newcomers, some of whom  were coming from established states with 
decent ser vices and infrastructure. Reflecting  these tensions, the group 
made a point to warn that “the Khilafah is a state whose inhabitants and 
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soldiers are  human beings. They are not infallible angels. You may see 
 things that need improvement and that are being improved.”12
ISIS operated as an expansionist po liti cal unit. Most states and organ-
izations agree to operate within the po liti cal system, and they usually care 
about outside legitimacy.13 ISIS did not have such international legitimacy 
concerns or allies in the conventional sense  because it rejected the con-
cept of the modern state, international treaties, and borders. It demanded 
bay’a (allegiance) from other po liti cal and Islamic groups in the region 
and worldwide. The allegiances it secured  were prominently featured in 
its media outlets, including its magazine, Dabiq. Not all of  these allegiances 
 were religion based. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan note that many 
tribes joined the organ ization not  because they endorsed its ideology; the 
tribal allegiances  were driven predominantly by power politics.14 There-
fore it is crucial not to overestimate the power of ideology, especially in 
settings where  there is a po liti cal vacuum that threatens the existence of 
groups and organ izations.
As part of its territorial expansion strategy, ISIS portrayed its aims as 
unequivocally religious. To illustrate, it tried to justify its  battles against 
Kurdish paramilitary groups of the region like Yekîneyên Parastina Gel 
and Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê. “Our war with Kurds is a religious war. 
It is not a nationalistic war—we seek the refuge of Allah,” proclaimed 
ISIS; “we do not fight Kurds  because they are Kurds. Rather we fight 
the disbelievers amongst them, the allies of the Crusaders and Jews in their 
war against the Muslims.”15 ISIS regularly called the Kurdish groups 
it was fighting against “commies,” “terrorists,” and “Assad regime sup-
porters” with “numerous flimsy female ‘fighters.’ ”16
Despite its aspirations to statehood and a territorial base, ISIS tried to 
increase its reach through attacks in multiple settings globally.  These at-
tacks did not need to be coordinated with the organ ization; mere inspi-
ration and the attacker’s testimony  were good enough for ISIS. In the 2016 
nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida, the perpetrator, Omar Mateen, 
stated that he was a “soldier” of the organ ization, and he expressed his 
admiration for Tamerlan Tsarnaev and the Boston Marathon bombings, 
noting that it was now his “turn.”17 The definition and character of lone- 
wolf attacks have changed considerably in the past de cade. Especially 
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 after the Boston Marathon bombing perpetrated by the Tsarnaev  brothers, 
who  were inspired by al Qaeda, “terrorism by inspiration” and lone- wolf 
attacks have been prominently featured and endorsed in jihadi publica-
tions. ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al- Adnani was quoted as say-
ing, “If you can kill a disbelieving American or Eu ro pe an . . .  kill him 
in any manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for anyone’s advice 
and do not seek anyone’s verdict.”18 This pragmatic flexibility enabled ISIS 
to take advantage of any violent act committed by self- proclaimed sym-
pathizers and supporters. In short,  because it was con ve nient, terrorism 
by inspiration became part of the unconventional apocalyptic state’s “for-
eign policy tool kit,” and one can expect this mode of terrorism to be 
part of  future terrorist organ izations, regardless of their ideology.
Spiritual Dimension: “The Religious” in the “Islamic”
The debate over what is “real” Islam is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Any reasonable analyst  will grant that ISIS is not representative of Mus-
lims or Islam. However, it would be naive to dismiss an organ ization that 
called itself Islamic and used frequent references to Islamic texts and tra-
ditions simply as “un- Islamic.” Graeme Wood, the journalist who wrote 
the controversial “What ISIS  Really Wants,” stated that ISIS was indeed 
Islamic, and that “the religion preached by its most ardent followers de-
rives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.”19 Some 
disagree with Wood’s argument; some scholars, for example, have argued 
that ISIS’s interpretation was not coherent and not consistent with the 
rich Islamic  legal tradition.20 This ongoing conversation is intellectually 
stimulating, but it does not change the fact that  there  will be many vio-
lent organ izations and groups in the  future that claim religious identities 
in order to rally followers. Even if scholars showed that ISIS  violated many 
Islamic precepts, it is doubtful that this argument would have a signifi-
cant impact on the group’s recruitment.
ISIS described itself as jihadi Salafi. Salafism is a branch of Sunni Islam 
that is based on emulating the actions of the Salafs (“righ teous pre de ces-
sors”) and living as one would have in the early days of Islam. Combined 
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with jihadism, the ideology’s focus becomes the military conquests, sym-
bols, and strategies of the early Islamic era. The organ ization’s interpre-
tation and enactment of this ideology, however, was much stricter and 
more focused than that of any other organ ization that described itself 
as jihadi. Po liti cal analyst Shiraz Maher, in his detailed survey of jihadi 
Salafism, states that ISIS constituted the “most dramatic physical manifes-
tation of Salafi- Jihadi doctrine in the modern era, serving a dualistic pur-
pose between temporal and cosmic ends.”21 ISIS indeed espoused a distinct 
apocalyptic ideology. The apocalyptic revanchism of the organ ization that 
promised divine justice had an influence on disillusioned Muslim youth 
both in the  Middle East and in other regions.
In Islamic eschatology, the scenario of apocalypse usually includes the 
symbolism of the imam and savior Mahdi, who is expected to establish 
his rule in the world and who, with the second coming of Jesus,  will fight 
against the antichrist. A scholar of militant Islamism, William McCants, 
drew attention to the fact that, unlike in prior Islamic apocalyptic move-
ments, the Mahdi did not feature prominently in the con temporary ISIS 
doctrine; the caliphate is the “locus of the group’s apocalyptic imagina-
tion.”22 In other words, despite the strong emphasis on the “end of the 
world” discourse, the apocalyptic narrative of the group focused more 
on the near  future than on the pres ent. Po liti cal historian Jean- Pierre Filiu 
situated the resurgence of this type of Sunni apocalyptic thinking within 
a con temporary framework that is delineated by occurrences like the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, the U.S. invasions of Af ghan i stan and Iraq, and in-
creasing Shiite fanat i cism about the apocalypse in Iran and Iraq.23 ISIS’s 
ideology, in this sense, was not just apocalyptic but also quintessentially 
revanchist. It showcased blood and suffering, and continuously promised 
violent revenge and domination of the West,  going beyond the apocalyp-
tic  battle scenes. It fed on the frustrations of the local communities with 
foreign interventions and unfulfilled promises, and it exploited the dis-
enfranchisement of youth worldwide.
ISIS espoused a takfiri ideology. A takfiri is a Muslim who declares 
another Muslim to be a nonbeliever (kafir). ISIS prioritized purifying the 
Islamic world and territories  under its control more than organ izing at-
tacks abroad. According to the group’s takfiri perspective, the Shia Mus-
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lims  were regarded as apostates  because their practice and ideology  were 
considered to be  later additions to the original Quranic precepts. ISIS 
designated many other types of Muslims as murtaddin (one who turns away 
from religion). For example, any Muslim who participated in man-made 
po liti cal systems, through voting or public ser vice, was considered an 
apostate.
No organ ization’s ideology can be  imagined in de pen dent of its leader. 
In this vein, ISIS’s public theology of governance could partly be attrib-
uted to its de facto founder, Abu Musab al- Zarqawi. Zarqawi was the head 
of al Qaeda in Iraq  until he was killed in 2006. A prominent Salafi cleric 
who influenced al Qaeda’s intellectual framework, Abu Muhammad al- 
Maqdisi, was Zarqawi’s mentor, although Zarqawi’s zeal went beyond 
even Maqdisi’s. Despite his training  under Maqdisi, Zarqawi represented 
an epistemic break from the rest of the al Qaeda leadership. His back-
ground was diff er ent from that of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al- 
Zawahiri, both of whom  were from wealthy families and had strong 
educational backgrounds (Zawahiri studied medicine, and bin Laden had 
a degree in public administration, whereas Zarqawi was a high school 
dropout who  later studied  under Maqdisi’s tutelage).  After spending some 
time in Af ghan i stan, Zarqawi established Jama‘at al- Tawhid wal- Jihad (the 
Group of God’s Unity and Jihad) in 2002 and pledged lukewarm alle-
giance to Osama bin Laden in 2004, which resulted in the organ ization 
becoming al Qaeda in Iraq. Zarqawi’s strong condemnation of Shiism and 
his uncompromising takfiri attitude made both Zawahiri and Maqdisi 
uncomfortable.
When he moved to Iraq, Zarqawi found the jihadis in the region too 
complacent. In his 2004 letter to the al Qaeda leadership, Zarqawi com-
plained that the jihadis in Iraq  were behaving too cautiously and  were 
proud not to have lost lives in their strug gle. “That should change,” Zar-
qawi wrote, as “we have told them in our many sessions with them that 
safety and victory are incompatible.”24 Al Qaeda did not like Zarqawi’s 
fanat i cism and the strict implementation of the takfiri ideology. In line 
with Zarqawi’s vision, the number of Muslims killed by ISIS was higher 
than the number of other victims, which shows that ISIS prioritized “pu-
rifying” the “Land of Islam” over organ izing attacks abroad. This priority 
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conflicted with al Qaeda’s desire to target non- Muslims (with a focus on 
the United States and its allies) and its concerns about maintaining unity 
in the Muslim world. Although al Qaeda was more reserved in its public 
statements regarding ISIS, the latter was vocal about its distaste espe-
cially for Zawahiri and the Taliban and their “soft” approach  toward the 
Shia. In an article the group stated that Zawahiri’s policies  toward the Shia 
“ were clearly based upon his deviant belief that they are ‘Muslims.’ ”25 In 
the same article, to Zawahiri’s statement that no Islamic state had sys-
tematically killed the Shia, ISIS responded that since the Shia had had 
po liti cal aspirations since the Safavid Empire it was now acceptable to 
kill them.
Following up on the differences of perspective between ISIS and al 
Qaeda, Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger posited that “where al- Qaida framed 
its pitch to potential recruits in relatable terms as ‘ doing the right  thing’, 
ISIS seeks to stimulate more than to convince.”26 Al Qaeda, for exam-
ple, did not use slaves  because of its concerns about public opinion and 
legitimacy. It emphasized “hearts and minds” in the Muslim world, and 
one can even argue that it wanted to become mainstream. Adam Gadahn, 
former spokesman and media adviser for al Qaeda, once wrote in a letter 
that jihadi forums are not ideal for al Qaeda interviews  because they are 
“biased  towards (Salafists) and not any Salafist, but the Jihadi Salafist, 
which is just one trend of the Muslims trends. The Jihad Salafist is a small 
trend within a small trend.”27 Al Qaeda, for the most part, has had clear 
po liti cal goals even if they are far- fetched. ISIS, on the other hand, was 
millenarian. In its worldview  there was no possibility of a compromise 
or negotiation with other po liti cal actors, and the group did not care about 
public opinion in the Muslim world.
The religious claims of ISIS did not go unopposed. Muslims world-
wide condemned the group’s actions, and many Muslim organ izations 
declared ISIS “un- Islamic.” For example, 126 scholars of Islam penned a 
famous letter to Baghdadi, explaining in detail why specific actions such 
as torture, disfiguring the dead, forcible conversions, and slavery are for-
bidden in Islam.28 ISIS published articles against such statements and ini-
tiatives. In a Dabiq article entitled “Islam Is the Religion of Sword, not 
Pacifism,” the group states:
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 There is a slogan repeated continuously by apol o getic “du’at” 
when flirting with the West and that is their statement: “Islam is 
the religion of peace,” and they mean pacifism by the word peace. 
They have repeated this slogan so much to the extent that some 
of them alleged that Islam calls to permanent peace with kufr 
and the kafirin. How far is their claim from the truth, for Allah 
has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword, and the evi-
dence for this is so profuse that only a zindiq (heretic) would argue 
other wise.29
In another issue of Dabiq, in an article called “Wala’ and Bara’ vs. Amer-
ican Racism,” they stated:
“Islamic” preachers and writers often do so with humanistic un-
dertones that seek to portray Islam as a religion of peace that teaches 
Muslims to coexist with all. Deluded by the open- ended concept 
of “tolerance,” they cite numerous ayat and ahadith that— rightfully 
so— serve to demonstrate that racial hatred has no place in Islam, 
but they do so for the purpose of advancing an agenda that attempts 
to “Islamize” more “liberal” concepts that the kuffar apply across 
the board for achieving evil, such as po liti cal pluralism, freedom 
of religion, and ac cep tance of sodomites.30
The group also strongly condemned interreligious dialogue initiatives:
Francis is taking the route traveled by his counter parts from the 
apostate “scholars” at al- Azhar and in Medina, namely the path 
of overlooking the clear call to warring against shirk and its 
 people throughout the Qur an and Sunnah— and instead altering 
the religion to fit some dev ilish “inter- faith” fantasy, far removed 
from the truth, which one is naturally inclined to seek. This is 
all part of a plan to demilitarize Islam or, to put it more cor-
rectly, to remove the clearly Quran- and Sunnah- based duty of 
waging jihad against pagans  until all the world is ruled by the 
Shari’ah.31
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In short, ISIS followed major religious initiatives and arguments against 
its policies and governance, and took the time and energy to boldly re-
spond. It argued that Islam was a religion of the sword and  there could 
not be any compromise. Although the group claimed a religious identity 
and performed gruesome executions,  there was nothing uniquely reli-
gious about the nature of its vio lence. Stathis Kalyvas, a po liti cal science 
professor, noted that “ there is nothing particularly Islamic or jihadi about 
the organ ization’s vio lence” and the practices used by ISIS “have been 
used by a variety of insurgent incumbent actors in civil wars across time 
and space.”32 He recommended analyzing ISIS as a “revolutionary” actor 
that happened to be Islamist, rather than as  either simply an Islamist actor 
or a sectarian one.33 This interpretation is consistent with Cronin’s and 
Walt’s analyses; the group might have been Islamist, but it exhibited the 
character of a revolutionary pseudo- state and analyses should take this 
po liti cal qualification into account.
Spatial Dimension: Territorial Under pinnings in Perspective
An organ ization’s ideology is intimately tied to the time and space it op-
erates in. ISIS was, for the most part, the result of the po liti cal vacuum 
created by the American invasion of Iraq and hasty withdrawal from the 
region  after promising the Sunni groups full participation in the new Iraqi 
po liti cal system. Unfulfilled promises and the early withdrawal consoli-
dated the existing frustrations with Arab authoritarian regimes and fre-
quent foreign interventions. Not surprisingly, the group’s ideology was 
 shaped by the po liti cal  factors that gave birth to it. Fawaz Gerges con-
firms that, in his conversations with Iraqi tribal leaders, many acknowl-
edged that their sons joined ISIS not  because of its Islamist ideology but 
as a means of re sis tance to the sectarian central authority in Iraq and its 
regional patron Iran.34 The unique conditions created by the invasion, 
such as the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and the establishment of special 
detention facilities, helped bring together disillusioned actors with a jihadi 
orientation and experience. Abu Ahmed, a se nior official in ISIS, once 
stated that Camp Bucca (the detention center where he met Baghdadi 
for the first time) was an extraordinary opportunity for jihadis in that it 
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brought them all together in a physically safe environment; “ Here [in 
Camp Bucca], we  were not only safe, but we  were only a few hundred 
metres away from the entire al- Qaida leadership.”35
From mid-2013 to mid-2014, ISIS extended its territories to Syria. 
The group’s expansion to Syria was pos si ble  because of failed governance 
and civil war. Weiss and Hassan remind readers that ISIS benefited from 
the absence of a “Syrian” jihadi discourse in war- ravaged Syria and that 
the group had a mono poly on the global Salafi jihadist narrative. In 
April 2013 Baghdadi unilaterally declared the group’s jurisdiction over 
Syria and named the organ ization “the Islamic State of Iraq and al- Sham.” 
The expansion created further complications with al Qaeda. Baghdadi 
did not heed the stark warnings and insisted on the group’s in de pen dence. 
Cole Bunzel noted that this division divided the jihadi ideologues; one 
group dominated by younger jihadis supported Baghdadi, whereas an-
other group of se nior jihadis denounced ISIS’s defiance.36
ISIS also signaled how seriously it took the territory and region it 
operated in. It put  great symbolic emphasis on the Syrian city of Dabiq, 
near Aleppo,  after which the group named its magazine. In Islamic es-
chatology, Dabiq is one of the sites where the caliphate  will meet the 
armies of “Rome” ( there are diff er ent interpretations of what “Rome” 
stands for; the most common one is any army of “the West”). ISIS actu-
ally wanted to draw the United States and its ally armies to the region; it 
was part of its revolutionary revanchist theology. One of the group’s fa-
mous statements noted, “If one examined the battleground of Sham, he 
would see that the military factions before ISIS’s official expansion fell 
mostly into four categories: (1) Islamic factions with an international 
agenda; (2) ‘Islamic’ factions with a nationalist agenda (leaders have a 
Salafi background and soldiers engage in more religious practices than 
 those in the third category); (3) nationalist factions with an ‘Islamic’ 
agenda; and (4) secularist factions with a demo cratic agenda ( Free Syrian 
Army).”37 In that po liti cal landscape ISIS prided itself on being the only 
au then tic Islamic unit, fighting against all the  others that are Islamic in 
name only.
ISIS’s public theology of governance and its ideology are unique to the 
time period it operated in, while the group was a product of the histori-
cal perspectives and understandings of jihadism.  Today’s communication 
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technologies, for example, change the color of ideologies and redefine 
in- group discussion par ameters by increasing the reach of any organ-
ization’s message. McCants reminds us that the biggest split in the global 
jihadist community happened with the advent of new forms of social media 
such as Twitter, where, unlike on private discussion boards, discussants 
with unpalatable views cannot be silenced.38 Radical groups can market 
their ideologies online and provide sympathizers with concrete instructions 
on how to carry out attacks.
ISIS had observable ideological under pinnings that cannot be captured 
comprehensively in a chapter- length treatment. Wahhabism, the ultra-
conservative Islamic doctrine founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al- Wahhab 
in the eigh teenth  century, was one such influence. The doctrine aimed to 
purge the religion of practices that did not exist in the Qu’ran or in the 
initial years of the birth of Islam, such as tomb visitation. Abd al- Wahhab 
made a pact with Muhammed bin Saud, a prominent tribal leader who 
was in control of a critical portion of the Arabian Peninsula. The pact 
has continued into the po liti cal structure of con temporary Saudi Arabia. 
Hassan traced many of the extremist religious concepts that constitute 
ISIS’s ideology to Saudi Arabia’s Sahwa (Islamic awakening) movement 
in the 1970s and a similar movement in Egypt, where Salafism and po-
liti cal Islam merged.39
 There are also individuals whose legacies cannot be underestimated 
in the formation of ISIS’s ideology and governance. Among them are Ibn 
Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah al- Muhajir, Abu Bakr Naji, Sayyid 
Imam Sharif, and Abu Musab Al- Suri. Ibn Taymiyya, a medieval Sunni 
Muslim theologian, was the main intellectual influence  behind Wah-
habism; he espoused a literal interpretation of the Qu’ran, and his writ-
ings endorsed takfiri approaches; he believed that if a Muslim does not 
practice the “right” interpretation of Islam then he should be severely 
punished. Egyptian author and leading Muslim Brotherhood member 
Sayyid Qutb’s revolutionary Islamism also played a role, albeit much less 
direct than Taymiyya and Wahhabism. In his famous Ma’alim fi- l- Tariq 
(Milestones), Qutb defended the use of physical force and jihad to bring 
down existing organ izations and authorities. “Given Qutb’s advocacy of 
systemic change,” John Calvert maintained, “his influence has been stron-
gest among Islamist militants who adopt the methods of ‘direct action’ 
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to bring about a theocratic state.”40 Abdullah al- Muhajir’s treatises (such 
as the Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Jihad) are known to have influenced 
Zarqawi’s worldview. Muhajir argued that Muslims are obligated to leave 
lands of infidelity that submit to positive law, that “siding with apostates 
against Muslims is the greatest infidelity of all, and that Islam does not 
differentiate between military and civilians.”41
Al Qaeda strategist Abu Bakr Naji’s 2004 online manifesto, The Man-
agement of Savagery, also undergirded the ISIS strategy. Deriving insights 
from Ibn Taymiyya, Naji divided the path to statehood into three stages: 
exercising the power of vexation and exhaustion; the administration of 
savagery; and taking power and establishing the state.42 Naji was skepti-
cal of the former treatises on jihad; he cautioned in The Management of 
Savagery that “the po liti cal, security, and military books which the he-
retical movements published— such as the  Brothers— are more danger-
ous than books of  others  because they mix their writings with proofs from 
the Book [the Qur’an] and the Sunna and events from the sira  after they 
have distorted them.”43 In addition to Abdullah al- Muhajir’s book and 
Abu Bakr Naji’s The Management of Savagery, Gerges counted The Essentials 
of Making Ready (for Jihad) by Sayyid Imam Sharif (also known as Abdel- 
Qader Ibn Abdel- Aziz or Dr.  Fadl) among the three manifestos that 
“represent the most extreme thinking within the Salafi jihadist movement 
and the degeneration of this ideology into Fiqh Damaa (the jurisprudence 
of blood).”44 Abu Musab Al Suri’s contributions to jihadi strategy (epito-
mized by his book- length manifesto The Call to Global Islamic Re sis-
tance and individual shorter writings, including his occasional articles 
called “Jihadi Experiences” in al Qaeda’s magazine, Inspire) most likely 
played a role in shaping the ideology and strategy a jihadi organ ization 
should follow. In his work, Suri emphasized the importance of joining 
both open fronts and individual operations, and he advised transform-
ing the re sis tance into a strategic phenomenon, “ after the pattern of the 
Palestinian intifada against the occupation forces, the settlers and their 
collaborators . . .  but on a broader scale, originally comprising the entire 
Islamic world.”45
ISIS is unique to its time and should not be conflated with other Islamic 
groups and movements. Ahmed al- Hamdan, a well- known jihadi Salafist 
and a former student of Maqdisi, wrote in his famous “Methodological 
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Difference between ISIS and Al Qaida” that it would be a  mistake to say 
that ISIS was a part of the Salafi jihadi movement for they have de-
stroyed the Salafi Jihadi methodology and attacked its iconic leaders.46 
This iconoclasm might well be interpreted as a natu ral next step in the 
jihadi trajectory that exhausted its conventional methods and experienced 
a po liti cal transformation. In that sense it is critical to follow influential 
jihadi theologians worldwide to observe what kind of intellectual currents 
are in development.
Looking Ahead: The Legacy of ISIS and  Future  
Jihadi Movements
 There are too many dimensions of ISIS’s existence and thinking to be 
reduced to ideology. ISIS challenged the traditional conception of a ter-
rorist organ ization. It transformed parts of a once authoritarian country 
into a religious- cult- like po liti cal unit and started showcasing its brutal-
ity through multiple media channels. ISIS might be territorially defeated, 
yet its members are now escaping to diff er ent continents to take part in 
other organ izations. It is obvious that  there  will be groups in the  future 
who  will carry the caliphate banner and take lessons from the ISIS expe-
rience. The same goes for attacks “by inspiration.” Lone- wolf attacks ex-
isted before ISIS. However, ISIS made the most efficient use of the jihad 
sympathizers, and it continuously and publicly encouraged  these attacks. 
The number of attempts might have been relatively low, but when an at-
tack happened, it usually resulted in a high number of casualties.
ISIS was considered jihadi Salafi, but not like the groups that came 
before it. It was a revolutionary revanchist organ ization that made fre-
quent use of apocalyptic imagery and narratives. Its understanding of gov-
ernance was  shaped by its leaders and by the territories it operated in, 
and it borrowed perspectives from diff er ent sources in history. It was the 
outcome of a series of failed jihadi proj ects, evolving theoretical perspec-
tives on governance, changing technologies, the Western legacy in the 
region, personal feuds, and most impor tant, a po liti cal vacuum. Even 
when a group is physically defeated, its members and sympathizers live 
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on, and its ideology is not destroyed. Po liti cal vacuums and foreign in-
terventions prepare the ground for radicals who have coherent enough 
ideologies to rally the frustrated masses that are facing existential threats.
The ideological  battle against jihadi groups is also a sensitive one. Pol-
iticians should avoid weighing in on the religious debate and using theo-
logical terms. It is critical to keep in mind that overt po liti cal support for 
one group might discredit it in the eyes of potential followers. Atheel al- 
Nujaifi, who was the governor of Ninevah Governorate between 2009 
and 2015, once said that “this issue [ISIS] has to be resolved not by  Maliki, 
but as a Sunni proj ect. We have to strug gle against ISIS with our Sunni 
way. It is not a fight for Shiites or Maliki’s supporters. Maliki cannot fight 
ISIS.”47 Outside intervention in the politics of ideology makes  matters 
even worse and gives ammunition to radicals. Theological debate about 
how Islamic a group is or is not should be left to theologians and scholars 
of Islam.
As this chapter notes, many groups and tribes pledged allegiance to 
ISIS as a means of self- preservation. Looking ahead, this is one fact that 
policymakers should remember. Even when  there is a significant religious 
identity pres ent, po liti cal units, including tribes, operate to protect their 
existence and, if pos si ble, extend their influence. The Realpolitik di-
mension sometimes got lost in the widely distributed dramatic imagery 
produced by ISIS and the sensational reporting of the organ ization’s ex-
ecutions and advances. Especially given the ISIS recruits’ low level of reli-
gious knowledge, it is clear that something beyond religion was at play in 
the organ ization’s operational success. The major policy lesson  here is to 
pay more attention to state- building and cooperating with leaders around 
the world to prevent power imbalances and vacuums.
In order to prevent ISIS from reappearing in the  future, the focus 
should primarily be on good governance and capacity- building in 
conflict- ridden socie ties. If communities feel disenfranchised and their 
basic needs are not met, they are more likely to join jihadi movements. 
That is why it is critical to partner with or provide support to local poli-
cymakers to build infrastructures and create systems where concerns can 
be aired through po liti cal platforms. In Iraq, for example, a solid power- 
sharing system between Sunni and Shia communities that  will alleviate 
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their existential concerns is essential. Similarly, in Syria, the end of the 
civil war and a focus on reconstruction and reconciliation, albeit chal-
lenging, could prove to be the most effective solution against jihadi 
organ ization recruitment and radicalization. Relying only on military 
capabilities and operations, in the absence of reliable partnerships,  will 
likely alienate local communities and make  matters worse.
Another policy that would help the  battle against radicalization would 
be to minimize ambitious foreign policy engagements and interventions 
abroad. ISIS and many other jihadi organ izations used the Western mili-
tary presence in the  Middle East and South Asia to justify their actions. In 
the absence of broad international consensus, foreign interventions rarely 
produce desired results and are likely to weaken po liti cal structures that 
are not able to cope with radicalization.
On the domestic politics front, it is critical to have demo cratic sys-
tems with a strong civil society presence and multiple channels through 
which citizens and residents can convey their concerns. When fighting 
terrorist organ izations, reducing the prob lem to identity politics and sin-
gling out religious or national groups might have short- term po liti cal ben-
efits, but in the long term  those actions  will only help radical organ izations 
recruit adherents. Even if it claims a religious identity, ISIS and other ji-
hadi organ izations constitute a direct threat to more Muslims than non- 
Muslims. Portraying the tension as one between the West and Islam is 
not only analytically fallacious and factually incorrect, but also practically 
dangerous. Therefore, while keeping necessary intelligence facilities in 
place, it is crucial to treat all citizens and residents equitably and take 
mea sures to decrease alienation and disenfranchisement in demo cratic 
socie ties.
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Not Your  Father’s Intelligence Failure
Why the Intelligence Community Failed to 
Anticipate the Rise of ISIS
Erik J. Dahl
The rapid rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 and early 2014 caught many observers by surprise and led to charges that 
American intelligence had failed to anticipate and understand the grow-
ing threat. Not all experts have agreed that  there was any intelligence 
failure; some have claimed that the American intelligence community 
(IC) actually did a good job of warning about ISIS but that the Obama 
administration failed to listen. Se nior intelligence officials, however, have 
acknowledged that they underestimated ISIS and overestimated the ca-
pability of the Iraqi security forces combating it, and this chapter argues 
that the American intelligence community did indeed fail to properly as-
sess the growing threat from ISIS.
Although  there has been considerable discussion in the media about 
a pos si ble intelligence failure concerning the rise of ISIS,  there has been 
relatively  little careful examination of the issue in the policy or scholarly 
lit er a ture.1 Most scholars who have studied the question have concluded 
 there was an intelligence failure. David Siman- Tov and Yotam Hacohen, 
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for example, write, “The meteoric rise of the Islamic State in June 2014 
stunned the intelligence organ izations in the United States.”2 Ephraim 
Kam argues that U.S. intelligence was not alone in failing to understand 
the danger as the group  rose to prominence in 2014:
Less than a year before, no government or intelligence commu-
nity in the nations most affected by ISIS predicted the force, scope, 
or speed of its emergence. . . .  Not even one actor seems to have 
envisaged that by the  middle of 2014, the organ ization would con-
trol one third of Syria and one quarter of Iraq, infiltrate into other 
countries, and threaten the  future of states, the stability and sur-
vivability of regimes, and the way of life of large population groups.3
This chapter adds to the lit er a ture by first examining what U.S. in-
telligence and national security leaders said about the threat from ISIS 
and its pre de ces sor organ ization al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in the years be-
fore it exploded to prominence in 2014.  These statements and reports 
from government agencies and officials tended to lag  behind the devel-
opment of the threat and often provided  little more than reviews of past 
events and broad- based warnings of potential dangers to come.  These of-
ficial assessments are then compared with the view from outside experts 
during the same time period, who similarly tended to provide warnings 
about the continuing threat from al Qaeda– affiliated groups but  little ap-
preciation that the greatest threat would come from AQI and then ISIS.
The chapter next reviews the statements by se nior government lead-
ers, including President Barack Obama, about the intelligence failure and 
the debate in the media and among experts over who is to blame for it. 
The subsequent section examines a separate controversy about intelligence 
and ISIS over the management of intelligence at the headquarters of U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM), the major U.S. military command re-
sponsible for fighting ISIS. The chapter concludes by considering the 
reasons for the intelligence failure to understand ISIS and argues that the 
failure to anticipate ISIS is more than simply another in a long list of 
American intelligence failures. This most recent failure is an example of 
the many new challenges facing the American intelligence community 
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 today as it continues to grapple with nonstate actors and other uncon-
ventional threats.
Assessments of the Threat
The strength of ISIS came to world attention when its forces moved into 
Fallujah, Iraq, on New Year’s Day 2014. Then in June 2014 the city of 
Mosul fell to ISIS, and the Iraqi Army failed to stop it as soldiers dropped 
their uniforms and fled. Did American intelligence warn policymakers 
that this might happen? Did they see it coming, or  were they caught flat- 
footed, as critics have charged? This section reviews the public rec ord 
about what American intelligence agencies and se nior officials  were say-
ing about ISIS (and its pre de ces sor AQI), focusing on the period before 
2014.
It should be acknowledged that the only assessments available are  those 
that have been made public. We do not know what information IC agen-
cies and officials  were providing during this time in classified channels, 
and some observers have claimed that the classified rec ord shows a his-
tory of significantly more detailed and perceptive warnings than are 
reflected  here. But  until  those classified warnings are made available, 
such as through the work of a blue- ribbon commission empowered to 
investigate the ISIS intelligence failure, the public rec ord is all we have 
to go on.
U.S. Government Assessments
Before the summer of 2013, most intelligence leaders and other se nior 
government officials assessed al Qaeda in Iraq as a serious threat, but it 
was usually not high on their list of concerns. For example, in his annual 
congressional testimony in February 2011, Director of National Intelli-
gence (DNI) James Clapper said that AQI “ will be a per sis tent security 
prob lem,” but he added, “we believe it is unlikely AQI  will be able to 
achieve its larger strategic goals of controlling territory from which to 
launch attacks.”4 In January 2012 Clapper warned that al Qaeda’s regional 
affiliates, including al Qaeda in Iraq, would surpass the remnants of “core” 
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al Qaeda in terms of threats to U.S. interests; and of AQI, he said, “we 
are watchful for indications that AQI aspires to conduct attacks in the 
West.”5
In a media conference call in April 2012, an unnamed se nior U.S. 
counterterrorism official said, “AQI in Iraq is still a very dangerous, potent, 
lethal organ ization.” The official said the intelligence community had ex-
pected some increase in AQI operations following the U.S. withdrawal 
from Iraq, but added, “I do think that a piece of good news is that the Iraqi 
security forces are actually  doing a decent job of keeping up with AQI. 
But it is certainly a  battle and AQI is a well- armed adversary.”6
In March 2013 the commander of U.S. Central Command, Marine 
General James Mattis, gave his annual congressional testimony on the 
posture of Central Command. His prepared statement had only one ref-
erence to al Qaeda in Iraq as “a sustained violent AQI threat.”7 Clapper’s 
prepared testimony that same month was stronger: he noted that the 2012 
attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and the 2013 attack on an Al-
gerian oil fa cil i ty demonstrated the threat represented by al Qaeda affiliates 
and splinter groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq: “Since the 2011 withdrawal of 
US forces, AQI has conducted nearly monthly, simultaneous, coordinated 
country- wide attacks against government, security, and Shia civilian tar-
gets.”8 But he also added in his remarks before the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, “AQI almost certainly lacks the strength to overwhelm Iraqi 
security forces.”9
The State Department issues an annual assessment on terrorism, and 
its 2012 assessment, published in May 2013, noted that “Al- Qa’ida in Iraq 
(AQI)— even with diminished leadership and capabilities— continued to 
conduct attacks across Iraq.”10 By the  middle of 2013 threat assessments 
 were becoming more dire, and in July 2013 David Shedd, acting deputy 
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), said at a conference 
that al Qaeda– affiliated groups  were gaining strength in Syria: “Over the 
last two years  they’ve grown in size,  they’ve grown in capability, and ruth-
lessly have grown in effectiveness.”11 Then, in September 2013, a se nior 
administration official told reporters on a conference call that the danger 
from ISIS was growing: “This is  really a major and increasing threat to 
Iraq’s stability . . .  and it’s an increasing threat to us.”12
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One of the strongest warnings came in November 2013, when Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of State Brett McGurk warned in congressional 
testimony, “Internally and regionally, pressures continue to build, exac-
erbated by a resurgent terrorist network led by al Qaeda’s Iraq- based af-
filiate, now known publicly as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(AQ/ISIL). The next year in Iraq may be pivotal.”13
In early 2014  these warnings became more urgent. Clapper’s Janu-
ary 2014 testimony focused on other issues, but noted that Iraq was 
facing a rising challenge from AQI, and the civil war in Syria was con-
tributing to increased attacks by AQI.14 Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, then the 
DIA director, was more out spoken and testified on February 11, 2014, 
that “ISIL prob ably  will attempt to take territory in Iraq and Syria in 
2014.”15
In March 2014, General Lloyd Austin, who was then commander of 
U.S. Central Command, testified that the security situation in Iraq had 
deteriorated significantly, “exacerbated by the active presence of Al Qaeda 
(through the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and the steady influx 
of jihadists coming into Iraq from Syria.”16 The 2013 State Department 
assessment, issued in April 2014, noted that al Qaeda in Iraq now called 
itself ISIL, had increased the vio lence of its attacks, and had expanded 
from Syria into Iraq.17
Since 2014 ISIS has been a major concern. The 2014 State Depart-
ment report, issued in June 2015, began by stating, “Major trends in global 
terrorism in 2014 included the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’s 
(ISIL’s) unpre ce dented seizure of territory in Iraq and Syria.”18 DNI Clap-
per’s February 2015 testimony included considerable discussion of ISIS/
ISIL, and in February 2016 Clapper described it as “the preeminent global 
terrorist threat.”19
This history of official assessments of AQI and ISIS shows that IC 
leaders did provide a number of high- level strategic warnings about the 
threat. But  these warnings  were often tempered, couched as “on the 
one hand, on the other hand” assessments that are commonly found in 
the intelligence community, such as the assessments into early 2013 that 
AQI was diminished but still represented a threat. And even when the 
assessments became more dire in late 2013 and early 2014, they  were still 
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very general, with  little indication in the public rec ord of specific, ac-
tionable warnings that might have been useful for decisionmakers.
The View from Outside Experts
The public rec ord suggests American intelligence agencies  were slow to 
recognize the rising threat from ISIS. But how does that rec ord com-
pare with the assessments of nongovernmental experts and scholars? 
Did outside experts have a clearer view of the rising threat from ISIS 
than intelligence officials did?20 In early and mid-2013, terrorism ex-
perts  were warning of the growing threat from al Qaeda– affiliated 
groups, but al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was widely con-
sidered to be the affiliate that presented the greatest threat, and  there was 
 little appreciation that al Qaeda in Iraq would soon rise to such deadly 
prominence.
In July 2013 the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a subcom-
mittee hearing on the threat from al Qaeda affiliates.21 Some of that testi-
mony appears prescient  today; Frederick W. Kagan, for example, said of 
AQI: “The group is expanding its capabilities at an accelerating rate, and 
the Iraqi Security Forces appear to be unable to contain it, despite nu-
merous offensive and defensive operations.”22 But Kagan also reflected the 
conventional wisdom by noting, “Almost all analysts agree that AQAP poses 
a direct and immediate threat to the U.S. homeland for the excellent rea-
son that it has already attempted attacks against us on three separate occa-
sions.”23 The focus on AQAP was also seen in September 2013, when the 
House Homeland Security Committee Subcommittee on Counterter-
rorism and Intelligence held a hearing on the threat from that group, with 
several speakers warning it was the al Qaeda affiliate that presented the 
greatest threat to the U.S. homeland.24
In September 2013 the Bipartisan Policy Center warned of the threat 
from al Qaeda and its affiliated groups, including al Qaeda in Iraq, al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 
The center’s report stated, “It is too soon to predict the long- term threat 
posed by al Qaeda and allied groups as the movement is undergoing a 
transition that may end up proving to be its last gasp; but the right set of 
circumstances in the unstable  Middle East could also revive the network.” 
The report stated that AQI had increased its attacks in Iraq since Ameri-
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can troops pulled out of the country at the end of 2011, and that AQI 
was involved in the Syrian civil war. It warned that “the group is perhaps 
more threatening and consequential  today than it has been at any time 
since the height of its power in 2006.” But the report also noted that se-
nior American officials assessed AQAP as posing “the greatest immedi-
ate threat from a jihadist group to the United States.”25
In December 2013 two subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee held a joint hearing on the resurgence of al Qaeda in Iraq, 
and the testimony they heard was much more alarming. Daniel Byman 
testified that the group “has seemingly returned from the dead,” while 
Kenneth M. Pollack said that “AQI has been one of the principal culprits 
in the worsening vio lence across Iraq.”26 The testimony of  these respected 
terrorism experts mirrored the warnings of government officials at the 
same time, but by then— less than a month before ISIS occupied Fallujah— 
the warnings may have been too late.
Acknowledging the Failure
Se nior U.S. intelligence officials have acknowledged that the IC under-
estimated the ISIS threat. Admiral Michael Rogers, director of the 
National Security Agency (NSA), said, “I’ll only speak for me and for 
NSA— I wish we’d been a  little stronger about” the threat.27 Director of 
National Intelligence Clapper said that the IC made the same  mistake 
with ISIS that it did in Vietnam: it underestimated the  enemy’s  will to 
fight. He told an interviewer: “What we  didn’t do was predict the  will 
to fight. That’s always a prob lem. We  didn’t do it in Vietnam. We under-
estimated the Viet Cong and the North Viet nam ese and overestimated 
the  will of the South Viet nam ese. In this case, we underestimated ISIL 
and overestimated the fighting capability of the Iraqi army.”28 In Sep-
tember 2014, in an interview with CBS’s 60 Minutes, when President 
Obama was asked about Clapper’s comments he acknowledged that the 
United States had underestimated the rise of ISIS and overestimated 
the ability of the Iraqi military.29
 There has been controversy over what Obama believed about the 
threat from ISIS and what advice and assessments he received. If  there is 
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a single quote that seems to sum up the failure to understand the rise of 
ISIS, it came from Obama in an interview with the New Yorker published 
on January 27, 2014. He described ISIS as a ju nior varsity basketball team: 
“The analogy we use around  here sometimes, and I think is accurate, is if 
a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that  doesn’t make them Kobe Bry-
ant.”30 The White House  later argued that Obama had not been talking 
about ISIS, but in the context of the full article it did seem clear that the 
president was referring to— and discounting the threat from— ISIS.31
It is pos si ble that Obama’s “jayvee team” comment was a reflection 
of the advice he was getting at the time. Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic 
published a favorable article about the president in April 2016, in which 
he wrote: “Early in 2014, Obama’s intelligence advisers told him that ISIL 
was of marginal importance. According to administration officials, Gen-
eral Lloyd Austin, then the commander of Central Command, which 
oversees U.S. military operations in the  Middle East, told the White 
House that the Islamic State was ‘a flash in the pan.’ ”32 Goldberg noted 
that Austin’s spokesman denied he had made such a statement.33 But by 
late spring 2014, Goldberg wrote, Obama’s view of ISIS had shifted to 
consider it a much more serious threat. Obama explained to advisers, ac-
cording to Goldberg, that he saw ISIS as representing a truly new and 
dangerous threat, in the way that the Joker was presented in the Batman 
movie The Dark Knight:
 “There’s a scene in the beginning in which the gang leaders of Go-
tham are meeting,” the president would say. “ These are men who 
had the city divided up. They  were thugs, but  there was a kind of 
order. Every one had his turf. And then the Joker comes in and 
lights the  whole city on fire. ISIL is the Joker. It has the capacity 
to set the  whole region on fire. That’s why we have to fight it.”34
Whose Failure Was It?
Not all observers believe American intelligence failed to properly assess 
and warn about the threat from ISIS. Former CIA official Paul Pillar 
defends the IC against charges of failure, suggesting that  there may have 
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been more warnings about ISIS than are publicly known: “It is remarkable 
how, when anything disturbing goes bump in the night overseas, the 
label ‘intelligence failure’ gets quickly and automatically applied by  those 
who have no basis what ever for knowing what the intelligence commu-
nity did or did not say—in classified, intra- governmental channels—
to policymakers.” He added that although  there is a tendency to believe 
that surprises should not happen, “This belief disregards how much that 
is relevant to foreign policy and national security is unknowable, no 
 matter how brilliant  either an intelligence ser vice or a policymaker 
may be.”35
Some analysts— especially  those critical of the Obama administration— 
have argued that the failure lies not with the intelligence community, 
which had warned about ISIS, but with se nior officials who disregarded 
the warnings. Former U.S. representative and chair of the House Intel-
ligence Committee Mike Rogers said, “This was not an intelligence com-
munity failure, but a failure by policy makers to confront the threat.”36 
Fox News reported in September 2014 that, according to an unnamed 
Pentagon official, “detailed and specific intelligence about the rise of ISIS” 
was included in the President’s Daily Brief for at least a year before 
June 2014.37 Critics cited that report to claim that Obama had ignored 
warnings from the intelligence community.38
 There have been a number of unconfirmed reports that intelligence 
agencies did in fact provide specific warning. The Daily Beast, for ex-
ample, reported that the failure of the Iraqi military to stand up to ISIS 
was no surprise: “Both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency 
have issued reported analy sis for nearly a year warning that Iraq’s mili-
tary would not be able to stand up against a sustained campaign from 
ISIS.”39 And in July 2014, amid growing discussion in the press about 
intelligence failure, a CIA spokesman was quoted in the Washington 
Times saying, “Anyone who has had access to and actually read the full 
extent of CIA intelligence products on ISIL and Iraq should not have 
been surprised by the current situation.”40 We do not have  these intelli-
gence reports, and without them we cannot have a full accounting of the 
intelligence picture available; but the public rec ord to date does not ap-
pear to support the argument that the IC was providing such prescient 
warning.
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The CENTCOM Intelligence Controversy
Alongside the complaints about a failure by the intelligence community 
to foresee the rise of ISIS,  there has been a separate controversy over the 
management of intelligence at U.S. Central Command headquarters. 
Civilian analysts complained they  were pressured by se nior officers to 
put a positive spin on their assessments of the efforts against the Islamic 
State, and  those charges led to investigations by the Department of De-
fense (DoD) inspector general (IG) and by a joint task force in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. In addition, Demo cratic members of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) conducted their 
own inquiry.
The controversy arose in May 2015 when a DIA analyst assigned to 
CENTCOM headquarters filed a complaint with the DIA inspector 
general charging that se nior CENTCOM intelligence officials had 
modified intelligence assessments “to pres ent an unduly positive out-
look on CENTCOM efforts to train the ISF and combat ISIL.”41 The 
se nior Iraq analyst at CENTCOM, Gregory Hooker, reportedly was 
the leader of a group of analysts who complained that their intelligence 
assessments  were changed to be more optimistic by Major General Ste-
ven Grove, the CENTCOM se nior intelligence officer, and his civilian 
deputy, Gregory Ryckman.42 More than fifty analysts filed complaints 
with the Pentagon IG in July 2015.43 A survey of Central Command 
staff members conducted between August and October 2015 found that 
more than 40  percent of analysts  were concerned that  there  were flaws 
in the integrity of the intelligence analy sis and in how their work was 
handled.44
David Shedd, a former acting director of the DIA, wrote that the 
charges by the analysts suggested a very serious prob lem might exist: “If 
the allegations are determined to be well founded it would mean that 
top brass at a combatant command  violated the sacrosanct professional 
code of intelligence to provide objective analy sis,  free of po liti cal bias 
and personal agendas. The fact that as many as 50 analysts reportedly 
signed the complaint filed with the inspector general suggests the prob-
lem is not a stand- alone case but systematic.”45
03-3216-7-ch03.indd   50 04/17/18   12:47 am
 Not Your  Father’s Intelligence Failure 51
The House Joint Task Force found that changes that had been made 
at the CENTCOM intelligence directorate led to attempts to distort or 
suppress negative assessments, and to the production of intelligence assess-
ments that  were more positive than was warranted by the judgments of 
other members of the IC or by  actual events.46 The HPSCI Demo cratic 
inquiry also criticized the CENTCOM policies, finding: “CENTCOM 
created an overly insular pro cess for producing intelligence assessments 
on ISIL and Iraq Security Forces (ISF)— one that at times deviated from 
analytical best practices; stalled the release of intelligence products; lim-
ited the ability of CENTCOM analysts to coordinate with IC experts; 
insufficiently accommodated dissenting views; and negatively influenced 
the morale of CENTCOM analysts.”47
 There is some evidence that politicization at CENTCOM directly 
affected strategic assessments that reached national leaders: CBS News 
reported that the CENTCOM se nior intelligence officer, Grove, on one 
occasion in 2015 “blocked a negative assessment of Iraq’s military from 
the President’s Daily Brief, a top secret intelligence summary viewed 
only by the president and his closest advisors.”48 But the prob lems at 
CENTCOM appear to have occurred largely during and  after a lead-
ership turnover within the intelligence directorate in the summer of 
2014.49 By that time ISIS’s strength was clear, making it unlikely that 
the suppression of negative assessments contributed to an underestima-
tion of ISIS’s capabilities during 2013 and earlier, while ISIS was becom-
ing a major force and such assessments would presumably have been most 
useful.
The DoD IG released its report in January 2017, which stated, “In 
sum . . .  we did not substantiate the most serious allegation, which was 
that intelligence was falsified.”50 The IG also found  there was insufficient 
evidence to substantiate the claims of some analysts that intelligence had 
been distorted or suppressed in order to provide a more optimistic view 
of conflict against ISIS. But the IG did find what it called “a strong per-
ception among many intelligence analysts” that intelligence leaders  were 
attempting to distort reporting on ISIS, and it identified several weak-
nesses in the CENTCOM intelligence pro cess that appear to have led to 
such a perception.51 It also found that some officials in other intelligence 
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agencies believed that although CENTCOM’s intelligence assessments 
 were not systematically distorted, they  were more optimistic than  those 
of the other agencies.52
The CENTCOM controversy reflects what may be a larger prob lem 
for intelligence, which is the apparent tendency of se nior officials— 
especially military leaders—to minimize threats and put the capabilities 
of U.S. forces and allies in a positive light. One journalist has described 
“the longstanding cultural differences between intelligence analysts, 
whose job is to warn of potential bad news, and military commanders, 
who are trained to promote ‘can do’ optimism.”53 Such optimism can 
make it difficult for civilian decisionmakers to arrive at objective threat 
assessments. Barack Obama, for example, indicated that he took the views 
of military commanders into account; in May 2015,  after Jeffrey Gold-
berg of The Atlantic noted that Ramadi had just fallen to ISIS and asked 
the president  whether he believed we  were losing the war, Obama re-
plied, “No, I  don’t think  we’re losing, and I just talked to our CENT-
COM commanders and the folks on the ground.”54
Reasons for Failure
The American intelligence community underestimated the potential 
threat from ISIS and overestimated the ability of the Iraqi security forces to 
 counter that threat. We can understand the reasons  behind that intel-
ligence failure at two levels: specific  causes of this par tic u lar failure, and 
reasons that can be seen in many cases of intelligence failures.
What  Were the Specific  Causes of This Failure?
Commentators have pointed to several reasons why American intelligence 
failed to foresee the rising strength of ISIS. Nelly Lahoud and Liam Col-
lins, for example, believe the counterterrorism community failed to prop-
erly analyze the trajectory of ISIS dating back to at least 2006, and that 
part of the prob lem was with an “al Qaeda fixation,” as  there was “a post-
9/11 bias  toward understanding the threat emanating from jihadi groups 
around the world through the lens of AQ.”55 But  there appear to have 
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been two primary  causes of the failure: first, that the United States lacked 
the physical presence in Iraq and Syria that would have been needed to 
establish intelligence networks; and second, that  those intelligence assets 
that  were available against ISIS  were focused mainly on providing direct 
support to military operations and not on gaining a broader understand-
ing of the threat.
U.S. intelligence capabilities against AQI and  later ISIS  were limited 
in Iraq  after the withdrawal of U.S. forces at the end of 2011. Kam writes 
that “the CIA station in Baghdad was, at that time, the biggest CIA station 
in the world, with hundreds of operators and researchers. Following the 
departure from Iraq in late 2011, intelligence coverage shrank as the 
need was reduced and the CIA presence was scaled back.”56 The United 
States resumed occasional surveillance flights over Iraq in 2013 and at-
tempted to create a joint intelligence center to share information with 
the Iraqis, but  these efforts reportedly garnered only modest results.57 
Similar limitations hobbled American intelligence in Syria, especially 
 after the U.S. embassy in Damascus was closed in 2012 for security 
reasons.58
Without an on- the- ground physical presence, intelligence agencies 
 were limited to using technical collections systems such as signals intelli-
gence and aerial reconnaissance.  These capabilities can provide useful tar-
geting and other technical data, but they cannot provide a full a picture of 
the threat  unless they are complemented by  human intelligence— which 
can only be developed by having personnel in place. And to compound 
the prob lem,  these technical capabilities have mostly been used to sup-
port military operations, especially  those aimed at finding and killing 
terrorist targets  under the rubric of “Find, Fix, and Finish.” Sarah Chayes, 
a journalist who served as a special adviser to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair-
man Admiral Michael Mullen, argues that this has been a prob lem ever 
since the 9/11 attacks, as intelligence priorities have moved away from 
strategic- level analy sis and  toward more direct military support. “What 
you had is a drift of the intelligence community  toward essentially being 
a paramilitary organ ization, the intelligence gathering and analy sis being 
in support of that sort of paramilitary activity: basically finding and fix-
ing targets.”59
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Broader Patterns of Intelligence Failure
The failure to foresee the rise of ISIS demonstrates several of the same 
prob lems that can be found in the long litany of American intelligence 
failures dating back to Pearl Harbor, but more recently including failures 
to anticipate the Ira nian Revolution in 1979, the end of the Cold War, 
and the Arab Spring.60 One lesson from  these past failures is that even 
when strategic intelligence is good, specific tactical warning of a rising 
threat— such as a  future attack—is rarely available.61 This appears to have 
been the case  here. For several years before 2014, officials understood that 
ISIS represented a long- term, serious threat; but they did not know— 
they prob ably could not know— that soon ISIS would become the most 
prominent face of that threat.
This level of understanding— good at the strategic level but weak at 
the operational and tactical levels—is evident in a story told by former 
acting CIA director Michael Morell. In February 2013, Tom Donilon, 
the national security adviser, asked Morell and the National Counterter-
rorism Center (NCTC) director, Matt Olsen, to meet with the president 
to describe what the threat from international terrorism would look 
like in the years ahead. Morell writes, “The overarching theme of my 
presentation— almost two years ago to the day of the writing of this book 
and well before the rise of ISIS— was that the war against Islamic extrem-
ism was far from over and that this war would be one that would be 
fought by multiple generations.”62 Looking back  today, Morell’s warn-
ing appears to have been a very good strategic assessment— but one 
won ders, what could a policymaker have done with such a broad- based 
warning?
Although several intelligence and military leaders did warn about the 
threat from ISIS in the years before 2014, the history of intelligence fail-
ure shows that it is not enough to simply mention a potential threat to a 
decisionmaker. A possibly apocryphal story about Henry Kissinger ex-
emplifies this prob lem. Once when he was secretary of state, Kissinger 
was briefed about a coup attempt that had taken place somewhere in the 
world. He complained that he should have known about it ahead of time, 
only to be told by his intelligence briefer, “But we warned, you, sir.” Kiss-
inger reportedly replied, “Yes, but you  didn’t persuade me.”63
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Another lesson from the ISIS case that resembles earlier failures is that 
no intelligence agency can predict the  future. As Kam writes, “Part of 
the assessment and forecasting difficulty is that no source, no  matter how 
good, can report what  will happen.”64 This lesson may sound banal or 
trite, but  there is a debate in the intelligence lit er a ture about  whether it 
is reasonable to expect intelligence professionals and agencies to make ac-
curate predictions about the  future.65
Some experts have not been optimistic about the ability of intelligence 
agencies to anticipate conflict; former CIA director and secretary of de-
fense Robert Gates, for example, said in a speech at West Point in Febru-
ary 2011: “I must tell you, when it comes to predicting the nature and 
location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our rec ord has 
been perfect. We have never once gotten it right.”66 But the intelligence 
community does acknowledge that warning of  future threats is part of 
its job: the National Intelligence Strategy for 2014 identifies “anticipa-
tory intelligence” as one of its foundational mission objectives, stating that 
“the IC  will improve its ability to foresee, forecast, and alert the analytic 
community of potential issues of concern and convey early warning to 
national security customers.”67 And during his confirmation pro cess as 
CIA director, John Brennan responded to a written question from the 
Senate Intelligence Committee by stating, “With billions of dollars in-
vested in C.I.A. over the past de cade, policy maker expectations of C.I.A.’s 
ability to anticipate major geopo liti cal events should be high.”68
Not Your  Father’s Intelligence Failure
Although some aspects of the ISIS intelligence failure resemble prob lems 
seen previously, as a  whole it appears to be more than simply another in-
stance of the same old intelligence failure. The failure against ISIS repre-
sents something new and even more troubling for the American intelli-
gence community  because it illustrates the challenges intelligence  faces 
 today from new types of threats, and in par tic u lar from nonstate actors.
Se nior intelligence officials have been warning for several years that 
 today’s world is in many ways more dangerous, and more difficult for the 
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intelligence community to analyze, than it has been in the past. Director 
of National Intelligence Clapper, for example, testified in 2014, “Look-
ing back over my now more than half a  century in intelligence, I’ve not 
experienced a time when  we’ve been beset by more crises and threats 
around the globe.”69 More recently, when Clapper announced that he 
would be retiring at the end of President Obama’s second term, he told 
the House Intelligence Committee, “Our nation is facing the most di-
verse array of threats that I’ve seen.”70 CIA Director John Brennan said, 
“I’ve never seen a time when we have been confronted with such an array 
of very challenging, complex and serious threats to our national security, 
and issues we have to grapple with.”71
Kam writes that the rise of ISIS was an example of  these new and more 
difficult challenges for intelligence. As difficult as it is to anticipate and 
predict traditional strategic surprises such as the outbreak of war or major 
terrorist attacks, it is much more difficult to understand and forecast intan-
gible events and pro cesses such as the rise of social movements or regional 
instability.72
 These challenges are even greater  because intelligence is more than 
ever  today a part of public discourse, meaning that its failures—or even 
perceived failures— are magnified. A number of experts have argued that 
the American intelligence community is facing a crisis as it attempts to 
grapple with this wider array of challenges and with a more complex 
information environment. Josh Kerbel of the DIA calls this a “Kodak 
moment” for the intelligence community,73 while former U.S. represen-
tative Jane Harman, president of the Woodrow Wilson Center, argues 
that “rearranging the deck chairs  will not be enough to prepare the in-
telligence community for the challenges that lie ahead.”74
Where to Go from  Here?
The prob lems that led to the inability to anticipate the rise of ISIS con-
tinue to affect American intelligence  today. For example, despite some 
indications of increasing focus on  human intelligence, critics of the 
Pentagon and the intelligence community charge that American mili-
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tary and intelligence agencies still rely too much on technical collec-
tion, such as signals intelligence and drone surveillance, at the expense 
of on- the- ground  human intelligence, or traditional spying.75 James 
Clapper has acknowledged the intelligence community’s limited abil-
ity to understand the capabilities and intentions of ISIS, especially in 
areas such as Syria that are usually denied to American personnel: “I’m 
not  going to fib to you, the intelligence challenges in Syria are quite 
profound  because  we’re not  there on the ground and that makes it a very 
challenging intelligence prob lem,” he said at a conference in October 
2014.76
In addition, statements by top military leaders indicate that their in-
telligence priority continues to be supporting the targeting and killing 
of ISIS leaders. This is clearly a key function for intelligence, but the sen-
sors and capabilities that are likely to provide good targeting intelligence 
are not likely to help assess the  future threat more than a few days or 
weeks down the road.77
 American intelligence is very good at the tactical level of finding and 
finishing specific targets such as terrorist leaders. And as we have seen 
above, it also tends to be good at the other end of the spectrum, provid-
ing very broad and general strategic intelligence and warning on poten-
tial  future threats such as ISIS. But what is lacking is intelligence about 
and an understanding of the environment where  these threats develop— 
the kind of operational- level intelligence that would be required in order to 
understand the capabilities and intentions of ISIS or other groups, and to 
help leaders decide what needs to be done about such threats. Michael 
Flynn, who was then the director of intelligence for U.S. and allied forces 
in Af ghan i stan, recognized this prob lem in 2010 when he criticized “the 
tendency to overemphasize detailed information about the  enemy at the 
expense of the po liti cal, economic, and cultural environment that sup-
ports it.”78
How can the American intelligence community develop this kind of 
operational- level intelligence on ISIS and other threats? First, it should 
abandon the “stovepipe” model that has  shaped the IC through most of 
its modern existence, in which security concerns and the need for spe-
cialization have pushed intelligence personnel to work in small, tightly 
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compartmented cells, apart from one another. Intelligence experts have 
long recognized the difficulties with that model, and much of the intel-
ligence reform effort following 9/11 was to create intelligence centers, 
such as the National Counterterrorism Center, that would bring analysts 
and collectors from a wide variety of disciplines together  under one roof to 
coordinate their efforts on a prob lem. More recently, however,  there has 
been growing recognition within the IC that more needs to be done 
to encourage greater use of intelligence fusion centers and all- source analy-
sis that brings together  human, signals, and other sources of intelligence. 
One positive impact of the ISIS intelligence failure may be that it  will 
spur pro gress in this area. At the CIA, for example, John Brennan di-
rected a restructuring that he believed  will be more effective in un-
derstanding and countering ISIS and other global threats by bringing 
together analysts, collectors, computer hackers, and  others in “mission 
centers.”79
Second, the intelligence community— and in par tic u lar the military 
intelligence community— needs to make greater use of open-source in-
telligence and increase its focus on po liti cal, economic, and cultural 
 factors. American intelligence excels at the technical collection of data, 
but it often fails to understand  human be hav ior. As a study by the Na-
tional Research Council noted, “Open sources can be particularly useful 
when analyzing  human be hav ior, such as economic, po liti cal, religious, 
and cultural developments.”80
Third, intelligence agencies should increase their use of the tool of 
net assessment, which involves not only understanding the  enemy but also 
understanding the capabilities of one’s own forces and  those of one’s al-
lies. Part of the prob lem with ISIS was that the intelligence community 
was not equipped to assess the strength of the Iraqi Army; as Kam argues, 
“assessing one’s own capabilities is not part of the mandate of the intelli-
gence community.”81 Within the American intelligence and national 
security establishment the only place where such work is done is in the 
Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment.82 As the importance of nonstate ac-
tors continues to increase, and the lines between friend and foe, and ally 
and  enemy, become more and more blurred, it is crucial that intelligence 
agencies move beyond the old thinking that their only concern is with 
understanding the  enemy.
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Fi nally, intelligence leaders need to address the unfortunate fact that 
intelligence assessments— especially public, official assessments— almost 
always lag  behind the development of the threat. If intelligence reports 
are to be useful for decisionmakers, they should precede the threat, not 
follow it. But as we saw in the case of ISIS, American intelligence assess-
ments are more often than not playing catch- up.
We can see this lag clearly in the State Department’s annual terrorism 
assessments, which are not issued  until well into the year after they at-
tempt to cover. But the same is true of other official U.S. government 
documents and statements. The National Intelligence Strategy, for ex-
ample, is issued only occasionally, and the strategy for 2014 did not even 
mention ISIS, although it did refer to al Qaeda.83 Even less frequently 
made public are National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs); the last publicly 
known NIE on the terrorist threat to the United States was published in 
2007.84 As a result, the DNI’s annual testimony is prob ably the most au-
thoritative and regularly updated public threat assessment made available 
by American intelligence, but it does not get the attention it deserves. To 
address the prob lem of intelligence lag, and to help decisionmakers deal 
with  future threats before they have fully developed, the American intel-
ligence community needs to redouble its efforts to provide anticipatory 
intelligence, both in classified and in public channels.
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When Do You Give It a Name?
Theoretical Observations about the ISIS 
Intelligence Failure
James J. Wirtz
Intelligence failures can take many forms and can have many  causes. When using the term “intelligence failure,” however, it is impor tant 
to be specific about what intelligence analysts and organ izations have 
failed to do or to predict. Indeed, intelligence failure usually refers to the 
absence of a timely warning about the occurrence of a discrete event. In 
other words, if intelligence analysts fail to estimate what is about to occur, 
where and when it  will occur, and why it is occurring, and to provide that 
estimate to policymakers in time for them to take appropriate action, then 
the label “intelligence failure” is likely to be used to characterize recent 
events.
Without comprehensive data, it is impossible to judge definitively how 
well intelligence agencies actually succeed at this demanding task; the 
lit er a ture on intelligence failure selects on the dependent variable, so to 
speak. Failures rather than successes gain the lion’s share of attention from 
scholars, prac ti tion ers, officials, and the public alike. Nevertheless, intelli-
gence analysts sometimes get it right. On the eve of the  Battle of Midway 
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in 1942, naval intelligence analysts and officers accurately estimated that 
Midway would be the target of a Japa nese attack and positioned the U.S. 
fleet to launch a devastating carrier air strike against the Japa nese force 
nearing Midway.1 In October 1962, U.S. intelligence analysts,  after first 
predicting such an eventuality was unlikely,2 detected the Soviet deploy-
ment of medium- range and intermediate- range ballistic missiles in Cuba, 
providing the John F. Kennedy administration with enough warning to 
take constructive action. Such “moments of splendid,” to use Sherman 
Kent’s phrase, are admittedly rare, but they do occur.3
By contrast, general warnings of deteriorating conditions that are not 
accompanied by discrete event predictions are not enough to prevent 
analysts from being accused of responsibility for an “intelligence failure.” 
In the weeks leading up to Pearl Harbor, for example, the Franklin D. 
Roo se velt administration was aware that Japanese- American relations 
had reached a nadir. Naval officers and intelligence analysts actually ex-
pected some sort of Japa nese military action in the Far East and had even 
expressed profound misgivings about forward deploying the U.S. fleet to 
Pearl Harbor, a move that they believed left the fleet vulnerable and badly 
positioned to respond to the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific.4 Simi-
larly, in the days before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. intelligence community 
delivered a strategic warning to the White House. The highly classified 
and communitywide product, the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), stated 
that al Qaeda had expressed interest in hijacking commercial airliners. 
Excerpts from the August 6, 2001, PDB, published in the 9/11 Commis-
sion report, also made it clear that al Qaeda operatives  were quite active 
in the United States.5 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the system was 
indeed “blinking red” in December 1941 and September 2001, Pearl Har-
bor and 9/11 are  today synonymous with the term “intelligence failure” 
in the annals of the intelligence studies lit er a ture.
So what exactly is meant by labeling the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity’s response to the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 
and early 2014 an intelligence failure? This chapter posits that the so- 
called ISIS intelligence failure indeed has much in common with the 
events leading up to both Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 attacks. On the one 
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hand, both intelligence and press reports provided accurate and timely 
warning of a deteriorating security situation within Iraq produced by 
what was believed to be a resurgence of al Qaeda. On the other hand, 
the intelligence community, and the press for that  matter, failed to an-
ticipate the political- military shock that placed ISIS at the forefront of 
U.S. domestic politics and international diplomacy, the June 2014 fall of 
Mosul and the collapse of the Iraqi Army. This was an especially alarm-
ing turn of events: approximately 1,500 ISIS fighters prevailed over a 
30,000- man Iraqi force that simply disintegrated  after years of U.S. train-
ing and material support. In other words, the intelligence community 
managed to issue some strategic warnings about the deteriorating mili-
tary situation in Iraq, but it failed to provide a compelling estimate of the 
true nature of the emerging threat or to warn policymakers about how it 
would likely manifest. Not surprisingly, the term “intelligence failure” 
now surrounds the rise of ISIS.
Nevertheless, if one explores this so- called intelligence failure, one 
can begin to understand the hurdles faced by the intelligence community 
in developing an accurate and timely estimate of ISIS and a nuanced re-
assessment of exactly what the intelligence community failed to under-
stand about the rise of the Islamic State. To offer this reassessment, the 
chapter first suggests that  there  were several unique ele ments about 
ISIS that represented a departure from the “al Qaeda model” of inter-
national terrorism. It also focuses on the structural constraints inherent 
in the U.S. intelligence community that made ISIS a difficult target. The 
chapter then offers some concluding observations about the so- called ISIS 
intelligence failure and how it might constitute a harbinger of  things to 
come.
The ISIS Estimate
 Today both experts and average citizens have a detailed and horrifying 
image of ISIS, whose rank and file routinely and gleefully commit and 
digitize unmentionable atrocities against Shia, “sheikists,” Christians, Ya-
zidis, apostates, prisoners of war, and even their own members suspected 
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of disloyalty. In 2014, for instance, Newsweek magazine provided an 
impressive and rather strange list of ISIS’s opponents: Salafis; Arab oil 
sheiks; Shiites; the governments and militaries of the United States, Iran, 
Iraq, Syria, and Turkey; Hamas; Hez bollah; and al Qaeda.6 Indeed, the 
list of ISIS’s opponents continues to grow and now includes the Lebanese 
Army, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the Islamic Front (rebel groups in 
Syria allied with al Qaeda), and the  Free Syrian Army. Nevertheless, it is 
impor tant not to allow hindsight to guide one’s judgments about the in-
telligence community’s assessments of ISIS. Vari ous aspects of ISIS  were 
unique on the world stage, combing to create what amounts to a new 
type of nonstate actor. The ele ments that made ISIS unique also made it 
a difficult target for the U.S. intelligence community.
The Lack of Net Assessment
The origins of ISIS can be traced to the chaos and anarchy that gripped 
Iraq in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and the fall of the Baathist 
regime in Baghdad. Co ali tion Provisional Authority (CPA) Proclamations 
1 and 2, which banned the Baath Party and dismantled the Iraqi Army 
in May 2003, left about the top 1  percent of the personnel in the Iraqi 
government and military outside the new Iraqi government (approxi-
mately 20,000 individuals). CPA Proclamations 1 and 2 did not destabi-
lize the situation on the ground in Iraq, but their impact was amplified 
by the fact that the Iraqi Army literally “self- demobilized” rather than 
face the brunt of the international co ali tion arrayed against it during the 
Second Gulf War. Iraq’s defeat and the initial decisions made by the CPA 
abruptly changed the po liti cal balance in Iraq. Specifically, Saddam Hus-
sein’s government and officer corps was dominated by Sunnis, and in the 
aftermath of the war this leadership was left adrift in a country now dom-
inated by a Shia majority. L. Paul Bremer, the top civilian administrator 
of the CPA, noted that the U.S. government had  little real choice in the 
 matter of “de- Baathification,” noting:
80% of the population, the Kurds and the Shia,  were very clear 
about the likely results of our recalling the army. Each had heard 
rumors that some American soldiers favored recalling Saddam’s 
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army. The Kurdish leaders— Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani— 
told me if you recall the army, we Kurds  will secede from Iraq. 
The secession of the Kurds from Iraq then or  today or in the  future 
 will, in my view, bring on a major regional war. It  will start civil 
war in Iraq. But it would also likely bring on a major regional war 
 because neither the Ira ni ans nor the Turks could tolerate an in de-
pen dent Kurdistan. The Shia leaders said they interpreted  these ru-
mors as showing our intention to install “Saddamism without 
Saddam.” The Shias had been cooperating with the Co ali tion fol-
lowing guidance from  Grand Ayatollah Ali-al Sistani. So the po-
liti cal arguments against recalling the army  were even stronger than 
the practical arguments.7
Bremer notes that the U.S. response to this dilemma was to create a new 
Iraqi Army; it was po liti cally impossible, and as events would show, not 
realistic, to remobilize Baathist Iraqi units.8
Although Bremer is correct to note that de- Baathification was lim-
ited in scope, the po liti cal and security impact of postwar policies greatly 
curtailed the ability of Sunni personnel to participate in Iraq’s new gov-
ernment and security forces. In 2003, for instance, the CPA formed the 
Iraqi Governing Council, whose membership was allocated along sectar-
ian lines. The decision, according to Isaac Kfir, “heightened sectarianism, 
as repre sen ta tion was based on quotas that only reinforced the simmering 
age- old divisions, instead of being meritocratic.”9 In hindsight, it is clear 
that  these disenfranchised individuals constituted a disgruntled group 
that would be po liti cally and ethnically attracted to a Sunni- centric, anti- 
Shia ideology— the kind of ideology advanced by ISIS. What is not clear 
in hindsight, however, is the hurdle the U.S. intelligence community 
would have to overcome to make the connection between de- Baathification 
and the rise of ISIS. The community would have had to engage in a “net 
assessment” to identify the second- and third- order risks created by de- 
Baathification. In other words, they would have had to make a deliberate 
estimate of how U.S. policy was producing unintended and unwanted 
consequences. Orga nizational culture, however, leaves the U.S. intelli-
gence community incapable of conducting this type of assessment.
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Two normative theories, reflected in the culture of analysts, make it 
difficult to conduct a net assessment as a routine part of the analytical pro-
cess. One, most closely associated with the work of Sherman Kent, focuses 
on ensuring the in de pen dence of intelligence analysts in providing in-
formation to policymakers. Kent’s thinking, which  shaped the forma-
tion and early evolution of the U.S. intelligence community, identifies 
the importance of po liti cal and policy detachment in producing relevant 
and effective finished intelligence. The strength of Kent’s approach is that 
it preserves the in de pen dence of analysts by separating the intelligence 
community from the overt pressure or orga nizational and interpersonal 
incentives that can shape intelligence to conform to current policy or the 
personal and po liti cal biases of policymakers.10 Yet, by creating a strong 
barrier against politicization, Kent’s prescriptions can separate intelligence 
too completely from policymakers; in this framework, policy assessment 
is beyond the scope of the intelligence community. The other operational 
framework, most closely associated with the reforms instituted in the mid-
1980s by then director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates, focuses 
on providing “actionable” intelligence, information of immediate and 
direct use to policymakers. To produce actionable intelligence, analysts 
have to maintain close working relationships with policymakers, liter-
ally looking at officials’ in-boxes to make sure finished intelligence ad-
dresses impor tant policy issues of the day.11 Nevertheless, following the 
Gates model too closely can create its own set of prob lems.  There is a 
possibility that policymakers  will pose biased questions to the intelligence 
community to guarantee that analy sis favorable to their positions  will 
emerge, or that they  will fail to pose the correct questions, leading to an 
incomplete understanding of the challenges they face. By following the 
Gates model, the only way that the U.S. intelligence community would 
have linked the growth of ISIS to de- Baathification is if they  were di-
rectly asked that question by se nior officials. It defies credulity to believe 
that, barring some extremely dire set of circumstances, policymakers 
would deliberately task the U.S. intelligence community with assessing 
the role of U.S. postwar policy in the rise of sectarian vio lence in Iraq.
ISIS was a particularly difficult target for the U.S. intelligence com-
munity  because an accurate estimate of the origins of the movement 
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would have needed to recognize the impetus it received from U.S. pol-
icy. An accurate assessment, ceteris paribus, would have amounted to a 
critique of a de cade’s worth of American policy  toward Iraq. In terms of 
orga nizational culture, this sort of assessment is largely beyond the capa-
bility of the U.S. intelligence community. Indeed, other weak or mis-
leading assessments produced by the U.S. intelligence community have 
been tied to the absence of a net assessment— that is, a failure to account 
for the impact of U.S policy on an unfolding situation. The failure of the 
Central Intelligence Agency to foresee the fall of the Shah or the fact that 
U.S. policy had stymied Saddam Hussein’s efforts to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction are cases in point.12 In any event, without this net as-
sessment, it was impossible to develop an accurate estimate of the poten-
tial scope and appeal of ISIS. U.S. policy made ISIS appealing to more 
than true radicals; it made it appealing to Sunnis who  were po liti cally 
disenfranchised following the Second Gulf War.
An Ideological Twist: ISIS Is Not al Qaeda
As Erik Dahl’s contribution to the volume makes clear, beginning in the 
 middle of 2013 the intelligence community repeatedly sounded the toc-
sin warning of deteriorating conditions in Iraq.  These estimates, how-
ever, focused primarily on the growing strength and activity of al Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI), a Sunni- based organ ization inspired by the exploits of 
Osama bin Laden, which would eventually morph into ISIS. In hind-
sight, it is clear that ISIS and al Qaeda embraced diff er ent po liti cal agen-
das; indeed, they are completely diff er ent animals. ISIS and al Qaeda are 
diff er ent organ izations with diff er ent goals that operate in diff er ent ways 
and pose diff er ent threats. As a result, just warning about an increasing 
“al Qaeda- like” threat in Iraq mischaracterized the real danger posed by 
the nascent ISIS. And, as Dahl’s commentary demonstrates,  there was 
nothing in the intelligence reporting that suggested that something fun-
damentally diff er ent from al Qaeda was about to emerge out of the chaos 
of the Syrian civil war and po liti cal unrest in Iraq. Dahl demonstrates that 
the intelligence community did notice that  things  were heating up in 
Syria and Iraq; what they failed to note was that the very nature of the 
threat was changing.
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Admittedly, experts debate the finer points about al Qaeda’s objec-
tives and operational style, but it is pos si ble to characterize the organ-
ization and its objectives in a general way to highlight some impor tant 
differences between al Qaeda and ISIS. Al Qaeda was ultimately about 
influencing events within the Muslim world, especially Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, by 1997 bin Laden turned his attention  toward non- 
Muslim states in an effort to drive Western influence from the  Middle 
East, leaving targeted regimes unable to resist the “internal jihad” that 
would follow. To undertake this strategy, al Qaeda employed a centrally 
controlled, hierarchical organ ization that specialized in finely crafted 
operations mostly directed against transportation targets.13 The organ-
ization employed the Internet to communicate to operatives and to dis-
seminate its message to a global audience, but it was cautious when it 
came to vetting recruits and disseminating operationally sensitive in-
formation. It used trained and apparently “cleared” operatives who evi-
denced relatively sophisticated tradecraft. Al Qaeda also operated a sort 
of “franchise system,” lending its stamp of approval to local and regional 
organ izations, but apparently only  after the new franchisees agreed to 
take a degree of guidance from al Qaeda central.14 And, as Bruce Hoff-
man has noted, bin Laden remained engaged in all facets of the al Qaeda 
operation  until his demise in 2011, despite reports suggesting he was 
“out of sync” or disengaged from al Qaeda and its affiliates around the 
world.15
Before his death, bin Laden had crafted a strategy for al Qaeda cen-
tral and its affiliates. According to U.S. military intelligence, bin Laden 
had apparently articulated a strategy for al Qaeda to continue to main-
tain its traditional goals while taking steps to preserve itself in the face of 
U.S. pressure:
• attriting and enervating Amer i ca so that a weakened United States 
would be forced out of Muslim lands and therefore have neither the 
 will nor the capability to intervene;
• taking over and controlling territory, creating the physical sanctu-
aries and safe havens that are Al- Qaeda’s lifeblood;
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• declaring “emirates” in  these liberated lands that would be safe 
from U.S. and Western intervention  because of their collective 
enfeeblement.16
In a remarkably prescient analy sis, Hoffman identifies what in hindsight 
are the origins of ISIS, which emerged when AQI applied bin Laden’s 
strategy to the deteriorating security situations in Iraq and Syria:
Syria has . . .  long been an Al Qaeda idée fixe. . . .  That country has 
even more of the characteristics of the same type of perfect jihadi 
storm than Af ghan i stan possessed three de cades ago: widespread 
support among the Arab world, the provision of financial assistance 
from wealthy Gulf supporters, a popu lar cause that readily attracts 
foreign volunteers, and a contiguous border facilitating the move-
ments of  these fighters into and out of the declared  battle space.17
Syria also offers a base in the Arab heartland, and offered AQI an oppor-
tunity to do  battle with the “hated Shi’a apostate Alawite minority” in the 
country.18
In hindsight, this “perfect jihadi storm” began to build by the  middle 
of 2012. First, with the death of bin Laden, al Qaeda’s efforts to centrally 
direct its franchisees seem to have lost traction, freeing affiliates to act 
more in de pen dently. Second, as AQI and other al Qaeda allies (such as the 
Syrian rebel organ ization Jabhat al- Nusra li- Ahl al Sham) attempted to 
exploit conditions in Syria, they escalated their operations and began 
to enjoy success. Third, to better exploit  these opportunities, a new organ-
ization, ISIS, began to displace AQI and to embrace diff er ent objectives 
and strategies. ISIS embraced a patently sectarian strategy that captured 
disaffected Sunnis and directed them against Shia and Alawites. Fourth, 
ISIS also shifted to “internal Jihad,” by at least initially focusing on the 
establishment of its own safe haven in territory formerly controlled by 
Syria and Iraq. Fifth, ISIS began to recruit disenfranchised, disillusioned, 
and marginalized youth, not just from Arab countries but from the en-
tire world. In other words, unlike al Qaeda central, ISIS did not focus 
on developing trained and vetted operatives for complex operations, but 
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instead welcomed all sorts of fellow travelers and adventure seekers to 
fill its emerging army. ISIS reportedly even set up training camps for 
youth in Ninevah Governorate in Iraq and in Aleppo and Raqqah in 
Syria to bolster its ranks with  children taken from captured territory.19 
 Needless to say, al Qaeda central never resorted to this sort of tactic to 
increase the number of its operatives.
Viewed in this manner, ISIS again posed a very difficult target for the 
U.S. intelligence community. An accurate estimate of the threat posed 
by ISIS involved more than just an assessment of the growing number of 
fighters or its growing combat capability (that is, the ability to deploy 
crew- served weapons or to field relatively large military units). An ac-
curate estimate would have needed to account for the opportunities pre-
sented by the death of bin Laden and the chaos of the Syrian civil war 
and the impact of a shift to internal jihad, a sectarian strategy, and a change 
in recruiting preferences. The real intelligence challenge did not involve 
recognizing that the potential for death and destruction was increasing; 
the intelligence community actually sounded that warning. Instead, it was 
to understand that AQI was being displaced by ISIS and that  these organ-
izations  were fundamentally diff er ent entities. And, once again, the U.S. 
intelligence community would have benefited from a net assessment that 
focused on the externalities created by the death of Osama bin Laden.20
 These issues  were in fact acknowledged by an intelligence scholar/
practitioner working in the Office of the Director of National Intelli-
gence. When asked if the rise of ISIS represented a failure on the part of 
the U.S. intelligence community, he responded with the question, “When 
do you give it a name?”21 In other words, ISIS represented a departure 
among violent nonstate actors. It was difficult to anticipate  because its 
 whole was greater than the sum of its contributing parts and enabling 
 factors. It was new and diff er ent, making it difficult to define  until it ac-
tually existed.
ISIS Is Not a “Normal” Clandestine Actor
In the years immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, scholars be-
came particularly interested in searching for clandestine links between 
diff er ent types of nonstate actors.  There was a fear that criminal networks, 
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black marketeers and money-laundering operations, smugglers, grassroots 
po liti cal or ethnic movements, proliferation entrepreneurs, or terrorist 
groups might somehow collaborate by sharing ser vices, networks, or per-
sonnel for mutual advantage.22 This type of collaboration was neither 
unknown nor unpre ce dented. In 1993, for instance, a Chinese narcotics 
organ ization in New York City linked up with a  human trafficking op-
eration and branched into smuggling illegal immigrants into California 
by transferring paying clients from oceangoing vessels to smaller fishing 
boats near San Francisco and Moss Landing.23 What was of special con-
cern was the use of similar drug smuggling networks to move terrorists 
and weapons of mass destruction across international borders. In other 
words,  there was a fear that multifaceted organ izations would emerge 
when diff er ent types of nonstate actors pooled resources, communica-
tions, and logistical networks.
ISIS is diff er ent in this regard. It is a multifaceted, entrepreneurial en-
terprise that exploits opportunities by pursuing a variety of objectives 
si mul ta neously. It is not a network of diff er ent nonstate actors (the tradi-
tional fear); instead it is a nonstate actor that undertakes multiple activi-
ties that in the past required specialized entities. For instance, it can be 
characterized as a po liti cal movement to create its own state. Alternatively, 
it can be characterized as a commercial operation that exploits black mar-
ket trade, especially by selling the oil produced  under its control. It also 
can be characterized as a sectarian movement, exploiting Sunni hostility 
 toward Shia and other minority groups (Christians, Yazidis, and  others) 
in areas  under its control. Sometimes, it appears to be a way for disenfran-
chised Baathists to gain po liti cal control over local areas. More recently, 
it has branched out into a global terrorist network that uses operatives or 
self- radicalized individuals to carry our relatively unsophisticated, al-
beit deadly, attacks on Western targets in revenge for Western kinetic 
operations against its forces in the areas that it controls. It could even be 
characterized as a youth movement, reaching out to disaffected adoles-
cents who seek liberation from local constraints (that is, their parents).
ISIS is also an especially dangerous threat  because it is the first terrorist 
organ ization to exploit Internet- enabled social media for its own nefarious 
purposes. Al Qaeda central rode the rails of the information revolution 
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and globalization to undertake precision strikes at intercontinental ranges, 
but ISIS used social media like Twitter and Facebook, platforms that both 
emerged around 2006, to communicate highly personalized messages to 
young  people around the world.  These messages  were framed to appeal 
to young  people and speak a language that young  people relate to. They 
offered the prospect of adventure, romance, and escape from the constraints 
of overbearing parents— the type of message that has a universal appeal 
to its key demographic. German intelligence officials, for example, have 
reported that almost 700  people left Germany to join ISIS, many of whom 
 were characterized as “normal teens.”24 ISIS uses a host of new media that 
incorporate audio and visual messaging that is easy for teen agers to un-
derstand but often incomprehensible to most adults. Indeed, many adults 
are completely unfamiliar with the “apps” used to communicate to young 
 people. According to Kathleen Bouzis:
The group utilizes numerous communication platforms including 
Snapchat, Kik, Twitter, ASK.fm, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, 
and  others. Its multiplatform social media messaging targets a broad 
recruitment audience in at least 23 languages and is part of the rea-
son for ISIS’s estimated 31,500 fighters. ISIL has also reached out 
to computer- savvy youth hacking networks that have conducted 
pro- ISIL attacks on over two hundred websites.  These hacks in-
cluded banners that read “I love you ISIS” and are targeted at seem-
ingly arbitrary websites such as the University of New Brunswick 
Student Union.25
For individuals whose significant real ity exists in cyberspace, not in the 
physical real ity of everyday life, social media take on a special importance 
that displaces  family, friends, school, and the workplace. In other words, 
ISIS’s appeal is to the young and impressionable audience that “lives” in 
cyberspace, an appeal that has more to with the discontent of adolescence 
than with the exigencies of jihad. Social media provide the group with 
an especially potent recruiting tool. This audience and this tool simply 
did not exist in the years preceding the 9/11 attacks. At least in its inter-
national manifestation, ISIS might in fact be best characterized as a youth 
movement, a sort of pied  piper to restless adolescents everywhere.
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An accurate estimate of the threat posed by ISIS would have required 
an assessment of how a new technology, “social media,” could be em-
ployed in an innovative manner by a nonstate actor to open new commu-
nication and recruitment strategies and broaden its base of international 
support. ISIS can thus be seen as a form of technological surprise in the 
sense that it pioneered an innovative application of an emerging technol-
ogy. Although the po liti cal use of social media— tweets, false news stories, 
and personalized po liti cal messages delivered by anyone with access to a 
Facebook account— was unheard of before 2007, in the aftermath of the 
2016 U.S. presidential election it is now a fixture in our social real ity. 
ISIS pioneered the use of  these new media to increase its appeal to a global 
youth audience.
Theoretical Musings
In a volume on the impact of intelligence organ izations since 1945, Paul 
Maddrell and his coauthors offer an impor tant observation about the abil-
ity of intelligence organ izations to warn policymakers about untoward 
events.26 Intelligence organ izations and the policymakers they serve tend 
to operate with a common view of the world that channels analy sis along 
a relatively narrow path. If unfolding events fit within the scope of this 
analytical and policy consensus, then intelligence agencies often provide 
useful and relevant analy sis to policymakers. If unfolding developments are 
beyond this shared consensus, however, then it is unlikely that intelligence 
analysts  will be able to provide timely warnings to policymakers. Failures 
of omission and commission lie  behind this observation. Questions that 
need to be addressed might never be raised by analysts or policymakers 
 because they seem irrelevant given the shared consensus. And if discor-
dant analy sis somehow manages to emerge from intelligence agencies, 
it is likely to be altered to fit the shared consensus or ignored as an 
irrelevant outlier. An intelligence culture,  shaped by bureaucratic, social, 
and po liti cal preferences, bounds the realm of the pos si ble when it comes 
to the capabilities of national intelligence agencies. When something 
emerges outside this realm, it is difficult to recognize. ISIS emerged in a 
way that was outside the realm of the U.S. intelligence consensus.
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The preceding analy sis suggests several  factors that made ISIS a dif-
ficult target for the U.S. intelligence community. First, a net assessment 
would have greatly facilitated an accurate estimate of the threat posed by 
ISIS, but the U.S. government, not to mention the U.S. intelligence com-
munity, lacks a formal mechanism not only to evaluate the success or 
failure of U.S. policy but also to determine if U.S. policy is producing 
externalities that are leading to a deteriorating international situation. Ad-
mittedly, the impact of de- Baathification on the security situation in 
Iraq remains a hotly debated topic. Nevertheless, it would appear that the 
U.S. intelligence community did not directly address how disenfranchis-
ing thousands of Sunnis might bolster AQI and inflame sectarian ten-
sions in Iraq. Ironically, the “fundamental attribution error” (that is, “we 
had no choice”) echoes in the explanations offered by policymakers for 
the pos si ble link between the rise of AQI/ISIS and de- Baathification. 
Similarly, the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 was touted as a  great 
success for U.S. counterterrorism policy. Nevertheless, questions about 
unintended consequences— such as the impact on al Qaeda franchisees— 
never seemed to be entertained. Every one seems to have forgotten that no 
government policy is universally good or bad, but instead represents a 
mix of positive and negative effects. The idea that the U.S. government 
would have undertaken a net assessment to better understand the exter-
nalities created by the death of Osama bin Laden, even in hindsight, 
appears far- fetched. The question itself was beyond the intelligence con-
sensus, and the intelligence community rarely conducts this type of 
net assessment. In other words, if a net assessment was critical to the 
ISIS estimate, the occurrence of an “intelligence failure” appears to be 
overdetermined.
Second, as contributors to the Maddrell volume note, the rise of ISIS 
contained a theological and religious component, which is difficult to de-
tect and assess within the U.S. intelligence consensus. The separation of 
church and state in the American po liti cal context runs deep, restricting 
the ability of the U.S. intelligence community to monitor the way theo-
logical differences influence Islamic fundamentalists. Mark Stout, for in-
stance, has noted that this failure to understand the interaction between 
Islam and terrorism slowed an accurate appreciation of al Qaeda:
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This prejudice against religion manifested itself in the IC no less 
than in the rest of the government. Lt. Gen. James Clapper, who 
had led the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] from 1991 to 1996, 
recalls no discussion of religion whatsoever during that time. For 
its part the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] veered  toward “hard 
fact” reporting (names, dates, places and the like) creating an en-
vironment in which consideration of the divine did not fit com-
fortably. The result was that analysts tended to address terrorism 
 either through ethnic or national lenses (despite the fact that this 
 enemy explic itly denigrated such distinctions) or simply focused 
on the tactical mechanics of the prob lem. In essence, the IC pro-
jected its self- image onto the  enemy.27
 Because an accurate estimate of the menace posed by ISIS required 
a  nuanced appreciation of theological or ideological differences be-
tween ISIS and al Qaeda, developing this estimate did not easily fit 
within U.S. intelligence culture. As Stout notes, stark assessments of the 
interaction between Islam and terrorism, which  were admittedly not 
particularly nuanced,  were injected into intelligence debates by outsiders 
four years  after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks.28  Because its opera-
tional style and agenda are rooted in theological differences with other 
Islamic fundamentalists, ISIS posed a difficult target for  those operating 
within the U.S. intelligence consensus.
Third, although Americans launched the information revolution, 
rushing to exploit the opportunities created by the impact of Moore’s 
Law on everyday life, they take both a technical and rather utopian 
view of the impact of emerging technology on the  human condition. 
In the view of the creators of the information revolution, new tech-
nologies are supposed to drive a steady improvement in the  human 
 condition as they increase productivity, disseminate best practices, and 
empower individuals at the expense of bureaucracies and governments.29 
Outside of this positive- sum view of technology, however, Americans, 
along with other proponents of the information revolution, are slow to 
focus on the externalities created by the information revolution or to envi-
sion the social, po liti cal, and strategic impact of the new information 
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technologies.30 Other strategic and intelligence cultures appear far 
more  adept at estimating the broad societal and po liti cal impact of the 
information revolution and are more  adept at exploiting the new pos-
sibilities created by the emergence of cyberspace.31 In other words, 
grasping that social media could have a profound impact on politics and 
society is not the forte of the U.S. intelligence community. Recogni-
tion that  there is an “information revolution 2.0”  under way is now en-
tering our collective consciousness, but only  after other groups— ISIS 
in particular— recognized the true po liti cal and social opportunities 
created by  these new information technologies. Although the argu-
ment appears counterintuitive, the intelligence failure related to ISIS 
might be based on a failure to properly assess the impact of technology 
on society.
Conclusion
 There is an old saying among analysts that comes to mind when one of-
fers judgments about the per for mance of the U.S. intelligence com-
munity against ISIS: “ There is no such  thing as a policy failure, only 
an intelligence failure.” In other words, regardless of the per for mance of 
intelligence analysts, they  will be blamed when policymakers encounter 
a policy setback. With that said, it  really is impossible to tell what, if 
anything, went wrong inside the U.S. intelligence community  until a 
complete accounting is made of the classified warnings and estimates that 
accompanied the rise of ISIS. It is pos si ble that the U.S. intelligence com-
munity issued detailed and profound warnings about the nature and im-
plications of the rise of ISIS without having any discernible impact on 
U.S. policymakers. This sort of situation is not unpre ce dented. Before 
the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II, national intelli-
gence agencies, diplomats, and even foreign governments provided a string 
of detailed and compelling warnings to the Soviet government with no 
real effect. Sometimes policy is impervious to intelligence.
More realistically, however, the rise of ISIS constituted a very mod-
ern and maddening conundrum for the U.S. intelligence community. It 
emerged from a complex interaction among theological debate, sectari-
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anism, opportunism, and technological innovation that produced a new 
type of nonstate actor on the world stage. It represented an abrupt and 
dangerous departure from conventional wisdom, from policy expecta-
tions, from what was considered to be socially, po liti cally, and strategi-
cally pos si ble. ISIS constituted an abrupt change. In fact it was the speed 
of this change, not necessarily the transformation of AQI into ISIS, that 
made the ISIS estimate so difficult. And  because the pace of change in 
international affairs continues to accelerate, the ISIS “intelligence failure” 
might be a harbinger of  things to come.
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ISIS and Other Actors in Historical Context
Kevin W. Martin
Despite all the media attention devoted to ISIS and the context in which it emerged and thrived, the study of  these phenomena pre­
s ents numerous dilemmas for the social scientist and the policymaker. The 
rapid pace of events, the complexity of a multisided conflict featuring 
shifting alliances, and the paucity of in de pen dently verifiable informa­
tion greatly complicate attempts to draw reliable conclusions and formu­
late effective responses. That said,  after surveying the massive body of 
journalism, policy analy sis, and scholarship, it is pos si ble to place the ISIS 
phenomenon in historical context and thereby identify certain issues that 
clarify past events, suggest the course of  future developments, and offer 
lessons for observers of the region.
First, the histories of ISIS, of the conflicts in which it has been en­
meshed, and of its relationships with other local actors in  these conflicts 
display multiple continuities with Syrian, Iraqi, and regional history. In 
other words, ISIS, its fellow jihadist groups, and the deeply intertwined 
Syrian and Iraqi conflicts did not appear ex nihilo. They are thoroughly 
explicable— although not inevitable— outcomes of familiar historical 
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pro cesses and experiences. As such, they cannot be successfully addressed, 
intellectually or instrumentally, without reference to that history. In this 
macrohistorical context, ISIS, all other groups attempting to overthrow 
existing regimes, and the vari ous popu lar movements designated by the 
term “Arab Spring” are manifestations of a broad, deep, transgenera­
tional dissatisfaction with the  Middle East’s po liti cal system.
Second, the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts that provided the site and con­
text for ISIS’s emergence have transformed, perhaps permanently, the re­
gion, the parties to  these conflicts, their victims, and the relationships 
between all of them. The terms of the post– World War I settlement that 
produced the  Middle East have been destabilized. Despite recent “victo­
ries” over ISIS and other violent opposition groups, it remains unclear 
 whether Syria and Iraq can survive as sovereign, unitary states within their 
current borders.
Third, once an isolated pariah state, Iran has emerged as a regional 
superpower, enjoying the status of hegemon in Baghdad, a nearly compa­
rable position in Damascus, and increasing weight in Turkey, Lebanon, 
Yemen, and the “Arabian Gulf.” In addition, Rus sia’s forceful intervention 
in support of the Assad regime has compelled strategic recalculations in 
Ankara, Amman, and elsewhere.
Fourth, despotic government has returned to Iraq and been reinvigo­
rated in Syria. The populations of  these countries have been “mobilized” in 
 every sense of that overused term: terrorized into exile or submission, 
militarized, “radicalized” into embracing one or another totalitarian vi­
sion of the  future, or exterminated. And  whether motivated by sincerely 
held notions of doctrinal purity or by cynical pragmatism, all parties re­
sponsible have  adopted practices deemed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. 
In addition to the mass murder of civilians,  human trafficking, the denial 
of food and medical ser vices, and the destruction and pillaging of both 
countries’ cultural heritage, the most common (and potentially conse­
quential) set of illegal practices constitutes the Orwellian neologism 
“demographic reengineering,” or the manipulation of population settle­
ment patterns for po liti cal purposes, an ongoing pro cess that historian 
Joshua Landis has dubbed “the  great sorting out.”1
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Owing to the transnational status of ISIS and the interstate reach of 
several local and regional actors, disentangling events in Syria and Iraq is 
empirically unsustainable. But for clarity’s sake I treat the two states sep­
arately, their governments serving as axes around which networks of al­
lies and opponents are arrayed. While well aware of arguments to the 
contrary, I also treat ISIS as a “real” (rather than “so­ called”) state, as it 
has clearly displayed the characteristics of the Weberian and most other 
social science definitions of such entities.2
Syrian Government Armed Forces
The Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) are divided into four branches: Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense Forces. The SAF experienced a number 
of defections and performed poorly in the early stages of the rebellion. 
As a result, by late 2014 its numbers had been reduced to 150,000–178,000 
active­ duty troops, or less than half its pre­ uprising contingent.3 The gov­
ernment has thus expended considerable effort on expanding and upgrad­
ing reserves and auxiliaries. In 2013 most of  these forces  were reor ga nized 
and institutionalized as the National Defense Forces (NDF). Trained and 
equipped (and some observers maintain, led) by the Ira nian Revolution­
ary Guards and Lebanese Hez bollah,  these 90,000–100,000 “volunteers” 
have played an increasingly significant role in the conflict.4
Yet the SAF and NDF have been used sparingly against the most for­
midable armed opposition groups— the Salafist and Kurdish­ led groups 
operating in northeastern Syria. The regime has instead focused most of 
its destructive power on  Free Syrian Army units and other more “moder­
ate Islamist” groups, a tendency also displayed by its Ira nian and Rus sian 
allies.5
This selective use of military power is in keeping with long­ term pol­
icy. Since before the uprising, Bashar al Assad repeatedly declared that 
Syria (and by extension, the world) had three alternatives: himself, jihadi 
terrorists bent on waging genocide against religious minorities, or the 
dismemberment of the state, a pro cess that would destabilize the entire 
region for de cades to come.6 Many of Assad’s subsequent actions appear 
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designed to make this assertion a real ity.7 In response to the peaceful 
protests of spring 2011, he promulgated a “reform” program that included 
amnesty for po liti cal prisoners. Yet the overwhelming majority of  those 
released  were “violent Islamists” who subsequently joined ISIS, Jabhat 
Fatah al­ Sham (Front for the Conquest of Syria), and other Salafist 
militias.8
The effect of  these selective releases was, of course, to enable extrem­
ist domination of the insurgency. Early in the conflict, the practice was 
so pervasive and so central to regime policy that some observers have ar­
gued that Assad and ISIS  were codependent, “exploit[ing] each other’s 
existence in pursuit of a common goal— the  wholesale destruction of any 
and all credible alternatives to themselves.”9 Such a conclusion is sup­
ported by the fact that the Assad regime long provided utilities to the 
former “capital” of the Islamic State at Raqqah, while ISIS sold electric­
ity to “the Syrian government through third parties.”10
Another regime practice with significant long­ term consequences is 
the aforementioned “demographic reengineering,” in this case prevent­
ing the return of populations to areas from which they  were displaced by 
the conflict in order to punish perceived disloyalty, and to “ensure that 
rebellious communities do not re­ establish themselves.”11
Domestic Allies of the Syrian Government
The Assad regime is also supported by a number of “irregular” armed 
groups that serve as “home guards” for their own communities and as se­
curity guards at government installations, checkpoints, and other sensitive 
sites; they also provide logistical support to the SAF and NDF. Accord­
ing to some sources, they have also been used as cannon fodder during 
major assaults. Among the more significant such groups are the Liwa 
Abu al­ Fadl al­ Abbas (Abbas Brigade), Liwa Asad Allah al­ Ghalib fi al­ 
Iraq wa al­ Sham (Conquering Lion of God Brigade in Iraq and the 
 Levant), Fouj al­ Mughawayr al­ Bahir (Marines Regiment), Jaysh al­ 
Muwahideen (Army of Mono the ists), Liwa Suqur al­ Sahara (Desert 
Hawks Brigade), Al­ Haras al­ Qawmi al­ Arabi (Arab Nationalist Guard), 
and Al­ Muqawama al­ Suriyya (Syrian Re sis tance).12
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Like ele ments of the NDF, many of  these organ izations have received 
foreign equipment and training. Several operate on both sides of the 
Syrian­ Iraqi border and include “foreign fighters” in their ranks. And 
many are or ga nized on a sectarian or ethnic basis. Thus their existence 
and proliferation since 2013 signify several critical developments: (1) the 
internationalization of the Syrian conflict; (2) the breadth and depth of 
support for the Assad regime in some minority communities; and (3) the 
eroding distinction between Syria and Iraq as theaters of war.
Regional Allies of the Syrian Government
The Islamic Republic of Iran is by far the most significant regional ally 
of the Assad regime. Building on a long­ term strategic partnership, Iran 
has provided considerable financial assistance, as well as vari ous forms of 
technical and logistical support to the Syrian government.13 In addition 
to the training, equipping, and guiding of militias, Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guard Corps has done the same for two wholly foreign Shia militias fight­
ing in Syria, Liwa al­ Fatimiyyun (Fatimid Brigade), and Liwa Zainebi­
yyun (Zaynabid Brigade).14 The Guard Corps also provides advisers to 
the SAF, and members of its Quds Force provide intelligence and par­
ticipate in impor tant combat missions. In fact, the critical, ever­ expanding 
role of the Quds Force has prompted some to argue that its leader, Major 
General Qasem Soleimani, “controls, directly or indirectly, most of the 
al­ Assad regime’s security establishment and attendant war machine.”15
Another long­ term strategic ally of the regime is the Lebanese “state 
within a state,” Hez bollah. It has provided logistical support and combat 
troops since late 2011, operating primarily along the Lebanese border, in 
the Orontes River Valley, the outlying areas of Damascus, and more re­
cently Aleppo. At any given time approximately 10,000 combat forces 
are pres ent in Syria, and they have played a significant role in several re­
gime victories. In the pro cess they have suffered hundreds of casualties, 
including the loss of Mustafa Badreddine and numerous other se nior 
commanders.16
The story of Iraq’s involvement in the Syrian civil war is more com­
plex and ambiguous. Seeking to deter U.S. intervention in Syria and “to 
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divert Islamists’ attention away from his regime,” from 2003 to late 2009 
Bashar al­ Assad made support for the Sunni insurgency in Iraq a core 
policy.17 During this period Assad’s director of military intelligence (and 
brother­ in­ law), the late Assef Shawkat, provided sanctuary and support 
to former Saddamists and leaders of the insurgency Izzat Ibrahim al­ Douri 
and Mohammed Younis al­ Ahmed. By such means, Syrian intelligence 
“facilitated and suborned al­ Qaeda terrorism” in Iraq, including deadly 
attacks against Iraqi police and bureaucrats in August 2009.18 Since the 
uprising against Assad’s regime, however, the two governments, both al­
lies of Iran, have found common ground, and Iraq has provided financial 
and logistical support— for example, air and land transshipment of Ira­
nian weapons, supplies, and personnel.
Opponents of the Syrian Government and Their Allies
The armed opposition to the Syrian government pres ents the most dif­
ficult challenges for scholars and policymakers. An astonishing number 
and variety of organ izations have taken up arms against the regime since 
2011.19 Although they share the stated purpose of effacing the old po liti­
cal order in Syria,  little  else unites them. Most have defied the efforts of 
exiled opposition leaders and other external actors to impose some mea­
sure of unified command and control. And most have proved incapable of 
establishing stable cooperative arrangements amongst themselves. Small and 
medium­ sized units frequently “defect” from one larger group to join 
another, change their names, or disband altogether, only to reappear in 
another guise. In short, with a few notable exceptions, Syria’s armed 
opposition groups have been fluid, ephemeral, and in the absence of con­
tinuous external support, unsustainable.
Furthermore, the terms Western observers have employed to classify 
 these groups are descriptively imprecise and bear  little analytical utility. 
What, for example, does the term “moderate opposition” denote when 
describing participants in an armed uprising that seeks the violent over­
throw of an existing government? Conversely, how does the term “Is­
lamist” serve as an antonym for “moderate” or “secular” when so many 
groups thus designated advocate a po liti cal system based on sharia? In the 
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absence of a more elegant and precise taxonomy, I have  adopted “Salaf­
ist” for  those groups whose ideologies and practices are more extreme 
than  those of other local actors and have retained “moderate” (always in 
quotation marks) for the remainder.
The Po liti cal Opposition
The Syrian opposition’s po liti cal leadership has been singularly in effec­
tive at achieving its stated aim, the removal of Bashar al­ Assad from power. 
Divided, exiled, and isolated from events on the ground in Syria,  these 
figures have proved incapable of establishing meaningful constituencies 
among the population, imposing centralized command and control on 
the armed opposition, or wielding influence with foreign governments.
The oldest and most prominent organ ization is the Syrian National 
Council, which was founded  under Turkish auspices in August 2011. The 
council claims to represent 60  percent of the opposition and has been 
granted official “recognition” by the Eu ro pean Union, the Arab League, 
and several UN­ member states, and is affiliated with the  Free Syrian 
Army. Owing to its many splits and defections, and its perceived domi­
nation by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the council has steadily 
lost influence since 2013.20 In November 2012 the council joined a larger 
umbrella group, the newly formed National Co ali tion for Syrian Revo­
lutionary and Opposition Forces, popularly known as the Syrian National 
Co ali tion.21 Another significant opposition organ ization is the Syrian 
Demo cratic Council, founded in December 2015. It is the po liti cal face 
of the Syrian Demo cratic Forces (SDF), a militia about which I say much 
more in the following sections. The council is unique among such um­
brella organ izations in that it is closely integrated with a disciplined and 
capable armed force, it was founded with and possesses a real constitu­
ency inside Syria, and its po liti cal program, which calls for a secular, 
demo cratic, and federalist Syria, is appealing to governments and public 
opinion in the West.
The “Moderate” Armed Opposition
Most observers date the militarization of the Syrian uprising to July 29, 
2011, when Col o nel Riad al­ Asaad announced the formation of the  Free 
Syrian Army (FSA). Initially at the core of the armed revolt, the FSA 
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has faded in significance. Never a coherent military force, since 2015 the 
FSA has become  little more than a brand name used episodically by dis­
parate groups throughout Syria. Underfunded and lightly armed (overt 
American support has been restricted to nonlethal aid), most FSA units 
have been unable to hold captured territory when subjected to air power, 
heavy weapons, or well­ executed ground attacks. As a result, mass de­
fections to Jabhat Fatah al­ Sham, ISIS, the SDF, and other organ izations 
have been common.
The FSA’s close identification with the Turkish government (many 
Syrians consider it a creation of Turkish military intelligence) and the 
corrupt practices and  human rights abuses of many units using the FSA 
label have undermined the organ ization’s standing among civilians.22 
Furthermore, the presence within the FSA of fighters expressing jihadist 
rhe toric, along with se nior commanders’ demonstrated inability to estab­
lish a coherent system of command and control, has caused the ardor of 
many Western supporters to cool. Fi nally, Turkey’s policy adjustments in 
light of Rus sian intervention render doubtful the FSA’s longevity.
An organ ization of more recent vintage, the Syrian Demo cratic Forces, 
pres ents a very diff er ent picture. Founded in October 2015, the SDF is 
the armed wing of the aforementioned Syrian Demo cratic Council, and 
comprises nineteen militias of predominantly Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian, 
Armenian, Turkmen, or Circassian ethnicity,  people of mixed ethnicity, 
and several tribal militias operating in northern and northeastern Syria.23 
The SDF is the official defense force of the SDC’s Rojava [West Kurdis­
tan] Revolution, whose goal is the creation of an autonomous region 
within the context of a secular, demo cratic, and federal Syrian Republic.
The largest and most formidable of the SDF militias are  those fight­
ing  under the banner of the  People’s Protection Units (YPG), the armed 
units of the Kurdish Demo cratic Union Party (PYD). As of late 2015, 
the YPG had become the U.S. Central Command’s favored proxy in the 
fight against ISIS.24 It has also received vari ous forms of support from 
Kurdish militias based in Iraq, and air support from British, Canadian, 
and French forces. Boasting of several victories, the YPG is widely ac­
knowledged to be the most experienced, motivated, and effective force 
confronting ISIS in northern Syria. Yet its parent organ ization’s affiliation 
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with the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), the PYD’s March 2016  declaration 
of self­ governance within an  imagined federal Syria, and the PYD’s de 
facto creation of an autonomous polity along much of the Syrian­ Turkish 
border have made them anathema to Ankara, a fact that bodes ill for the 
 future of U.S. support and thus for the SDF’s very existence.25
As noted, Syrian government forces have largely refrained from at­
tacking YPG units and PYD institutions. In fact Assad began to with­
draw his military and security personnel from predominantly Kurdish 
areas in 2013.26 This was a cunning rebuke to the Turkish government, 
which had been the first meaningful supporter of armed re sis tance to the 
Assad regime and fears nothing more than the establishment of a PKK­ 
allied entity on its southern border.
The most significant development affecting non­ Salafist opposition 
groups is the emergence of ghurfat amaliyat (operations rooms). Not fixed, 
physical installations,  these began as ad hoc intelligence­ sharing and planning 
units providing support for a specific military operation. Unconfirmed 
media reports and leaks from within opposition groups maintain that 
operation rooms’ member groups receive funding, communications gear, 
advice, logistical support, and sometimes weapons and training from the 
United States and its regional allies. For this purpose they are reportedly 
linked to one of the Joint Military Operations Centers (MOCs) that the 
United States has established in Jordan and Turkey.  After repeatedly fail­
ing to engender a broad­ based po liti cal co ali tion or coherent military 
command, the operations rooms appeared to be the Obama administra­
tion’s Plan B for influencing events in the Syrian civil war. Dozens of such 
“rooms” have appeared since early 2014, and a few— for example, the 
Southern Front and the Euphrates Volcano— have evolved into semi­ stable 
alliances of armed groups. Given the impact of Rus sian intervention, how­
ever, and the potential consequences of the unfolding Turkish­ Russian 
rapprochement, the  future of the operations rooms is uncertain.
The “Salafist” Armed Opposition
One  thing is clear: Salafism is not a novel phenomenon in Syria. It has 
deep historical roots. In the generic meaning of religious, social, and po­
liti cal reform with reference to al- salaf al- salih, or “the pious ancestors,” it 
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can be traced to clerics and other pious intellectuals of the mid­ nineteenth 
 century.27 As a coherent po liti cal ideology that aspires to replace the ex­
isting po liti cal order with an “Islamic State,” it appeared in the 1940s as 
a central tenet of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s program.28
In addition, the current conflict in Syria is in many ways a reprise, 
albeit on a much larger scale, of the 1976–1982 Muslim Brotherhood– 
led armed uprising against Hafez al­ Assad. All the Syrian leaders of 
Salafist groups engaged in the current uprising draw their ideological 
inspiration from the leaders of the previous one, particularly Marwan 
Hadid, the founder of al­ Talia al­ Muqatila (Fighting Vanguard), the 
Brotherhood’s armed wing.29
Furthermore,  today’s Salafist groups display other continuities with 
modern Syrian history. The Salafist proj ect seeks to efface the bound­
aries created by the post– World War I settlement.30 This goal was foun­
dational for the Arab Nationalist Movement of George Habash, the Arab 
Baath Socialist Party, Antun Saada’s Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and 
numerous other nationalist, leftist, and ostensibly secular movements that 
professed the necessity of vio lence from the 1930s to the 1970s.
Fi nally, while ruthlessly suppressed, the 1976–82 uprising prompted 
Hafez al­ Assad to seek a rapprochement with the Sunni merchant class 
of Syria’s cities. As a result, Assad facilitated the creation of numerous 
Islamic charitable foundations that constructed schools, hospitals, and 
mosques. This “strategic alliance” created institutional spaces and rela­
tionships within which ideological opponents of both Assad regimes could 
or ga nize and profess Salafist doctrine to the masses.31
Many of the most significant groups that have emerged from this his­
torical pro cess to take up arms against Bashar al­ Assad’s rule  were or ga­
nized into a sizable Saudi­ backed co ali tion (an estimated 45,000 fight­
ers), al­ Jabhat al­ Islamiyya (Islamic Front). Its members include Jaysh 
al­ Islam (Army of Islam); Harakat Ahrar al­ Sham al­ Islamiyya (Islamic 
Movement of the  Free  People of the Levant, popularly known as Ahrar 
al­ Sham); and Kitaib Ansar al­ Sham (Supporters of the Levant Brigades, 
popularly known as Ansar al­ Sham). While  these groups are explic itly 
opposed to ISIS, they sometimes operate in alliance with Jabhat Fatah 
al­ Sham. Another sizable (est. 7,000–10,000) such alliance is Tahaluf 
al­ Muhajirin wal­ Ansar (Alliance of Emigrants and Helpers), which in­
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cludes Jund al­ Aqsa (Soldiers of Aqsa) and other groups with direct con­
nections to al Qaeda. Just to complicate the picture further, as part of a gen­
eral trend of consolidation since 2015, some of  these groups have, at 
vari ous times, joined or left the large Saudi­ sponsored operations room 
Jaysh al­ Fatah (Army of Conquest).
Yet the Salafist groups that have played the most significant role in 
the Syrian conflict are ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al­ Sham. The latter group 
originated in August 2011 as a del e ga tion from the amir of the Islamic 
State of Iraq, Abu Bakr al­ Baghdadi, to Salafist groups fighting the Assad 
regime in Sunni­ majority areas of northern Syria.  After extensive dis­
cussions, the formation of Jabhat al­ Nusra li Ahl al­ Sham (Front for Sup­
port of the  People of Syria) was announced in January 2012.32
Soon hundreds of Syrians with experience fighting in Iraq flocked to 
Jabhat al­ Nusra’s banner. Thus it quickly earned a reputation as one of the 
most skilled, disciplined, and effective forces in the insurgency.33 Its amir, 
Abu Muhammad al­ Julani (real name Ahmed Hussein al­ Shara), was ini­
tially careful to cultivate positive relations with other Sunni groups 
and leaders of local communities and to refrain from the sectarian ex­
cesses and depredations of his parent organ ization.34 For all of  these 
reasons, for its perceived “Syrian” pedigree, its efforts to maintain law 
and order, and its attempts to provide “state ser vices” to the populations 
 under its control, the organ ization enjoyed popu lar support in its areas 
of operation.35
Although al­ Jolani was formally Abu Bakr al­ Baghdadi’s deputy, and 
he received arms and funding and from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), his 
group operated autonomously and often contrary to al­ Baghdadi’s stated 
policies. In April 2013,  after several (sometimes violent) disagreements, 
al­ Baghdadi attempted to reassert control by announcing the merger of 
Jabhat al­ Nusra and ISI to form a new organ ization, al­ Dawla al­ Islamiyya 
fi al­ Iraq wa al­ Sham (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, ISIL).36 Al­ Jolani 
swiftly announced his rejection of the  union, declaring that he had not been 
consulted about the merger. He then renewed his personal (and his organ­
ization’s) pledge of fealty to al Qaeda leader Ayman al­ Zawahiri.37
From 2013 to 2016, al­ Nusra experienced many “successes” in bat­
tlefield, terrorist, and kidnapping and ransom operations. Yet  these 
 activities invited air strikes by Syrian government, Rus sian, and American 
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forces. Conflict also erupted between al­ Nusra and former allies 
among Salafist groups and FSA units. As a result, al­ Nusra’s position was 
weakened.
In July 2016, al­ Jolani announced that al­ Nusra was severing its ties 
with al Qaeda and changing its name to Jabhat Fatah al­ Sham. Many 
Western observers disputed the sincerity of this secession, characterizing 
it as a ploy to garner more funding from al­ Nusra’s reputed sponsor Qatar 
and other wealthy Gulf donors.38 Given the group’s terrorist operations, 
assassinations, forced conversions of non­ Sunnis, and many other  human 
rights abuses, even a genuine break with al Qaeda is unlikely to change 
attitudes  toward the group outside the region’s “Salafist community.”
Regional Actors and the Syrian Opposition
The Turkish Republic has been a major player in the Syrian conflict since 
its inception. Initially, this took the form of fostering the creation of the 
 Free Syrian Army by providing refuge, funding, equipment, and training 
to SAF defectors. Soon thereafter, journalists and se nior state officials in 
the region, Eu rope, and the United States began presenting evidence that 
Turkey’s National Intelligence Organ ization (MIT) was providing 
comparable support to Salafist groups, permitting their fighters to cross 
the Turkish­ Syrian border at  will, facilitating the safe passage of foreign 
recruits between Turkey, Syria, and Eu rope, partnering in smuggling 
and other illicit forms of commerce that benefited ISIS, and even par­
ticipating in terrorist operations inside Syria.39
Turkey’s 2011 decision to actively support the armed rebellion against 
the Assad regime represents a dramatic shift from its posture of the 
previous de cade. But one facet of its policy during the uprising displays 
perfect consistency with its strategic vision since the foundation of the 
republic. If one disposition unites President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rul­
ing Justice and Development Party (AKP), its “enemies” in the move­
ment of Fethullah Gülen, and its secular, nationalist pre de ces sors in the 
 People’s Republican Party, it is the absolute refusal to countenance the 
establishment of a Kurdish­ ruled state on its southern border.
This continuity in policy explains Turkey’s willingness to “get in bed” 
with any and all opponents of the  People’s Protection Units of the SDF, 
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including ISIS and other Salafist groups other wise hostile to the Ankara 
government: “When it came to the war in Syria, NATO’s second­ largest 
member state would rather hamper the Kurds than defeat ISIS.”40 Thus 
Turkey delayed granting the United States, other NATO members, and 
regional allies permission to use Incirlik Air Base for bombing missions 
against ISIS targets; and it implacably opposes U.S. assistance to, or co­
operation with, the YPG. Turkey mounted Operation Euphrates Shield 
(August 2016– March 2017) with allied forces in northern Syria to create 
a “safe zone” by clearing SDF forces up to the west bank of the Euphra­
tes River, and to clear ISIS from towns adjacent to the Turkish border. 
While Turkey’s official pronouncements have routinely equated the SDF 
and ISIS as “terrorist” organ izations, the state’s air power was,  until Oc­
tober 2016, almost exclusively targeting the Kurdish militia’s positions.41
A 2016 policy shift in Ankara could have momentous consequences for 
the outcome and aftermath of the conflict. I refer  here to the ongoing rap­
prochement with Rus sia. While seemingly irreconcilable policy differ­
ences remain— Turkey continues to call for the removal of Assad, and the 
Rus sians are reported to have established closer ties with the SDF— these 
contradictions could be resolved via a quid pro quo agreement— that is, 
Turkey’s ac cep tance of Assad remaining in charge of a unitary (rather 
than federal) state, and Rus sia’s abjuring support for the all­too­frequently 
abandoned Kurds.
Jordan’s role in the Syrian conflict has been less obvious or signifi­
cant. Abu Musab al­ Zarqawi, the founder of Tanzim Qaidat al­ Jihad fi 
Bilad al­ Rafidayn (Organ ization for the Jihad’s Base in Mesopotamia), 
more commonly called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was a Jordanian criminal 
who was “radicalized” by his studies at the al­ Hussein Bin Ali Mosque 
in Amman and his experience waging jihad in Af ghan i stan.42 An impla­
cable  enemy of Jordan’s King Abdullah, al­ Zarqawi sought to destabilize 
and destroy the Hashemite monarchy by mounting assassinations and 
spectacular terrorist operations in Amman.43 Jordan subsequently partici­
pated in the 2014 bombing campaign against ISIS in Syria, only to “qui­
etly deescalate”  after the group’s horrific murder of captured Air Force 
lieutenant Muath al­ Kasasbeh.44 Since late 2015, Jordanian involvement 
appears to have been focused on intelligence cooperation with “U.S., 
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Eu ro pean, and regional intelligence ser vices” through the aforementioned 
Military Operations Command in Amman and hosting forward deploy­
ments of U.S. Central Command equipment and personnel.45
Saudi Arabia has also played a significant role in the conflict, serving 
since 2013 as the single largest provider of weapons (transshipped through 
Turkey and Jordan) and funds to the armed opposition. This is unsur­
prising given the Saudi government’s deep pockets and its perception of 
the conflict as a proxy war with its existential foe, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has funneled most such support to members 
of the Jaysh al­ Fatah (Army of Conquest) operations room, but reports per­
sist that it has dispensed similar largesse to ISIS and any other “Islamist” 
group deemed capable of inflicting pain on Assad’s Ira nian allies.
Despite its differences with the Saudis and other Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) members, Qatar has played a similar role, providing arms 
and cash to rebel groups across the po liti cal spectrum and offering gener­
ous aid packages to a small number of Syrian refugees. Since 2014 it has 
also operated (in cooperation with the United States) a small­ unit train­
ing fa cil i ty. It is reputed to  favor Jaysh al­ Fatah and (covertly) Jabhat Fatah 
al­ Sham, and it has permitted the Syrian National Co ali tion to operate an 
embassy in Doha since 2013.
Another country that has played a significant, though largely covert, 
role in the Syrian conflict is Israel, which conducted numerous well­ 
publicized air strikes against Syrian and/or Hez bollah military installa­
tions and convoys and exchanged artillery and small arms fire with Syrian 
government and rebel forces between 2013 and 2016. Less well docu­
mented are reports of Israel’s provision of ambulance and other medical 
ser vices to Druze rebels operating near the Golan Heights and its par­
ticipation in operations rooms in Jordan, Turkey, and Syria.
The Iraqi Government, Its Allies, and Its Opponents
Its transnational aspirations notwithstanding, ISIS is very much the product 
of Iraq­ specific historical experiences. De cades of personalized authoritar­
ian rule, “revolutionary” indoctrination, militarism, war, sectarian pro­
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paganda, state attempts to co­ opt Islamist and tribal groups, and foreign 
intervention produced the attitudes, skills, and institutional memories in­
forming the emergence of ISIS’s precursors and their evolution to date. 
Thus the Islamic State should be a thoroughly “familiar foe” to  those 
seeking its elimination.46 In what follows, I refer to the historical context 
as necessary, but focus primarily on events subsequent to the 2013 decla­
ration of ISIS, or the period of the “Second Iraq War.”
Iraqi Government Armed Forces
Iraq’s conventional armed forces comprise the Iraqi Army (including Spe­
cial Operations Forces), the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy (including 
Marines), the Iraqi Air Defense Forces, and vari ous Interior Ministry 
troops, together totaling approximately 800,000 active­duty personnel as 
of late 2017. The United States lavished enormous resources on building 
the “New Iraqi Army” between 2003 and 2012.47 Nevertheless, Iraq’s 
conventional armed forces have not performed well against ISIS or other 
manifestations of Sunni rebellion.
Domestic Allies of the Iraqi Government
Thus Iraq, like Syria, has been compelled to draw on the resources of 
irregular forces and regional allies. In June 2014 the government an­
nounced the formation of al­ Hashd al­ Shaabi (Popu lar Mobilization 
Forces, PMF) an umbrella organ ization consisting of sixteen major— and 
dozens of lesser— militias, totaling approximately 110,000 armed men.48 
Some of the PMF’s most significant components are the Badr Organ­
ization (formerly the Badr Brigades), Asaib Ahl al­ Haqq (League of the 
Righ teous), Saraya al­ Salam (Peace Brigades), Kataib Hez bollah (Hez­
bollah Brigades), and Kitaib al­ Imam Ali (Imam Ali Brigades).49 Most of 
 these militias, several of which have been the beneficiaries of U.S. train­
ing and air support, have engaged in “demographic reengineering” and 
other war crimes.50
The PMF report to the Iraqi prime minister, but many observers 
assert that they actually take their  orders from Tehran via Ira nian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qasem Soleimani, who is 
reputed to wield even greater power in Iraq than he does in Syria.51 
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Consensus holds that the Iraqi government would have failed to halt 
ISIS’s 2014 expansion southward, let alone retake much of the seized 
territory, without the intervention of the PMF and Guard Corps. 
 There is also general agreement that, by ceding such critical state se­
curity functions to its neighbor, Baghdad has further diluted its 
sovereignty.52
Another formidable military force occupies an ambiguous space be­
tween the Iraqi Armed Forces, its allies, and its opponents: the Kurdish 
militias collectively known as the Peshmerga. Reliable figures are un­
available, but estimates range from 150,000 to 200,000 armed person­
nel. Though nominally allied with the Iraqi central government in the 
fight against ISIS, the Peshmerga take their  orders from one or another 
institution of the autonomous self­ governing Kurdistan Regional Gov­
ernment (KRG), not from Baghdad.53
Since 2014 Peshmerga offensives have expelled ISIS from allegedly 
Kurdish­ majority regions of four provinces and in the pro cess have 
taken control of land formally  under the authority of the central gov­
ernment. The KRG reportedly plans to use  these territories as bar­
gaining chips in  future negotiations with Baghdad, a pro cess rendered 
more contentious by the KRG in de pen dence referendum of Septem­
ber 2017.54 Furthermore, Amnesty International and  others have accused 
the Peshmerga of “demographic engineering” in  these territories: de­
stroying homes in Arab villages, blocking former residents from re­
turning, and effectively annexing oil­ rich areas to the Kurdistan 
 Regional Government.55  These actions presage difficult relations be­
tween the central government and the KRG, if and when both parties 
deem the ISIS threat eliminated.
Another armed group with potential  future significance is the Irak 
Türkmen Cephesi (Iraqi Turkmen Front, ITF), which claims to protect 
Turkmen rights in Kirkuk, Mosul, and areas in the Diyala Governorate 
with substantial Turkmen populations. With the apparent consent of 
Baghdad and the KRG, they have received training and equipment 
from Turkish Special Forces and have participated in offensives against 
ISIS. The central government has announced plans to incorporate the ITF 
into the Iraqi Armed Forces  after ISIS is defeated.
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Regional Allies of the Iraqi Government
Since 2011, improved relations between Damascus and Baghdad have led 
to intelligence sharing, coordination of some military operations, and a 
limited number of Syrian air strikes against ISIS targets in Iraq. Contin­
ued cooperation, however, is dependent on the influence of Iran, which 
is by far Baghdad’s most significant regional ally in the fight against ISIS. 
This should be no surprise, given the two states’ proximity and the two 
governments’ numerous po liti cal and religious affinities. In addition, 
many of Iraq’s current po liti cal elite— members of the Islamic Dawa or 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Parties— spent many years in 
exile in the Islamic Republic, where they cooperated with that country’s 
intelligence ser vices in attempts to overthrow Saddam Hussein.56
Iran has provided financial, technical, and logistical support to the 
governments of Nuri al­ Maliki and Haider al­ Abadi. In addition to fund­
ing, training, and equipping the  People’s Mobilization Units (PMUs), 
Iran has assisted in the planning of offensives and provided weapons and 
ammunition to the Kurdish Peshmerga.57 Despite repeated claims to the 
contrary, since summer 2014 Tehran has also intervened in the conflict 
directly, mounting air strikes against ISIS targets and deploying armor 
and infantry in coordination with Peshmerga, PMUs, and Iraqi Army 
troops. In the pro cess, IRGC forces have sustained numerous casualties, 
including the death of several se nior officers.58
Armed Opposition to the Iraqi Government
At first glance, the story of armed opposition to the Iraqi government is as 
complex and confusing as that in Syria. Groups have changed names, al­
liances, and apparent purpose with dizzying frequency. Furthermore, in 
the absence of verifiable information, it is often difficult to determine 
 whether some smaller units are currently affiliated with one larger um­
brella group or another, or if some groups remain active. In addition, ob­
servers  can’t agree on the orientation of many groups, alternately describ­
ing the same organ ization as “Baathist, “tribal,” or “Islamist.”
Yet, upon closer examination, several significant facts become clear. 
First, as in Syria, the insurgency features numerous continuities with past 
events and actors. For example, key institutions, ideologies, policies, and 
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officials of Saddam Hussein’s regime featured in the post­2003 insurgency 
and have  shaped its continuing existence.
Second, many manifestations of the ongoing insurgency  were utterly 
preventable. In other words, the actions of the Maliki government pro­
duced, in some mea sure, the resumption of broad­ based conflict and fre­
quently hampered efforts to defeat ISIS. Many groups that participated 
in the uprisings against U.S. forces ceased hostilities, demobilized, and/
or changed their mode of opposition  after the implementation of the 2011 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that led to the withdrawal of U.S. 
combat troops. The Maliki government’s violation of previous agreements 
to incorporate Sunni insurgents into Iraqi government forces, its manip­
ulation of national elections to deny office to Sunni candidates, and its 
violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations have prompted many to 
take up arms again.59 Furthermore, several Sunni insurgent leaders, 
though avowed enemies of ISIS, have often refused to attack its positions 
 until  these and other grievances against the central government are 
addressed.
In addition, many of ISIS’s most stunning military successes in Iraq 
can be attributed to former prime minister Nuri al­ Maliki’s efforts to 
“coup proof” Iraq’s armed forces, replacing more competent profession­
als with loyal cronies who  were often inexperienced, corrupt, and prone 
to abandon the soldiers and civilians  under their command upon the first 
threat of insurgent attack.60 Fi nally, although Iran’s robust participation 
in the campaign against ISIS appears to have temporarily rescued Bagh­
dad from itself, its perceived domination of Iraq virtually guarantees the 
per sis tence of a Sunni insurgency into the foreseeable  future.
 Because  these issues defy classification, I have not attempted to place 
the major armed opposition groups into neat categories. Instead, I sim­
ply treat them in turn, indicating in each case the vari ous ways they have 
been characterized given their origins, their stated goals, and their pos­
tures  toward ISIS and the Iraqi government. ISIS is treated last.
Al­ Qiyada al­ Aliyya lil­ Jihad wal­ Tahrir (Supreme Command for 
Jihad and Liberation, SCJL), is a co ali tion of twenty­ three armed groups 
operating throughout much of Iraq. Founded in 2007, most of its con­
stituent members took up arms against the United States in 2003. The 
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SCJL ceased attacking Iraqi government targets  after the 2011 SOFA im­
plementation, only to resume hostilities with Baghdad in January 2014. 
The SCJL describes itself as “Islamist” and “Arab nationalist,” but  because 
it is led by former Iraqi vice president Izaat Ibrahim al­ Douri, many ob­
servers have characterized it as Baathist. The largest and most formidable 
of its components is Jaysh Rijal al­ Tariqa al­ Naqshbandiyya (Army of the 
Men of the Naqshbandi [Sufi] Order), which is also led by al­ Douri. SCJL 
is implacably opposed to the current Iraqi government and its Ira nian pa­
tron. Thus, though not formally allied with ISIS, it has praised some of 
the group’s actions and partnered with it during the 2014 “Northern Of­
fensive” that captured Mosul and other Iraqi cities.
Al­ Majlis al­ Askari al­ Amm li Thuwwar al­ Iraq (General Military 
Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries, GMCIR) was founded in January 2014 
by former bureaucrats and military officers of the Saddam Hussein re­
gime, reportedly in response to the Maliki regime’s killing of unarmed 
Sunni protestors in 2012 and 2103. The GMCIR, sometimes character­
ized as “tribal,” describes itself as demo cratic and nonsectarian and claims 
to command 75,000 armed fighters in Anbar and four other governor­
ates. Like the SCJL, it is an opponent of Ira nian influence in Iraq and 
cooperated with ISIS in the 2014 Northern Offensive.
Al­ Majlis al­ Askari li Thuwwar Al­ Ashair (Military Council of Tribal 
Revolutionaries), popularly known as the Anbar Tribes Revolutionary 
Council, is the most recent incarnation of Anbar Governorate– centered 
tribal militias that participated in the 2003–07 insurgency as well as the 
anti–al Qaeda “Awakening.” Formerly led by Sheikh Ali Hatem al­ 
Suleiman, they once boasted of 60,000 (mostly Dulaim) tribesmen at 
arms. The council also attempted, post­ SOFA, to engage in peaceful elec­
toral politics. As the Maliki government suppressed  these efforts, the 
council returned to armed re sis tance, participating in the 2014 Northern 
Offensive. Unlike many other insurgent groups, the council does not de­
mand the dissolution of the current Iraqi government. But it has refused 
to attack ISIS forces  until government troops are withdrawn from Anbar 
and other governorates and other demands are met.
Al­ Majlis al­ Siyasi lil­ Muqawamat al­ Iraqiyya (Po liti cal Council for 
the Iraqi Re sis tance, PCIR) is a co ali tion of several insurgent groups that 
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also demobilized in 2011 and attempted to participate in the po liti cal pro­
cess. The most significant of its members are Hamas al­ Iraq (Hamas of 
Iraq), Al­ Jabha al­ Islamiyya lil­ Muqawama al­ Iraqiyya– Jama (Islamic 
Front for the Iraqi Re sis tance), and al­ Jaysh al­ Islami fi al­ Iraq (Islamic 
Army in Iraq, IAI). The IAI was one of the largest and most effective 
groups participating in the 2003–07 anti­ U.S. insurgency, in the Awak­
ening against AQI, and in the ISIS­ led campaign that captured Mosul.61
By the summer of 2010, the Islamic State of Iraq was on the verge of 
extinction.62 U.S., Iraqi government, and Sunni Awakening forces had 
killed its top leadership, severely depleted its ranks, and driven it from 
most cities. Two sets of events transformed its fortunes: The onset of the 
Syrian civil war and the actions of the Maliki government. The withdrawal 
of Syrian armed forces and security ser vices from the Sunni­ majority 
regions along the country’s eastern border created another theater of opera­
tions, enabling ISI’s new leader, Abu Bakr al­ Baghdadi, to transform 
al­ Zarqawi’s Iraq­ centered proj ect into a truly transnational enterprise.63 
And the Maliki government’s refusal to pay the salaries of former Awaken­
ing fighters now on the Iraqi government payroll sent experienced, vengeful 
insurgents flooding back into ISI’s ranks.
This transfusion of manpower and expertise also threw yet another 
continuity into sharp relief: the ideological affinities and intertwined 
histories of ISIS and Iraqi Baathism. When named ISI’s new amir, al­ 
Baghdadi immediately began to expand on al­ Zarqawi’s policy of enlisting 
as many of Saddam’s former military and security personnel as pos si ble. 
Many became midlevel and se nior military commanders.64 And ISIS’s 
reor ga nized intelligence and security agencies— al­ Amniyyat— were 
designed, staffed, and managed by former officers of Saddam’s feared 
Mukhabarat.65 Furthermore, as of late 2015, all of Abu Bakr al­ Baghdadi’s 
se nior advisers and governors of Iraqi governorates  were former officers 
in the pre­2003 army, ostensibly secular Baathists closely associated with 
Saddam Hussein’s notorious eldest son, Uday.66
In fact, al­ Baghdadi’s personal history is replete with Baathist asso­
ciations. He was a member of “Saddam’s Youth,” in which he absorbed 
sectarian bigotry and the normalization of authoritarian government.67 
He received his BA, MA, and PhD at the Saddam University for Islamic 
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Studies, entry to which, scholars have argued, was impossible without 
references from se nior party members.68 Fi nally, rumors persist that close 
relatives of al­ Baghdadi  were employees of Saddam’s intelligence ser­
vices.69 All of  these connections have prompted some observers to declare 
that ISIS was “born out of the failure of the Baath” and to characterize the 
organ ization as “a spectral holdover of . . .  ‘secular’ Baathism.”70 Indeed, in 
many ways, the murderous, fiercely intolerant found ers and leaders of 
ISIS are truly “Saddam’s  children.”71
Conclusion: The  Future of the Islamic State  
and of Nation- States
Unsurprisingly, the United States and its allies have failed to formulate 
and implement a policy that could achieve several contradictory objec­
tives: the destruction of ISIS, the preservation of the Iranian­ allied Iraqi 
regime, the elimination of the Iranian­ allied Syrian regime, the preser­
vation and enhancement of Western influence in the region, and the shap­
ing of NATO member Turkey’s be hav ior.
As a result, Iran has adroitly exploited vio lence and instability to trans­
form itself into a regional superpower, and Rus sia’s forceful intervention 
on behalf of the Assad regime has altered the calculus of regional actors. 
Specifically, Ankara has entered an awkward embrace with Moscow and 
Tehran, apparently abandoning its goal of displacing Bashar al­ Assad. Tur­
key has instead “refocused on curbing Kurdish expansion” in northern 
Syria.72 Thus the trajectory of events seems clear. The Iranian­ allied re­
gimes in Damascus and Baghdad  will remain in power, the U.S.­ allied 
Kurds’ aspirations for autonomy in northern Syria  will be thwarted, and 
Western influence in the region  will be further diminished.
Yet, owing to the Syrian and Iraqi regimes’ incompetence, corrup­
tion, and brutality, “victories” like  those in Aleppo, Mosul, and Raqqah 
 will not herald the imminent return to stability. Neither do they suggest 
that  either regime can successfully govern  these “liberated” territories.73 
ISIS,  under this or another name,  will almost certainly retain the capac­
ity to wage guerrilla warfare and mount spectacular terrorist operations.74 
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Even an absolute military victory over the Islamic State would not mean 
an end to conflict, for, as Andrew Bacevich has noted, the “conditions 
that had given rise to ISIS would persist.”75
In Syria, although the Assad regime has used propaganda effectively 
to convince a sizable segment of the population that it alone can engen­
der a return to “normal life,” economic realities  will almost certainly 
prevent the emergence of anything resembling that state.76 And, in the 
absence of fundamental changes to what is widely perceived as a police 
state of profound sectarian complexion, “deep divisions in the polity”  will 
endure and fester.77
In Iraq many Sunnis appear to believe that the establishment of Ira­
nian hegemony in their country was the opening gambit in a global con­
spiracy contrived to “disinherit” “1.3 billion Sunni Muslims.”78  Unless 
the Abadi regime or its successors sincerely attempt to address the le­
gitimate grievances of Iraq’s Sunni citizens, the number of  those who 
currently see violent re sis tance à la ISIS as their “only option” is almost 
certain to increase.79
In brief, if regional actors seek to reduce support for ISIS and simi­
larly violent expressions of opposition to the existing po liti cal order, they 
should promote the establishment of better governance. Other wise, vi­
cious conflict  will emerge once more, featuring protagonists whose de­
stabilizing potential meets or exceeds that of ISIS.
Notes
 1 I encountered this term in an article by Elizabeth Tsurkov and Hasan al­ 
Homsi, “Seven Months  after ‘Liberating’ Palmyra, Residents Still Cannot 
Return,” Atlantic Council, October 13, 2016 (www . atlanticcouncil . org 
/ blogs / syriasource / seven ­ months ­ after ­ liberating ­ palmyra ­ residents ­ still 
­ cannot ­ return). Perhaps a more evocative euphemism is “denominational 
cleansing,” found in Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan’s ISIS: Inside the 
Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2016), p. 142. Examples of  these 
practices abound. On ISIS’s forced conversion of the Druze in northern 
Syria, see Aymen Jawad Al­ Tamimi, “Dar al­ Qada Statement in Jabal al­ 
Summaq: Translation & Analy sis,” Atlantic Council, November 18, 2016 
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perceived opponents in Darayya, see Hosam Al­ Jablawi, “Assad Ends ‘Da­
mascus Reconciliations’ and Makes Stopping the Bombing Conditional on 
the Opposition’s Departure,” Atlantic Council, October 19, 2016 (www 
. atlanticcouncil . org / blogs / syriasource / assad ­ ends ­ damascus ­ reconciliations 
­ and ­ makes ­ stopping ­ the ­ bombing ­ conditional ­ on ­ the ­ opposition ­ s 
­ departure). On the Kurdish  People’s Defense Units looting, burning, and 
evicting Arabs in the Jazira, see Haid Haid, “The Impact of the Kurdish­ 
Led Campaign to Isolate Raqqa,” SyriaSource, November 15, 2016 (www 
. atlanticcouncil . org / blogs / syriasource / the ­ impact ­ of ­ the ­ kurdish ­ led 
­ campaign ­ to ­ isolate ­ raqqa). On ISIS’s slaughter of Shia soldiers in Tikrit, 
see Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, p. 30. On ISIS slaughtering, expelling, raping, 
and enslaving the Yazidi  people of Mt. Sinjar, see Sami Moubayed,  Under the 
Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 
p. 138. On Assad regime­ sanctioned massacres in the Orontes River Valley, 
see Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, p. 168. On Shia militias’ multiple war crimes 
conducted with U.S. air support in central and western Iraq, see Weiss and 
Hassan, ISIS, p. xvi. On Sadrists and Iranian­ run Special Groups occupying 
army checkpoints to identify, lead away, and execute Sunnis, see Moubayed, 
 Under the Black Flag, p. 138. On the National Defense Force carry ing out 
“anti­ Sunni pogroms,” see Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, p. 132. On Iraqi military 
and police units  under the direct authority of Prime Minister Maliki engag­
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Islamic State– Khurasan Province
Amin Tarzi
The international threat assessments and strategies to  counter the group referring to itself as the Islamic State (IS) have been focused on Iraq 
and Syria, where IS has emerged as a serious threat to international secu-
rity and from 2014 to 2017 held large swaths of territory in  those two 
countries.1 Although the territoriality of IS in Iraq and Syria has dimin-
ished significantly, the group’s ideology and affinity are spreading into 
regional groups as well, expanding IS’s potential reach and regional de-
stabilizing ability. Affiliates and supporters of IS in other parts of the 
world, such as Af ghan i stan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—in which  there is a proclaimed IS province 
(wilayah)— have received varying degrees of international attention de-
pending on the scale and type of threat they pose to broader international 
security.2 The availability of assets by the United States and/or other IS- 
countering states in the aforementioned countries also influences the range 
of strategies available to respond to  these groups’ activities and territorial 
aspirations. One such group is the Islamic State– Khurasan Province 
(ISKP), active in Af ghan i stan and Pakistan.3 ISKP proclaims to represent 
an area covering Central Asia, most of India, and parts of Iran. This chap-
ter examines ISKP from its formal emergence in early 2015 and explores 
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ISKP’s use of historic and imaginary Khurasan in identity formation and 
its relationship with established Islamist organ izations, particularly the 
Taliban, active in the area. The chapter reviews some aspects of the con-
flict between the two groups and how this conflict is affecting the strate-
gies and interests of regional and local governments as well as the United 
States to  counter ISKP. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how 
to incorporate lessons learned from this situation into broader interna-
tional counterterrorism strategies.
Black Flags Unfurl in Af ghan i stan
In 2014 individuals and small groups of disgruntled Islamists in Af ghan-
i stan and Pakistan began pledging allegiance to IS in Iraq and its leader, 
Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi. The sources of discontent  were numerous and a 
combination of vari ous  factors. Some began distancing themselves from 
the policies and theological leanings of their existing groups.4  Others had 
personal disputes with their leadership. A number  were awed by the suc-
cesses of IS in Iraq and  later Syria, and some  were mere opportunists look-
ing for better compensation or adventure. What ever their grievance or 
motivation, they found individual reasons to align themselves with this 
newly emerging pan- Islamist group.5
In early 2014, IS expansion grew beyond individual pockets of dis-
content, as a dozen mostly Pakistani militants pledged their allegiance to 
IS, beginning the very dynamic and often misinterpreted formation of 
what has become ISKP. The principal cadre of IS influence in Af ghan i-
stan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan had 
links to a number of militant organ izations, including more established 
jihadist organ izations such as al Qaeda, Lashkar- e Taiba, Harakat al- 
Mujahdin, and Tahrik- e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and smaller newly 
emerged outfits like Tahrik- e Khilafat wa Jihad ( later renamed Ansar 
al- Khilafat wal- Jihad) and Jundullah (both the Pakistan- based and the 
mostly Uzbek, Afghanistan- based organ izations).6 In the fall the com-
mander (amir) of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Osman 
Ghazi (aka Adil/Odil Osman), issued a statement aligning IMU with IS 
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and breaking its longstanding alliances with al Qaeda and the Taliban. 
Ghazi did not, however, pledge allegiance to al- Baghdadi.7 With IMU 
coming alongside, a locally grown IS presence grew in the region.
Central Asian Connections
The rationale  behind IMU’s decision is curious and remains understud-
ied. The move by IMU may have represented an ideological shift by the 
militant organ ization or its leader. Instead of seeking to depose the gov-
ernments of Central Asian states and institute the sharia, maybe the idea 
of establishing a pan- Islamist global caliphate resonated with Ghazi. Upon 
declaring the intention of his group to join ranks with IS, Ghani praised 
the organ ization’s disregard for state bound aries and expressed hope that 
IS would take control of Palestine, Mecca, and Medina.8 While this was 
the ideology followed by another Uzbek- dominated group, Hizb al- Tahrir 
al- Islami, this message was unfamiliar to the majority of IMU’s core con-
stituents.9 It also could have been related to more practical concerns as-
sociated with IMU’s areas of operation and alliances rather than with an 
ideological shift. In June 2014, Pakistan launched military operations 
code- named Zarb- e Azb to curtail militant presence and activities in 
FATA, whose principal targets  were TTP, its local affiliates, and IMU.10 
As a result, IMU’s maneuverability was considerably restricted and its se-
curity threatened. Meanwhile, IMU’s longstanding alliance with the 
Afghan Taliban was weakening as the latter gained more po liti cal ac cep-
tance and was increasingly tolerated by both China and Rus sia.  These 
two countries regard the Uzbek group as a serious threat to the security 
and stability of trans- Oxus Central Asia and Xingjian. IMU potentially 
saw an opportunity to reshape its alliances to ensure survivability and rel-
evance in the region. What the proclamation did for IS, in theory if not 
in practice, was enable it to lay claim to adherents in Transoxiana.
Birth of ISKP
Initial reports of an or ga nized group calling itself ISKP emerged in Jan-
uary 2015 in two locations in Af ghan i stan: in the eastern Afghan province 
of Nangarhar close to the border with FATA, and in the Kajaki district 
of the southern Afghan province of Helmand. The group seemed an 
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amalgamation of the individualized IS adherents, al Qaeda discontents, 
and IMU, rebranded  under one name proclaiming itself to be IS in 
Khurasan. By late January, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al- Adnani of-
ficially announced the expansion of his group’s authority to Khurasan, a 
region he identified as encompassing Af ghan i stan, Pakistan, and other ad-
jacent territories. Adnani called on all in Khurasan who professed the 
unity of God or Unitarians (muwahhidun) to abandon disunity and fac-
tionalism by joining the caliphate (IS). Use of the term “muwahhidun” by 
Adnani reached back to early Islamic radical mono the ism and iconoclasm 
in Hijaz.11
Muwahhidun, originally theologized by Taqi al- Din ibn Taymiyyah 
(d. 1328),  later became the self- designated name for the forces  under Mu-
hammad ibn Abd al- Wahhab (d. 1792).12 The term in modern Salafist 
thought is a rejection of the Shiis, Islamic mysticism (Sufism), the customs 
of veneration of saints and statuary, and any action or object that in their 
view brings an association with the absoluteness of the unity of God. Evok-
ing Afghan history, Adnani referred to his audience as the progeny of 
 those who had fought against British and Rus sian oppression and called 
on them to join the new fight against the Americans and to enforce mono-
the ism (tawid) and vanquish polytheism (shirk). The IS spokesman identi-
fied Hafiz Sayyid Khan, formerly commander of TTP in the Orakzai 
Agency within FATA, as the governor (wali) of Khurasan Province and 
Shaykh Abd al- Rauf Khadim Abu Talhah as his deputy.13
Initially, ISKP had limited success in recruiting. It had gained several 
hundred active recruits and a larger number of sympathizers in FATA as 
well as in the Afghan provinces of Nangarhar, Helmand, Kunar, Logar, 
and possibly Farah, Zabul, and Ghazni, though some of the early activities 
attributed to ISKP  were  later discredited or revealed to be exaggerated. In 
February, ISKP suffered a considerable setback when Khadim was killed in 
an air strike in Kajaki, reducing the group’s territorial presence to only a 
few districts of Nangarhar where they had entrenched themselves.14
ISKP  under Assault
By summer 2015, according to General John F. Campbell, commander 
of U.S. Forces in Af ghan i stan (USFOR- A), ISKP had become “operation-
ally emergent in Af ghan i stan,” leading to the authorization in December 
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for the U.S. forces to target ISKP fighters by affiliation, regardless of 
 whether they posed a direct threat to U.S. or allied forces.15 In 2016 the 
joint U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism operation Green Sword killed 
one- third of ISKP’s members, including its leader, Hafiz Sayyid Khan, 
and reduced the territory the group held by two- thirds. This effort was 
augmented by Taliban attacks, which reduced ISKP to fewer than 
3,000 fighters.16 By some estimates, ISKP fighters had been reduced to 
1,200–1,300 in September 2016, and even as low as 700 by April 2017.17 
By this time, ISKP’s territorial hold was reduced to three districts in 
Nangarhar.
Although any rapid territorial expansion of ISKP inside Af ghan i stan 
or Pakistan seems highly improbable,  there are opportunities for ISKP 
to gain territory— both po liti cally and literally—as Af ghan i stan’s po-
liti cal situation remains unstable and its relations with the Pakistanis 
ebb and flow between conflict and cooperation. Further disenchant-
ment within the Taliban about their peacemaking deals and accommo-
dating policies both inside Af ghan i stan and with regional countries also 
could create a vacuum for ISKP to fill, despite the group’s weak posi-
tion and the fact that its message is alien to the majority of Afghans and 
Pakistanis.
Working to prevent the growth of ISKP requires more than kinetic 
action. An understanding of the narrative employed by ISKP and opera-
tionalizing the inconsistencies inherent therein would be a major step 
in preventing the group from expanding beyond the limited number 
of hardcore Salafists, castaways, and opportunists waving the IS black 
banner.
Whither Khurasan?
The story of Khurasan is part myth, part theology, and part geography, 
intermingled with the story of the expansion of Islam among non- Arabs 
in the lands formerly  under the rule of the Sasanian Empire. Khurasan 
continues to symbolize and mean diff er ent  things to pan- Islamists, Ira ni-
ans, and Afghans. The majority of reports and analyses on ISKP take 
the group’s understanding of Khurasan to be geo graph i cally framed as 
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an area encompassing Af ghan i stan and Pakistan, the Central Asian re-
publics, and parts of eastern (or all of ) Iran and western (or all of ) India, 
while some have identified the area as simply meaning Af ghan i stan and 
Pakistan; few have questioned the historicity of ISKP’s understanding of 
the term.18 What does the word Khurasan symbolize?
The use of myths is a natu ral part of any po liti cal organ ization’s quest to 
claim legitimacy and garner support, especially  those trying to link 
their aims and campaigns to historical periods of grandeur— real or 
 perceived—to achieve greater glory. In its use of myths and fables as well 
as religious allegories, IS joins a long list of organ izations trying to change 
the status quo with extreme vio lence while offering an idealized  future 
for  those who follow its dictates and vision. In counterterrorism, under-
standing how myths are operationalized by an organ ization such as IS can 
be instrumental to countering its broader narrative and appeal to the in-
tended audience of  these accounts.
Khurasan in the Global Jihadist and Local Lexicons
For the Islamists who seek to establish a global caliphate by force, 
Khurasan’s significance is related to a saying attributed by some Sunni 
Muslims to the Prophet Muhammad that an army carry ing black flags 
originating from Khurasan  will include the Mahdi (Messiah) among 
them. The chain of transmission of this prophetic tradition remains very 
weak, and  there are diff er ent versions of this saying, one of which is that 
the deliverance of Muhammad’s own  family from suffering  will come 
from the east.19 The messianic version,  whether evoked by a fringe al 
Qaeda group in Syria in September 2014 or by ISKP, has an amplified 
symbolism denoting the ultimate apocalyptic  battle between Islam and 
its enemies.20 However, for Ira nian and  later Afghan historical under-
standing, the significance of Khurasan— including the black banners—is 
tied to the enigmatic historical figure and the  later legends of Abd al- 
Rahman bin Muslim (d.755), better known as Abu Muslim al- Khurasani.21 
Abu Muslim and his followers wore black clothing and carried a black 
flag when leading the revolt from Khurasan against the Arab- dominated 
Umayyad Caliphate, bringing to power the joint Persian- Arab Abbasid 
dynasty and ushering in what is considered to be the zenith of Islamic 
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power. Abu Muslim was instrumental in the resurgence of the Ira nian 
 peoples within the Arab- dominated Muslim empire and in the revival 
of Ira nian cultural and linguistic heritage. This resurgence began in 
Khurasan, where Abu Muslim became the overlord before being killed 
on the order of the very dynasty he had helped bring to power.22 His-
torically, in the Ira nian, Turkic, and  later Afghan worlds, Abu Muslim is 
associated with the rise of local forces in the face of Arab domination as 
well as, in some cases, with the beginnings of activist Shiism.23 In fact, 
the national flag of Af ghan i stan  until 1927 was all black with a white seal 
in its center.
In addition to the starkly divergent meanings associated with Khurasan 
and the black flags by  those living in the region and the Islamist propa-
ganda from outside the region,  there are contradictions in how the two 
groups define the geo graph i cal limits of Khurasan as well. Since the con-
quest of the eastern flank of the Sasanian Empire by the Arabs in the 
mid- seventh  century, the province of Khurasan has existed on maps and 
covers a geographic space roughly corresponding to modern- day north-
eastern Iran, southern Turkmenistan, southern Uzbekistan, all of Tajiki-
stan, and most of Af ghan i stan, with the exception of the eastern and 
southern strip of the country bordering present- day Pakistan. In no 
historical or  later rendition has Khurasan included Pakistan, India, or 
beyond.24  Today, in Iran, Khurasan appears in the names of three north-
eastern Ira nian provinces.
For Af ghan i stan, the term has a much more po liti cal appeal in that 
country’s ongoing national identity strug gles and formulations. Since the 
1930s, as part of Af ghan i stan’s nation- building pro cess, the country’s 
history has been linked to pre- Islamic Aryana and to Khurasan in Is-
lamic tradition. In this constructed narrative, Af ghan i stan, since 1747, is 
positioned as the successor state to Khurasan, sharing in its glories and 
re sis tance, including against the domination of the Arab Umayyads. Abu 
Muslim’s birthplace, which commonly is accepted as Merv in modern- day 
Turkmenistan, has been shifted to the northern Afghan city of May-
mana in the Afghan narrative, and he has been elevated to the status of 
an Afghan hero.25 Since the Soviet invasion and through the Taliban 
period,  people mobilized around ethnic identities, and  battles,  whether 
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against the communists or the Taliban,  were fought largely along ethnic 
lines. Khurasan serves as a counterbalance to the Pashtun domination of 
the country, providing a more inclusive national construct. The word Af-
ghan i stan means the land of the Afghans, another name for Pashtuns. 
Non- Pashtun citizens of Af ghan i stan have been using Khurasan as their 
preferred name for the country, signifying its non- Pashtun and, thus, in-
clusive past.
Operationalization of the Term Khurasan
The use of the term Khurasan by ISKP allows the group to signal to fol-
lowers and to enemies that it is now in a position to initiate the final  battle 
for Islamic domination of the world and the arrival of the Mahdi. The 
Afghan analyst Borhan Osman writes that the substitution of Khurasan 
for Af ghan i stan and Pakistan allows IS to avoid the recognition of nation- 
states, a construct that the pan- Islamists reject.26 This argument would 
have had more currency if IS had not pointedly included in its own name 
the word “state” (al- dawlah), which was a late inclusion in Islamic termi-
nology through the Ottomans and is subtly diff er ent than the notion of a 
caliphate.27 The IS strategy, which falls outside the scope of this chapter, 
seems more a geopo liti cal reor ga ni za tion of existing nation- states than an 
effort to eliminate them.
However, Osman’s suggestion reveals another, perhaps unintended, 
consequence, which if not countered may provide  future currency for the 
ISKP model. Improving Afghan- Pakistani relations remains a critical as-
pect of enhancing security and stability, not only in Af ghan i stan but also 
increasingly in Pakistan and indeed in the region as a  whole. The long-
standing border dispute between the two neighbors has led to de cades of 
both states denying the full legitimacy of the other and pres ents an ever- 
present obstacle to building trust between the neighbors. On the one 
hand, the mistrust and conflict have led Islamabad to meddle in internal 
Afghan politics, including through the use of proxies. On the other 
hand, Kabul has blamed its neighbor for all its ills while maintaining 
territorial ambitions on Pakistani territory. Each side has, at times, har-
bored and nurtured ele ments that could and do threaten and seek to 
destabilize the other. The emergence of the Taliban phenomenon in the 
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1990s and its survival  after 2001 are widely regarded as manifestations of 
this.28 If Afghan- Pakistani relations do not witness a fundamental change 
whereby the two countries establish a genuine strategic understanding, 
 future groups like ISKP that espouse a territorially unbound, anti-
national system of an Islamic state or caliphate might find room for 
greater maneuverability in the region and be used by one or the other 
side or by ele ments within each government to impose that government’s 
interests on the other. Again, the emergence of the initial Taliban move-
ment in the Afghan po liti cal scene in the mid-1990s should be a vivid 
reminder of such a potentiality.29
Since the Khurasan narrative and symbols used by ISKP contradict 
what the majority of the local populations believe about Khurasan, a 
deeper operationalization of this discrepancy, using local, historical, and 
national symbols— particularly in the case of Afghanistan— might fur-
ther diminish any potential appeal that this organ ization may have be-
yond the circle of dedicated pan- Islamists. The debunking of ISKP’s 
“Khurasan” claim, both historically and geo graph i cally, could also lessen 
the appeal of joining up for  future fringe ele ments who might be attracted 
to the organ ization for its claim to a history and territory that, for  these 
ele ments, evoke a historical strug gle, be it anti- Pashtun in the case of Af-
ghan i stan or Islamist pan- Turkic in the case of Central Asia.
Islamic State versus Islamic Emirate
Although Af ghan i stan did not give birth to IS, the country was pivotal 
in the upbringing of its “founding  father,” Abu Musab al- Zarqawi. The 
links between the leadership of what has become IS and Af ghan i stan go 
back to the 1980s Islamist- nationalist re sis tance groups against the Sovi-
ets (commonly referred to as the Mujahidiin) and the government they 
supported in Kabul and continued with the emergence of the Taliban and 
their rule over most of that country from the mid-1990s to 2001.30 The 
current leader of IS, al- Baghdadi, is alleged to have lived for some time 
in Kabul  under the Taliban in the 1990s. He was affiliated with al Qaeda 
while Zarqawi first fought against the leftist Afghan government and  later 
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returned in 2000 with al Qaeda’s support to run a jihadist training camp 
in the western Afghan city of Herat.  These spaces outside of the Afghan 
government’s control served as an “incubator” for individuals who  later 
became the core leadership of IS.31
The Islamic Emirate of Af ghan i stan
Almost two de cades before al- Baghdadi’s declaration of the Islamic State 
and his assumption of the title of caliph, the Taliban Movement of Af-
ghan i stan in September 1996 declared their leader Mullah Muhammad 
Omar Mujahid to be the commander of the faithful (amir al- muminin) 
in Qandahar and announced the formation of the Islamic Emirate of Af-
ghan i stan.32 From the outset, unlike IS, the Taliban sought international 
legitimacy, but only managed to secure formal recognition by three 
countries— Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The 
initial proclamations of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate  were mostly Afghan- 
centric. However, with the cementing of their ties with al Qaeda, their 
outlook became more pan- Islamist. Retrospectively, the strategies of the 
Taliban and  those of al Qaeda differed fundamentally, as the former 
wanted to become a national movement and be recognized by the inter-
national community as such, while the latter wanted to keep Af ghan i-
stan in a perpetual state of anarchy, using it as a base for waging global 
jihad. The current, or neo- , Taliban have mostly returned to the found-
ing Afghanistan- centric princi ples of the movement with an arguably less 
religiously zealous message, calling on Muslims to avoid extremism in 
the religion with the goal of becoming a legitimate force in the po liti cal 
arena of the country.33 Of course, the Taliban remain a violent insurgency 
and are very keen not only on retaining their mono poly over this vio lence 
but also on controlling and managing it.34
 Under the Islamic Emirate, the Taliban hosted Osama bin Laden and 
his al Qaeda organ ization, a policy that ultimately led to its po liti cal de-
mise in the aftermath of the 2001 terror attacks in the United States. 
However, while al Qaeda remained more of an idea than an organ ization 
or a po liti cal entity, the Taliban quickly or ga nized themselves into a gov-
erning organ ization and administrative system.35 An argument can be 
made that one of the weaknesses of the Taliban message was the lack of 
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a cohesive ideology other than trying to enforce a southern Afghan 
“village identity” on the entire country.36 One idea that has remained a 
guiding princi ple of the Taliban from the outset has been that of local-
ism, with  little regard beyond the occasional verbal support for  causes 
such as the Palestinian issue and some of the al Qaeda– inspired messag-
ing. In the early days of the Islamic Emirate, the localism of the Taliban 
did not extend beyond their own greater Qandahar region. Ayman al- 
Zawahiri, then al Qaeda’s deputy leader, reportedly warned Zarqawi 
before he left for Iraq not to repeat the  mistake of the Taliban whose 
power base hinged mostly on southern Af ghan i stan and the Qandahari 
ele ments therein.37 Perhaps learning from their initial  mistakes, the re-
emerged Taliban have tried to speak for all of Af ghan i stan, including 
providing assurances that they  will re spect the rights of the Shiites and 
other minorities within the country.
The emergence of ISKP occurred in a highly sensitive period for 
the Taliban, who had lost their elusive but unifying founding leader 
sometime in spring 2013. Although the movement managed to keep a lid 
on Mullah Omar’s demise  until it was officially revealed two years  later 
by the Afghan government, the Taliban had to deal with internal frac-
tures due to the absence of their undisputed leader in a time when major 
decisions needed to be made about  whether and how to make peace 
with the Afghan government, to open dialogue with foreign countries, 
and to shape relations with Pakistan, in addition to decisions on military 
 matters and expanding their areas of operation. Following the confirma-
tion of Mullah Omar’s death, the head of the Taliban leadership council, 
Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, became the new amir al- muminin 
and secured the allegiance of Zawahiri, among  others, but disagreements 
remained among top members of the movement over leadership posi-
tions.38 The Taliban leadership took another hit when in May 2016 the 
United States conducted an air strike, killing Mansur, who was replaced 
by Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada.39 Compounding the Taliban’s loss 
of personnel is the increased pressure being put on them by their “hith-
erto largely friendly host, Pakistan.” As a result, they are looking to move 
to more remote and unstable regions of Af ghan i stan, which brings the 
potential of conflict with ISKP.40
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Challenge to the Islamic Emirate
Taking advantage of the discontent over internal leadership strug gles, 
ISKP began recruiting among the Taliban members, meeting with lim-
ited success. ISKP used the absence of and  later the confirmation of the 
demise of Mullah Omar in their propaganda, courting disgruntled mem-
bers of the Taliban and arguing that he no longer was the legitimate leader 
of the Islamic community or emirate. They argued that  these former Tali-
ban should pledge their loyalty to al- Baghdadi, the legitimate Islamic 
leader. The most significant switching of sides occurred in the heartland 
of the Taliban, when Khadim set up a cell with a few hundred fighters in 
the Kajaki district of Helmand Province. He was a former commander of 
the Taliban who, according to Osman,  after being released from the 
U.S. detention fa cil i ty at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2007,  rose to prom-
inence, becoming the second in command within the movement’s mili-
tary establishment. He  later fell from grace  because of the Salafist views 
he acquired while in detention, which contradicted the Taliban’s steadfast 
adherence to local interpretations of Islam—an admixture of the Hanafi 
school of jurisprudence and local Pashtun customary codes. For the core 
IS leadership, Khadim exemplified an ideal representative in the region 
of Af ghan i stan and Pakistan. He followed their Islamist worldview based 
on forceful propagation and enforcement of strict mono the ism to the 
exclusion of the Shiites, Sufis, and local customs such as veneration of 
Muslim saints and visiting of shrines, adhered to their interpretation of 
the sharia, and rejected national bound aries. In addition, he had direct 
communication with IS leadership in Iraq and Syria while based in the 
heartland of the Taliban. What Khadim did not possess was the taste for 
brutality that had become the signature of IS operatives. In a trend that 
seems to have been the case for a majority of ISKP recruits, the rationale 
for Khadim’s association with the new organ ization was “pragmatic rather 
than based on convergence with the aims and methods of the IS.”41 Three 
years  after his triumphant return to the Taliban ranks, Khadim was mar-
ginalized from the Taliban leadership council, which had become domi-
nated by Mullah Mansur following Mullah Omar’s illness and ultimate 
demise. While Khadim’s Salafist tendencies might have been the cause 
for his marginalization,  there are also reports of intertribal conflicts that 
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 were complicating his commitment to the emerging Taliban leader-
ship. The cell formed by Khadim posed a danger to the Taliban as ISKP 
expanded beyond Khadim’s native Kajaki to neighboring districts of 
Musa Qala, Nawzad, and Baghran. Within weeks of Khadim’s appoint-
ment as the deputy governor of ISKP, he was killed in an airstrike, to the 
Taliban’s relief. Since Khadim’s death, no one of his stature has switched 
sides from the Taliban to ISKP.42
Despite tactical cooperation of con ve nience, on a strategic level ISKP 
continues to delegitimize and seek ways to weaken the Taliban. ISKP has 
tried to portray the Taliban as puppets of Pakistan and has criticized them 
for not committing to implement sharia- specified punishment and for 
tolerating the drug trade in the areas  under its control. They have also 
leveraged the perceived softening of the Taliban on the Shiite and other 
minorities to exploit ethnic divides by inserting indirect messaging of 
exclusion— for example, Adnani addressing his announcement of the for-
mation of ISKP specifically to the “muwahhidin in Khurasan,” which, 
of course, excludes the Shiites and other non- Salafists.43
The Emirate Strikes Back
In June 2015, ISKP reportedly killed three Taliban shadow district gov-
ernors in Nangarhar, ushering in full and open hostility between the Is-
lamic Emirate and the Islamic State.44 In response to this attack, Mullah 
Mansur, then acting as the head of the Taliban leadership council, dis-
patched an open letter to al- Baghdadi, warning that, if ISKP did not cease 
the formation of parallel jihadist fronts, the Taliban “[would] be forced to 
defend” their achievements. Mansur also cautioned IS leadership to dis-
trust  those “who  were  either disappointed with the Taliban  because of 
vari ous reasons or thrown out of their organ ization for committing 
crimes.”45 The letter revealed not only the threat that ISKP posed to the 
Taliban’s near mono poly of the Islamist re sis tance in Af ghan i stan and the 
fractures among its membership “for vari ous reasons,” but also the Tali-
ban’s positioning itself as the defender, the legitimate insurgent in this 
fight. Mansur’s letter failed to persuade IS leadership to curtail ISKP’s ac-
tivities.46 In fact, the two jihadist organ izations began targeting each other 
more vigorously and with increased vio lence. Signature IS brutalities such 
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as broadcasting beheadings and blowing up Taliban sympathizers began 
appearing in Af ghan i stan. This escalation of vio lence by ISKP provoked 
the Taliban ulama to issue a fatwa in June, allowing the Talibs to wage a 
“defensive” campaign to  counter ISKP in Nangarhar that resulted in sig-
nificant territorial losses for ISKP in the southern districts of the prov-
ince. By early January 2016 the Taliban ulama broadened their defensive 
edict to include an added obligation to wage an offensive jihad against 
ISKP.47
In late 2015 the Taliban also started  going  after ISKP affiliates and 
supporters beyond Nangarhar. In November the Taliban scored a decisive 
victory in the southern Afghan province of Zabul against the IMU— 
ISKP’s main Uzbek affiliate, killing its leader, Osman Ghazi. The Tali-
ban also began opposing the mainly Uzbek Jundullah, an IMU splinter 
group operating in northeastern Af ghan i stan in proximity to Tajikistan.48 
Commenting on the IMU’s conclusive defeat, an IS supporter posted this 
statement: “The Taliban achieved in 24 hours what the Americans  were 
unable to do in 14 years.”49  These victories  were a two- pronged blessing 
for the Taliban. First, the Taliban stopped a major local rival from gain-
ing a foothold in Af ghan i stan, isolating the IMU even more  after their 
displacement from FATA, and reversed the brief territorial gains made 
by Jundullah. Second, they  were propaganda boons for the Taliban in 
Central Asian, Chinese, and Rus sian circles.
Strug gles over Owner ship of Battlespace and Vio lence
The Taliban’s goal is to preserve the insurgency inside Af ghan i stan as its 
exclusive prerogative, and it has worked since ISKP’s formation to maintain 
the upper hand. Tensions are escalating between the two groups as ISKP 
seeks to insert itself into the Afghan po liti cal and military battlespace. In 
April 2016 a suicide attack at a bank in Jalalabad, the provincial capital of 
Nangarhar, resulted in over thirty deaths and many injuries. Another at-
tack close by, on the same day, targeted a Sufi saint’s shrine. The Taliban 
denied and condemned both attacks. According to Kate Clark, a re-
porter and analyst covering Af ghan i stan since 1999, the first bore the 
hallmarks of Taliban tactics; the second did not. In an unverified social 
media posting, Shahidullah Shahid, formerly a spokesman for TTP, 
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claimed responsibility for both attacks in the name of ISKP. The inter-
national news outlets and the Afghan government took his claim as fac-
tual; thus the first IS attack in Af ghan i stan was recorded.50 The denial of 
the attacks by the Taliban illustrated their movement’s responsiveness 
and sensitivity to local and perhaps even international attitudes  toward 
them. However, in attacks in June that targeted foreigners such as the 
Gurkha guards employed by the Canadian embassy in Kabul and an at-
tack on Mawlana Ataullah Faizani, a member of the Kabul provincial 
council, both the Taliban and ISKP claimed responsibility. In this case, 
according to a member of the Taliban speaking in private, his group 
claimed to have carried out the attacks, despite not having done so, to 
deflect attention away from ISKP, fearing their presence and activities 
would prolong the presence of foreign forces in Af ghan i stan. The removal 
of foreign forces from the country is the Taliban’s paramount demand for 
accepting a peaceful resolution of their insurgency.51
The  battle lines are drawn between the two Islamist organ izations. 
One the one hand, ISKP pres ents ideological and operational challenges 
for the Taliban, the defection of key Taliban leaders to ISKP being a sig-
nificant one, as that opens for ISKP the front door to the mind-set and 
strategies of the Taliban. On the other hand, overall the emergence of 
the new organ ization has also had a positive impact on the Taliban’s quest 
for broader ac cep tance both inside and outside of Af ghan i stan, as they 
seek to be a local Islamist solution to Af ghan i stan’s instability.
The wild card in this pursuit is Pakistan, the longtime backer and host 
of the Taliban. As echoed in early 2017 by the new commander of US-
FOR- A, General John W. Nicholson, “The insurgents cannot be defeated 
while they enjoy external sanctuary and support . . .  in Pakistan.”52 As 
the Taliban gain more acceptability with regional countries mainly 
 because of their opposition to ISKP, their submissiveness to Islamabad’s 
directives should be expected to decrease. The question to consider is 
 whether a united Taliban with more freedom of po liti cal decisionmak-
ing  will emerge to seriously engage in peace negotiations with the Af-
ghan government or  whether ISKP  will morph into a savvier spoiler role 
and create new alternatives to the Taliban, prolonging the instability in 
Af ghan i stan and the region.
06-3216-7-ch06.indd   133 04/17/18   12:49 am
134 Tarzi
Afghan Government Begins Counter- ISKP Operations
Early in 2016 ISKP’s activities started to attract attention from  others be-
sides its local Islamist competitor. Before that, other interested parties for 
the most part allowed the two groups to  battle it out between themselves. 
As ISKP was establishing itself in Nangarhar, the message to the local 
population and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
(ANDSF) was conciliatory. They did not harass government institutions 
and employees but claimed, according to one report, that they  were in 
Nangarhar to  counter the “ISI Emirate”— linking the Taliban with Pak-
istan’s Inter- Services Intelligence.53 With ISKP’s mid- January attack on 
the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, that all changed.  Until then, ANDSF 
had mostly been on the sidelines, engaging in limited campaigns against 
ISKP.  After that they went on full offensive against the group, supported 
by the Special Operations Joint Task Force– Afghanistan, the counterter-
rorism force within the U.S. Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Another 
group making a difference in the fight against ISKP in Nangarhar are 
the local fighters, who in contrast to the Afghan military “have made a 
name for being effective, aggressive against the  enemy and, unlike other 
places, not particularly abusive of the population.”54 The U.S. Depart-
ment of State also designated ISKP as a foreign terrorist organ ization, a 
label that rings true with the local militias who see the fight against ISKP 
as “an existential fight and the ISKP as a foreign force which has behaved 
with unparalleled brutality  towards civilians.”55
The impact on ISKP has been significant. Since the  middle of 2016 
the operations carried out by the Taliban, ANDSF, and the United States 
have severely disrupted ISKP’s territorial hold. During this time, ISKP 
reverted to its former modus operandi and reignited attacks on sectarian 
targets.  Whether this is  because of their failure to mount a successful cam-
paign to capture territory in  either Af ghan i stan or Pakistan or for some 
other reason is not known.
ISKP Reintroduces Sectarian Vio lence to the Afghan Conflict
The first manifestation of their resurrected strategy was in July 2016. ISKP 
claimed responsibility for an attack on a predominately Shiite demon-
stration that resulted in the death of eighty individuals and demonstrated 
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their reach into Kabul. In response to Taliban condemnation, ISKP is-
sued a fatwa claiming that the Shiites  were indisputably infidels, adding 
that any Sunni religious scholar who rejects this understanding and ISKP’s 
right to kill them is himself an apostate. In October two attackers tar-
geted a popu lar shrine during Ashura— the commemoration of the death 
of Husayn, a grand son of the Prophet Muhammad, who is the third imam 
for the Shiites— killing nineteen  people.56
The Taliban’s response shows how the group has evolved since its 
emergence in the 1990s. The Taliban condemned ISKP’s attacks, refer-
ring to the Shiites as their “ brothers.”57 In its initial campaign to gain 
control of Af ghan i stan in the 1990s, the Taliban at times targeted Shiites 
 because of their religious affiliation, not just  because of their refusal to 
submit to Taliban rule. As the movement gained more authority, its an-
tisectarian tendencies diminished. The neo- Taliban, in spite of its alli-
ances with militant jihadist outfits with antisectarian doctrines, has largely 
stayed away from sectarianism and has called on the Shiites to join the 
Taliban movement as an Islamic— rather than just Sunni— national lib-
eration front.  There are no credible statistics on the number of Shiites 
among the Taliban ranks, but the numbers are likely small given the low 
level of support for the Taliban in the predominantly Shiite regions of 
Af ghan i stan. The overarching policy of the movement has been to re-
main aloof on sectarian issues.
Overall, from the early days of the Afghan anticommunist re sis tance 
to the ensuing civil war and through the Taliban period, despite clear 
splits in groups based on sectarian identities, the level of Sunni- Shiite open 
confrontation in Af ghan i stan has been very low. In comparison with the 
levels of sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq and in Syria, the levels in Af-
ghan i stan have been almost negligible. Po liti cal grievances in Af ghan i stan 
are usually not based on sectarian issues. However, lack of open confron-
tation should not be regarded as an indication of lack of sectarian discord. 
 There is tension, perhaps less  because of theological issues (as in the case of 
the Salafist groups) and more  because of ethnohistorical questions of 
social justice and repre sen ta tion. Indeed, the preferred name for the 
country by many of Af ghan i stan’s non- Pashtun po liti cal activists is 
Khurasan, while some nationalist Hazarahs prefer the regional construct 
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of “Hazaristan” as their homeland. According to sociologist Anand Gopal, 
the Taliban have been unable to put into practice their nationalist vision, 
and although the “Taliban is not a ‘Pashtun movement’, it is a movement 
comprised predominantly of Pashtuns.”58
And this tension could be exploited. The majority of Afghans, includ-
ing the Taliban, thus far have tried to show a unified front against ISKP 
attacks, specifically  those targeting the Shiites. In addition, part of the 
Taliban’s current sectarian policies can be traced to their warming rela-
tionship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, an entity anathema to IS and 
its goals.
What Role  Will Iran Play?
According to some reports, the Taliban have drawn a red line on direct 
sectarian- driven operations, turning down financial incentives from Arab 
Gulf states to engage in anti- Iran and anti- Shiite operations.59 In prepa-
ration for the December 2016 conference of the Iran- based World Forum 
for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, according to its Secretary 
General Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, invitations  were extended to some “fig-
ures in the Taliban movement who believe in the unity of Muslims.”60 
The strengthening bonds with Shiite Iran challenges ISKP and the broader 
Arab- dominated IS community. With the potential growth of discon-
tent by non- Afghans and Afghan Salafists within ISKP’s ranks with cur-
rent Taliban leadership’s Shiite- tolerant or Shiite- friendly policies,  there 
are dangers that the hallmark antisectarianism of IS could be mobilized 
to further push Af ghan i stan’s war  toward a more sectarian conflict. Such 
a move could potentially reignite the regional proxy war in Af ghan i stan 
with realigned alliances and newcomers and increase the threat to global 
security emanating from regions of Af ghan i stan that fall outside of the 
government’s control. Moreover, if the Afghan government’s control over 
its territory deteriorates further, Iran could come to see the Taliban as its 
least threatening option, which would bring the complicating Ira nian 
voice— regardless of Tehran’s direct participation— into the on- again, off- 
again peace negotiations with the Taliban. The United States has publicly 
acknowledged Tehran’s backing of the Taliban, as well as Iran’s multidi-
mensional relationship with the Afghan government.61 It is also impor-
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tant to keep in mind that since 2001 the number of madrassas in Af-
ghan i stan qua dru pled, mostly funded by Iran and Saudi Arabia.62 If the 
sectarian divide in the country is politicized as it has been in Iraq and 
Syria, the gradu ates of  these schools most likely  will follow groups such 
as ISKP or even harsher versions of it and their Shiite equivalents. Fur-
thermore, since IS territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, its supporters in the 
Afghanistan- Pakistan region could provide any number of its ranks a ref-
uge and space to regroup and merge into an array of militant groups 
formerly based in Pakistan.63
Reemergence of Rus sia on the Afghan Scene
Another player in this complex security environment not to be ignored is 
Rus sia. In their operations against IMU and their overall opposition to 
IS- inspired or - backed groups, the Taliban have found a sympathetic ear 
in Moscow, potentially inducing the reinternationalization of the Afghan 
conflict. Taliban successes prompted Zamir Kabulov, Rus sia’s special 
envoy to Af ghan i stan, to state that “Taliban interests objectively coincide 
with ours.”64 The potential is reminiscent of the 1990s proxy wars sup-
ported by India, Iran, and Rus sia on one side and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
and, to a certain point, the United States on the other. To the discomfort 
of Kabul and New Delhi, the Rus sians with Ira nian and Chinese support 
have opened a dialogue with the Taliban. Rus sia, along with China and 
Pakistan— but without the participation of Af ghan i stan and India— held 
a meeting in Moscow in November 2016 to discuss countermea sures to 
the threats posed by ISKP.  After complaints by Af ghan i stan and India, 
another meeting in Moscow was or ga nized two months  later that in-
cluded representatives from Af ghan i stan and India. Although specific 
information about what the Moscow talks entailed is not available, the 
maneuverings are eerily reminiscent of the po liti cal jockeying before 
and  after the formation of the Taliban.65 According to General Nichol-
son, “Rus sia has overtly lent legitimacy to the Taliban,” and he added 
that Moscow, with a position based “not on facts,” believes the Taliban 
are only engaged against ISKP and not against the Afghan government.66 
Nicholson went even further in his accusations in April 2017 when he 
declined to refute reports that “they [the Rus sians] are sending weapons 
06-3216-7-ch06.indd   137 04/17/18   12:49 am
138 Tarzi
to the Taliban” to  counter ISKP— these weapons having surfaced in the 
Helmand Province.67
The multiplicity of groups and policies engaged in Af ghan i stan once 
again could undermine peace and stability in Af ghan i stan.  There is a risk 
to the continued legitimacy of the Afghan government and an incentive 
for the Taliban ranks to split to accommodate or take advantage of one 
or another group of potential supporters. Such a scenario would also open 
more opportunities for ISKP or its  future incarnations, not only inside 
Af ghan i stan and Pakistan but also in Central Asia and in India— Kashmir 
in par tic u lar. In 2008, while serving as his country’s ambassador to Af-
ghan i stan, Kabulov is reported to have said that the United States and its 
allies have repeated all of the Soviets’  mistakes, adding, “Now they are 
making  mistakes of their own, ones for which we do not own the copy-
right.”68 It would be in ter est ing to ask Ambassador Kabulov  whether Rus-
sia’s reemergence onto the Afghan scene would be regarded as a new 
 mistake or a solution.
A Way Forward
By the start of 2018, ISKP had yet to recover any significant territory 
and had fewer than 2,000 followers with some estimates as low as 700.69 
ISKP has thus far been unable to align its call for an apocalyptic fight to 
establish a largely undefined vision of an Islamic state (or caliphate) with 
the aspirations of the majority of Afghan or Pakistani Islamists who are 
more inclined to focus on establishing their own national or regional ver-
sions of Islamist polities. The message of ISKP has thus far alienated the 
majority of rural Afghans and Pakistanis. However,  there is a danger that 
they might attract followers among urban university students in both 
countries who are dissatisfied with the existing governments and oppo-
sition groups, and the group’s potential to morph into another manifes-
tation of militant Islam in  either country should not be overlooked.70
In Af ghan i stan, the Taliban remain an undeniable opposition force 
and as such have become a po liti cal and military real ity among the re-
gional states and beyond. They have had local success garnering support 
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and in military operations, having gained control over most of the coun-
try in the 1990s. They have experience employing both brutal vio lence 
and nonviolent mea sures and have used both to maintain that support and 
control and to gain po liti cal legitimacy. They have also faced defeat, tac-
tically before 2001 and strategically when their leadership was ousted 
from Af ghan i stan altogether as a result of the U.S.- led campaign Operation 
Enduring Freedom. Despite  those losses, they have maintained a sig-
nificant presence in the country, denying the Afghan government con-
trol in over 36  percent of the country’s districts. The Afghan government 
has been denied control despite the support of the United States, NATO, 
and the international co ali tion and having more funds at its disposal than 
 were allocated  under the Marshall Plan— the U.S. aid program that, be-
tween 1948 and 1952, helped sixteen Western Eu ro pean countries recover 
 after World War II.71 More recent nongovernmental reports indicate that 
the Taliban threaten 70  percent of Af ghan i stan, while being in full con-
trol of fourteen districts.72
Notwithstanding their internal leadership prob lems and difficulties 
with Pakistan over policy issues such as the modalities of reconciliation 
strategies with the Afghan government, the Taliban are still  viable op-
ponents. The advent of ISKP has challenged the Taliban’s mono poly over 
the insurgency and has opened an opportunity for ISKP to grow its ranks 
by attracting members of the movement who are dissatisfied with the 
Taliban leadership’s decisions. ISKP also has attracted former Taliban al-
lies such as TTP and IMU since the Taliban does not condone attacks 
inside Pakistan or in any of Transoxiana states.
Of the ninety- eight U.S.- designated terrorist groups, twenty operate 
in the Afghanistan- Pakistan region, and three violent extremist organ-
izations— including the Taliban— are active in the region.73 The advent 
of ISKP—an organ ization inspired and supported by the only militant 
jihadist group that has managed to control large swaths of territory— 
within this region can only delay even more the prospects for peace and 
security, not only in the region but also beyond. While ISKP is still in its 
infancy and in a relatively weak state of organ ization and proliferation, 
two  factors could mitigate its potential empowerment in the region and 
weaken the pan- Islamist message overall.
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The first and obvious  factor is the relationship between Af ghan i stan 
and Pakistan. Similar to the beginnings of IS in Iraq and Syria, ISKP ger-
minated in areas where governmental authority was weak or non ex is-
tent.  These groups fill vacuums; they seldom create them. The area known 
 today as FATA is a by-product of late- nineteenth- century po liti cal calcu-
lations by the British to ensure the safety of its imperial domains in India. 
Unlike the vacuums created as result of the war in Iraq, FATA is a land 
without central governance by colonial design. The Afghan ruler of the 
late nineteenth  century wanted to incorporate the area he referred to as 
Yaghistan— the land of the unruly or hostile— into his emirate and im-
pose the rule of governance therein; however, in the final agreement it 
remained a part of British India. In the case of Af ghan i stan and Pakistan, 
as I have argued elsewhere, both countries’ refusal to accept the viability 
of the other as a state with full sovereignty within their existing interna-
tionally accepted borders has been at the core of their inability to build a 
durable trusting relationship.74 The vacuum of authority in FATA par-
tially stems from the Afghan- Pakistani border disagreement, which al-
lows militants and terrorists to establish roots. In addition, both sides at 
times have used such groups to put pressure on the other side.  There  were 
reports in 2017 of an impending decision by Pakistan to incorporate 
FATA—an area similar in size to Belgium— into the province of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa; this would be a positive step  toward bringing governance 
to this region.75 However, governance needs to be coupled with pros-
pects for economic prosperity, which can be best achieved with an inclu-
sive package deal between Af ghan i stan and Pakistan. Such a deal would 
need the backing of their international partners, which include  those who 
regard ISKP as a direct threat to their own security. The idea is not new, 
but its implementation has always taken a back seat to more immediate 
concerns. However, failure to address this under lying cause of many of 
the immediate concerns is tantamount to treating the symptoms and not 
the disease. This disease is not only cross- contaminating Af ghan i stan and 
Pakistan but also spreading regionally and, through IS- style groups, into 
the youth pools across the globe. In 2017 Pakistan began the construction 
of a 2,500- kilometer (1,500- mile) chain- link fence along the Durand 
Line, hoping to prevent militants from passing into and out of Af ghan i-
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stan. However, Af ghan i stan has vehemently protested the establish-
ment of such a barrier since it would delineate the border.76
Bringing Kabul and Islamabad into a trusting relationship is a multi-
faceted proj ect with many players and wild cards. A more immediate mea-
sure that could reduce ISKP’s ability to expand its information operations 
and serve as a countermea sure to the pan- Islamist message being put 
forth by IS would be to focus on the major contradictions and discrepan-
cies inherent in their claims to Khurasan and use them to weaken the 
group’s ability to recruit. Their Khurasan narrative, including its his-
torical and geographic constructs, contains factual flaws and contradicts 
local understandings of the term. By repeating that Khurasan includes 
Pakistan, analysts and reporters inadvertently lend credence to an ob-
scure allegory of Islam’s final victory and also support the incorporation 
of the Indian subcontinent into the calculations of the jihadists such as 
ISKP. A deeper analy sis of the term and its history can illustrate the in-
accuracies of ISKP’s historical and cultural understanding of their own 
message. In a  battle for minds, symbolic details such as  these offer power-
ful tools.
At a time when ISKP is in retreat, it is time to focus on undermining 
its message and find ways to fill the po liti cal vacuums it seeks.
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International and Regional Responses
An Appraisal
Hussein Banai
The emergence and expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, or Daesh in Arabic) in the summer of 2014 shocked and dis-
mayed the international citizenry. In the short span of just a few weeks, 
ISIS forces inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi and Syrian armies, Syrian 
opposition groups, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and  every religious or ethnic 
minority group from Mosul to the outskirts of Aleppo. As part of the 
group’s sophisticated media strategy, mass executions, ritual beheadings 
of Western and other foreign citizens, and severe punishments handed 
down to local residents  were broadcast and disseminated over vari ous 
online media outlets. The brazen attacks on Western targets that soon 
followed suit revealed the transnational breadth of its recruitment and 
radicalization methods beyond the troubled borders of the  Middle East.
Initially, the international and regional responses to  these bewilder-
ing developments  were slow and piecemeal. At a time when news head-
lines  were dominated by negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program or 
the U.S. diplomatic opening  toward Cuba, the con spic u ous displays of 
extraordinary brutality mixed with declarations of statehood  were baffling, 
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even to many experts.1 But as the aims and capabilities of ISIS became 
more apparent, the United States and its NATO allies took the lead in 
assembling an international co ali tion to halt ISIS’s momentum and reverse 
its gains. Key regional states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt 
 were even slower in developing counter- ISIS strategies. This was less a 
reflection of their impotence in the face of a transnational jihadist net-
work and more about their competing interests  under new geopo liti cal 
conditions that favored some over  others.
This chapter considers the joint U.S.- led international and regional 
responses to ISIS’s emergence and expansion in Iraq and Syria. In the 
first section, it provides an overview of the U.S.- led international ef-
forts to  counter ISIS’s military and po liti cal advances according to the 
declared strategic objectives of the Global Co ali tion to  Counter Daesh. 
The second part of the chapter lays out the divergent priorities and com-
peting interests that have  shaped major regional powers’ responses to 
ISIS. The approach undertaken in this section is necessarily more ana-
lytical given the conflicting strategies pursued by countries such as Iran 
and Saudi Arabia to stabilize their respective zones of influence. Assess-
ing the implications of the contrasting international and regional re-
sponses to the seemingly chronic issue of transnational violent jihadism 
forms the basis for the third section of the chapter. The chapter con-
cludes by making the case for an alternative framework for addressing 
the permissive conditions that enable the onset of transnational terrorist 
networks.
U.S.- Led International Response to ISIS
The international response to the rise and spread of ISIS has largely taken 
shape and been carried out  under the auspices of the U.S.- led Global Co-
ali tion against Daesh. The co ali tion, which was formally established in 
December 2014, is composed of sixty- eight partner nations from several 
regions. Notable absences from the co ali tion include Rus sia, China, Iran, 
and the embattled government of Bashar al- Assad in Syria, which, as I 
discuss in the next section, not only account for the co ali tion’s slower- 
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than- anticipated rate of pro gress but are also significant in determining 
the outcome in both Syria and Iraq. The core mission of the co ali tion, as 
first outlined by President Obama, has been to “degrade, and ultimately 
destroy, ISIS through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism 
strategy.”2 The broad outlines of the strategy to achieve this mission have 
evolved somewhat over time, but they center on five “lines of effort”: 
(i) military components; (ii) stopping the recruitment and flow of foreign 
fighters; (iii) cutting off ISIS’s funding and financing; (iv) offering hu-
manitarian assistance and stabilizing affected areas; and (v) countering ISIS 
propaganda.
On the military front the campaign has been carried out by air, artil-
lery, and ground units, and has been largely led by the United States 
through Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Of  these components, air 
strikes account for a substantial portion of attacks against ISIS targets inside 
Syria and Iraq. According to figures released by the Pentagon in 2016, of 
the nearly 16,000 air strikes (in roughly 128,000 sorties) conducted against 
leadership, facilities, and the supply networks of ISIS, approximately 
13,000  were carried out by the United States.3 Similar proportions hold 
between American and other co ali tion partners in terms of artillery sup-
port and ground units working in advising and training capacities. As of 
this writing, OIR has cost the United States more than $10 billion, or a 
daily cost of about $12.6 million since the start of operations in Au-
gust 2014. Despite the disproportionate financial and operational military 
burdens borne by the United States, the absence of any American ground 
troops has, correspondingly, placed considerable pressure on local part-
ners to exploit ISIS’s vulnerabilities on the ground through intensive 
counterinsurgency tactics designed to “clear, build, and hold” affected 
areas. Since August 2014 this combination of air, artillery, and ground 
assaults has, according to co ali tion figures, resulted in the liberation of 56 
and 27  percent of populated areas  under ISIS control in Iraq and Syria, 
respectively.4 As of this writing, the  battle to recapture Mosul in Iraq is 
well  under way and indications are that the combination of Iraqi ground 
forces (with special help from the elite forces of the Ira nian Revolution-
ary Guard Corps) and air cover by the co ali tion warplanes  will shrink 
ISIS’s foothold in Iraq further still.
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The effort to halt the recruitment and flow of foreign fighters has been 
more evenly dispersed among members of the co ali tion, in contrast to 
the military components of the strategy. Owing to improved border se-
curity mea sures, better  human and signals intelligence- sharing mecha-
nisms, improved cybersecurity programs, and the waning novelty of ISIS 
as a revolutionary force capable of upending longstanding zones of au-
thority in the region, the co ali tion has been most effective in significantly 
reducing the inflow of fighters and sympathizers into Iraq and Syria. 
According to the co ali tion’s own 2016 figures, the number of foreign 
terrorist fighters entering  these territories is “down significantly, from 
approximately 1,000 per month in 2014, to approximately 500 per month 
in 2015, to a negligible amount  today.”5 As for the danger posed by ISIS 
outside of Iraq and Syria, the effort to effectively combat sleeper cells and 
would-be sympathizers is decidedly more complex and challenging. The 
 legal framework  behind the international response on this front has been 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 ( adopted unanimously 
in 2014), which calls on all member states to work  toward preventing 
travel and financial support for ISIS sympathizers. Since the passage of 
the resolution, according to the U.S. Department of State, “58 countries 
and the United Nations now contribute foreign terrorist fighter profiles 
to INTERPOL. At least 23 countries have completed national action 
plans to  counter terrorism and violent extremism, and 11 have launched 
programs to  counter radicalization and recruitment of foreign fighters 
in their countries. Mea sures include de- radicalization centers and 
hot- lines.”6
To combat ISIS’s external and internal sources of funding, the co ali-
tion has  adopted a two- pronged approach.7 By identifying and tracking 
ISIS’s management and sale of oil and gas resources, internal taxation, pat-
terns of kidnappings for ransom, and illicit sale of drugs and antiquities, 
the co ali tion has been able to mount military and international polic-
ing campaigns to halt the revenues generated by  these resources. This 
effort has involved precision bombing of oil fields and convoys of 
trucks carry ing oil and gas, as well as reserves of cash, within and outside 
ISIS- controlled areas. Co ali tion aircraft have also targeted key infra-
structure and installations used by ISIS to transport money and resources. 
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Intercepting networks of  human and material trafficking alongside the 
Turkish, Jordanian, and Saudi borders has also substantially reduced the 
occurrence of kidnappings and  human smuggling (for slave  labor). What 
remains difficult to retain are the reserves of cash and gold bullion seized 
by ISIS forces  after their capture of major cities such as Mosul in Iraq (up 
to $429 million, for instance, believed to have been left  behind in Mo-
sul’s central bank vault at the time of the city’s surrender to ISIS forces).8 
External sources of financing from wealthy private donors in Persian Gulf 
countries— principally Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Saudi Arabia— were instrumental in supporting the formation and early 
expansion of ISIS.9 Efforts to combat ISIS’s flow of external funding are 
coordinated through the Counter- Daesh Finance Group (CFIG). The 
CFIG’s mandate has been to disrupt ISIS’s use of international financial 
networks “by designating— domestically, regionally and through exist-
ing UN Security Council resolutions— Daesh se nior leaders, facilitators 
and financiers, effectively freezing their assets and making it more costly 
and more difficult for them to do business.”10 However, fulfilling the 
mandate of CFIG continues to be a challenge given the complex web of 
unregistered private charities disguised as “humanitarian” organ izations 
and donations through encrypted social media applications that serve as 
a global financial lifeline for ISIS.
Of course, none of the successes on the battlefield or against ISIS’s 
 human and financial resources would be sustainable without longer- term 
strategies to stabilize and reconstruct newly liberated areas. To this end, a 
major effort of the co ali tion has been to support security and stabilization 
programs designed to restore infrastructure (schools, hospitals, roads, 
bridges, power plants, and so forth), train local police units, resettle dis-
placed populations, and revitalize local economies  after ISIS forces have 
been pushed out. In Iraq, where nearly all such efforts have been con-
centrated in light of the ongoing civil war in Syria, co ali tion members 
have pledged monetary support to the UN’s Funding Fa cil i ty for Imme-
diate Stabilization ($200 million pledged) and Funding Fa cil i ty for 
Expanded Stabilization ($50 million pledged) programs. To date, the 
results of  these programs have been mixed across Iraq. In some cities, 
such as Tikrit, UN and co ali tion efforts to resettle internally displaced 
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populations, to remove mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 
and to retrain new police officers have been somewhat effective. But 
successes remain mostly circumstantial owing to the fact that very  little 
of the money pledged has actually materialized to carry out major infra-
structure programs and create the conditions for sustainable economic 
stability in affected areas.  These prob lems are further compounded by 
the rising tide of sectarianism and an already mistrustful relationship 
between the Shia- led Iraqi central government (and Iranian- backed mi-
litias) and local Sunni tribes and authorities that undercut efforts at dis-
pute resolution and postconflict reconciliation.11
Last, given the transnational nature and reach of ISIS’s following and 
activities, a major pillar of the co ali tion’s strategy is to  counter jihadist 
propaganda and radicalization efforts inside and outside the war- torn re-
gions in the  Middle East and North Africa. ISIS’s dynamic online strat-
egy to identify, radicalize, and recruit sympathizers through propaganda 
videos, publications, and social media engagements set it apart from other 
jihadist organ izations that eschewed such audacious displays of brutality 
and gore for fear of alienating potential recruits to their cause. In the 
aftermath of brazen attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Orlando, and San 
Bernardino, in addition to the almost routine wave of attacks in Iraq, 
Syria, and Libya, the qualitative difference between ISIS’s propaganda 
machine and  those of other jihadist groups became ominously clear. A 
much- touted slogan by jihadists since ISIS’s rise, as a result, is “half of 
jihad is media.”12 The counterpropaganda effort undertaken by the co-
ali tion is aimed at undermining ISIS’s message and self- depiction as a 
successful revolutionary force, while also appealing to potential recruits 
with an alternative message of moderation and conciliation. The main 
partners in executing this strategy are the UAE- based Sawab Center, the 
U.K.- based Co ali tion Communications Cell, and the U.S. Department 
of State’s Global Engagement Center. It is very difficult to assess the ef-
fectiveness of the co ali tion’s efforts in this domain since  there is  little 
public information available.  There is  little doubt that a string of targeted 
killings of ISIS’s top propagandists such as its spokesman, Abu Muham-
mad al- Adnani, in late- summer 2016, or its British- born executioner, 
Muhammad Emwazi (also known as Jihadi John) earlier in the same year, 
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have succeeded in diminishing the aura of invincibility around the organ-
ization among potential recruits. Similarly, social media organ izations 
have developed more sophisticated methods for detecting and shutting 
down accounts used to disseminate jihadi propaganda such as ISIS’s main 
publication, Dabiq. At the very least,  these efforts have served to elevate 
more credible voices of moderation and reflection— such as theological 
authority at venerable institutions such as al- Azhar University—in the 
same online forums and networks where extremists seek out disaffected 
young Muslims and convert them to the cause of violent jihad.
Together,  these five lines of effort have made up the co ali tion’s strat-
egy to “degrade, and ultimately destroy,” ISIS’s version of the caliphate 
that, by 2015, had clearly exploited the quasi- sovereign status of central 
governments in Syria and Iraq and exposed the impotence of other coun-
tries in the region. As of this writing in 2018, it is indisputably clear that 
ISIS’s territorial possessions, military capabilities,  human and financial 
resources, recruitment networks, and propaganda outlets have been sig-
nificantly reduced since the end of 2014. As a militant organ ization ca-
pable of projecting power, ISIS is a degraded force. That much is evident 
based on the metrics identified by the co ali tion. Just as readily apparent, 
however, is the fact that the under lying conditions that facilitated the rise 
of ISIS in the first place for the most part remain unaffected by the co ali-
tion’s overall strategy. To complicate  matters more, the co ali tion against 
ISIS does not include some key regional and international players such as 
Iran, Rus sia, and China, which have formed parallel co ali tions of their 
own in pursuit of their narrow interests in the region. Even within the 
U.S.- led co ali tion, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey have at dif-
fer ent junctures pursued objectives that are at odds with the stated goals 
of the co ali tion. As a symptom of state collapse, rising sectarianism, po-
liti cal opportunism of adjacent countries, and trenchant regional rival-
ries, ISIS’s destruction  will ultimately require a comprehensive po liti cal 
strategy that credibly mitigates the security dilemma created by  these 
under lying  factors. The deficiencies and pitfalls of the U.S.- led interna-
tional response to ISIS become apparent when one considers the regional 
dynamics that continually undermine efforts to destroy the organ ization. 
It is to this differential regional response that I turn next.
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Regional Paradoxes and Rivalries
As alluded to in the previous section, the regional responses to ISIS’s rise 
and transmutation into a quasi- state operation have been at variance with 
the U.S.- led Global Co ali tion’s aims and strategies. At first glance, this 
variation may seem puzzling given the  ripples of instability caused by 
ISIS’s expansion throughout the region, which have resulted in the mass 
displacement of  peoples across borders, the heightened risk of further con-
flict due to rising sectarianism, and the direct threat posed to nearly all 
regimes in the region by a transnational jihadist ideology openly chal-
lenging the legitimacy of established  orders. Any one of  these  factors, it 
would seem, should have been sufficient to trigger a united regional front 
against ISIS. It is also evident that the lack of a regional co ali tion to com-
bat ISIS is not due to any deficits in resources or incompetence of the 
major states in the region. Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Egypt, and Jordan are more than capable, both militarily and financially, 
to take on a peripatetic paramilitary outfit, but have instead mostly 
remained on the sidelines, only selectively intervening to fortify what 
they see as their own vital interests. As a member of NATO, Turkey, too, 
is capable of drawing on its considerable military and intelligence resources 
to effectively destroy ISIS’s base of operations and deprive it of supplies 
of  human and military resources (through its shared borders with Syria 
and Iraq). Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, moreover, has provided 
crucial security and intelligence assistance to the governments in Iraq 
and Syria through its elite Quds Force; and yet it has been left out of any 
regional co ali tion to take on ISIS.
Rather, the reluctance with which many countries in the region have 
approached the joint effort to combat ISIS is informed by their compet-
ing interests and rational calculations of who  will ultimately benefit more 
from the reconstitution of state authority in Syria and Iraq. As the vet-
eran journalist Patrick Cockburn observed ahead of many policy analysts 
in Western capitals, “The Islamic State’s success has been helped not just 
by its enemies’ incompetence but also by the divisions evident between 
them. John Kerry boasts of having put together a co ali tion of sixty coun-
tries all pledged to oppose ISIS, but from the beginning it was clear that 
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many impor tant members  weren’t too concerned about the ISIS threat.”13 
Indeed, as Cockburn and  others have recounted since, the ISIS threat, 
often menacingly portrayed as an existential issue in Western media, has 
from the very beginning been regarded by the countries in the region as 
a cause for alarm and opportunity mostly for what it entails for their 
geopo liti cal interests.14 Whereas Sunni- majority Arab states (led by Saudi 
Arabia) have conceived of ISIS as largely a check and a buffer (however 
unpleasant) against a would-be regional hegemon in Iran, the Ira nian se-
curity establishment and its Shia Arab allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and 
Yemen view ISIS as bait by Sunni countries designed to weaken, and 
eventually end, Iran’s influence in the Arab world. For its part, Turkey 
has had a muddled set of objectives: at once balancing its keen interest in 
warding off any developments that would strengthen the cause of Kurd-
ish autonomy with facilitating the arming and movement of Syrian reb-
els in fighting the Assad regime, including material support for jihadi 
groups such as Jabhat al- Nusra.
In attempting to unpack this seemingly contradictory assortment of 
strategic interests, however, one must take into account the military and 
po liti cal developments that hastened the unraveling of the status quo ante 
in the  Middle East. In this re spect, as the po liti cal scientist Curtis Ryan 
has argued, the regional response to ISIS must be placed in the context 
of successive historical “jolts” to the longstanding established order in the 
region: namely, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the wave of popu lar uprisings 
that swept across the Arab world, and the counterrevolutionary authori-
tarian backlash in response to them.15 The 2003 Anglo- American inva-
sion of Iraq left in its wake not only a broken state along sectarian and 
ethnic lines (despite the best efforts of some leading Iraqi politicians early 
on to forge a representative republic), but also one beset by terrorism and 
external meddling by regional powers. It was in this toxic environment, 
as numerous accounts have shown, that al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),  under 
the early tutelage of the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, trans-
formed itself from a traditional jihadi terror cell into one actively pursu-
ing the establishment of an Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Upon Zarqawi’s 
death, the leadership of ISI eventually fell to Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi, who 
took advantage of the mix of increased sectarianism in Iraqi politics and 
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full- blown civil war in Syria to found ISIS. This metamorphosis is cov-
ered in greater detail in the early chapters of this volume, but the broad 
contours of its inception are impor tant to recall  here  because of what they 
also reveal about the under lying  factors that made them pos si ble. Put sim-
ply, in the absence of the fracturing of the Iraqi state— especially along 
retributively sectarian lines—in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, the 
rise of jihadist politics, let alone the transmutation of AQI to ISI to ISIS, 
would have been impossible.16
The aftermath of the invasion was also consequential in propelling 
the Islamic Republic of Iran to newfound prominence not only as the 
guardian of Shia interests in the region, but also as a major power player 
meddling in the internal politics of large and small Arab countries (Bah-
rain, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, leaving aside its support for vari-
ous Shia po liti cal movements and militias in major Sunni Arab countries 
such as Saudi Arabia).17 Iran played a major role in fortifying Shia po liti-
cal parties and militias in Iraq throughout the postinvasion period. This 
involvement was especially empowering to Iran’s hard-liners and com-
manders of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which in-
creasingly operated as a foreign and security establishment parallel to Iran’s 
official government. The significance of IRGC’s growing autonomy and 
power cannot be overstated in the context of increasing sectarianism in 
the region, for, as “the guardians of the Islamic revolution,” the Guards’ 
core mission is the export and safekeeping of Iran’s revolutionary ideals 
throughout the Islamic world.18 The catastrophic aftermath of the inva-
sion of Iraq provided the IRGC with a renewed sense of mission, a call 
of duty that they continue to pursue with  great zeal from Baghdad to 
Damascus to Beirut. In Iraq this has meant developing close po liti cal, eco-
nomic, and military ties with Shia parties, commercial entities, and mi-
litias, much to the chagrin of Sunni and Kurdish contingents. In Syria 
the main strategic objective of the Guards, in addition to preserving their 
longstanding partnership with the Assad regime, is to prevent the emer-
gence of any  viable anti- Shia Islamist force among the Syrian opposition 
should the regime prove too weak to reconstitute its power.19
Iran’s response to ISIS, therefore, has been largely consistent with its 
overall strategic objectives in Iraq and Syria. As long as ISIS is contained 
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and weakened to a point where it ceases to pose any serious danger to 
the status quo in  those countries, then neither the Guards nor Iran’s po-
liti cal establishment is  going to risk getting bogged down in an asym-
metric conflict with a jihadist movement.20 To this end, Iran has been 
highly selective in its engagement: the IRGC have been more than con-
tent to allow Rus sian and Global Co ali tion forces to attack ISIS targets 
in eastern Syria and along the border with Turkey, but in the  battle to 
retake Mosul, IRGC commanders spared no expense and direct military 
support to the Iraqi central government.
Indeed, the same assessment applies to Rus sia’s actions against ISIS 
forces. Since its entry into the Syrian conflict, Rus sia’s chief objective has 
been to fortify the regime of Bashar al- Assad as a bulwark against any 
encroachments by American and NATO forces into its traditional sphere 
of influence. The campaign against ISIS, therefore, has provided the Rus-
sians a con ve nient excuse to carry out this strategy  under the guise of 
counterterrorism. In ISIS, Rus sia also recognizes a familiar  enemy it has 
intermittently fought off in Chechnya (indeed, veterans of the Chechnya 
conflict can be found among both Rus sian forces in Syria and ISIS re-
cruits across the region). This familiarity, moreover, has yielded a strate-
gic approach that views such groups as essentially containable and prone 
to manipulation in ser vice of extraneous strategic interests. Regarding 
the latter, Rus sia has been  adept at using counter- ISIS mea sures as a cover 
for attacking anti- Assad forces and redirecting jihadist attacks against 
U.S.- backed opposition forces in eastern Syria and along the Turkish bor-
der. Much of this, of course, has been carried out in perfect synchrony 
with the elite units of Iran’s IRGC, who share the same objectives.
Iran’s ascendance as a regional influencer, in turn, has alarmed much 
of the Sunni Arab world, especially the member states of the Gulf Coop-
eration Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman). In their view (although Oman’s position is 
generally more neutral), Iran’s overt support of Shia po liti cal parties and 
social movements in the Arab world, coupled with the expansion of its 
nuclear and military programs, pose a serious threat to the existing geopo-
liti cal order. Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the GCC 
countries have benefited tremendously from an Arab- dominated order 
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in the region. For nearly three de cades, GCC countries had reaped hefty 
domestic and regionwide rewards from close military, intelligence, and 
economic partnership with the United States. However, the aftermath 
of the Iraq war and the unexpected wave of Arab uprisings across the re-
gion in 2010 and 2011, which led to the de facto collapse of four Arab 
states (Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and, Libya), effectively resulted in the upend-
ing of this order. In addition, the successful negotiation of a nuclear deal 
between Iran and major world powers has induced major anxiety in 
Arab capitals about a pos si ble thaw in U.S.- Iran enmity that for so long 
had worked to their advantage. In response to this remarkable unravel-
ing, leading Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have scrambled 
financial and military resources to stem the tide of po liti cal change in 
the region (most notably in Egypt and Bahrain) and to  counter Ira nian 
influence through sectarian tactics.21 The most vis i ble aspects of this 
strategy have been the confrontations with Iran’s proxies in Bahrain 
and Yemen. In each case Saudi Arabia not only swiftly deployed its mili-
tary forces, but also unleashed a regionwide anti- Shia campaign through 
its own Salafi jihadist proxies, culminating in the Saudi execution of 
Sheikh Nimr Baqir al- Nimr, a prominent Shia opposition leader in the 
kingdom.22
The inconsistent and incoherent responses of Arab nations to the 
emergence and expansion of ISIS, therefore, have to be considered against 
this backdrop of intense rivalry and sectarianism between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. If ISIS could be exploited to diminish Shia and Ira nian influence 
in Arab lands, then Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies would have  little in-
centive to destroy the group outright. The wild card  here, of course, is 
the extent to which the spread of jihadist militancy could end up desta-
bilizing the pro- Western monarchies themselves. This wariness perhaps 
accounts for some of the crackdowns on radical preachers and private 
financial donations to ISIS residing in the GCC countries. In the main, 
however, forcefully balancing Iran’s regional ambitions remains the 
foremost priority of Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies. This imperative 
is evident in the formation of the Saudi- led Islamic Military Alliance to 
Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) in December 2015, in response to the Ira nian 
government’s World Against Vio lence and Extremism (WAVE) initiative 
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that was launched two years earlier. Notably, IMAFT excludes Iran and 
its Shia allies, while the aims of the WAVE initiative are almost exclu-
sively focused on Sunni Salafi jihadist movements. Both organ izations 
pay lip ser vice to fighting ISIS, but their respective missions only vaguely 
refer to the need for combating terror and global extremism.
Last, Turkey’s role as the only regional stakeholder with membership 
in the NATO alliance is also instructive. The onset of civil war in Syria 
and the subsequent emergence of ISIS as a quasi- state between Iraq and 
Syria have created a massive humanitarian crisis, with Turkey on its front-
lines. As of this writing in 2018, the UN Refugee Agency estimates the 
number of Syrian refugees in Turkey at 2.8 million, which has added 
strain to an already depressed economy and heightened security environ-
ment. The most burdensome complication for Turkey, however, is the 
involvement of Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish fighters along its southern bor-
der. On the one hand, Turkey cannot be seen as indifferent to the plight 
of Syrian Kurds bravely holding back an ISIS onslaught; on the other 
hand, the success of the  People’s Protection Units (or YPG militias) has 
alarmed Turkish leaders about the possibility of a revival of separatist sen-
timents among its own sizable Kurdish community (upwards of 25  percent 
of its population). As such, the Turkish government has exploited the 
ISIS threat to ramp up nationalist sentiments against the decades- long 
insurgency mounted by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).  Under the 
cover of the U.S.- led Global Co ali tion, Turkey has directed a significant 
portion of its air strikes at PKK camps in northern Iraq.23 Moreover, as 
part of the co ali tion supporting the overthrow of the Assad regime in 
Syria, Turkey has actively participated in the arming and training of op-
position groups such as the  Free Syrian Army, and even some jihadist 
factions like Jabhat al- Nusra. In this effort it has allowed safe passage for 
jihadist fighters into Syria and Iraq, and according to an EU- commissioned 
study by Conflict Armament Research has served as a major supply route— 
whether through lax border control or willful disregard— for bomb- making 
materials used by ISIS.24
In sum, even a cursory look at the regional dynamics would yield a 
complex, multilayered, intersecting, and contradictory set of security 
and po liti cal priorities for each of the major stakeholders. The mixture of 
07-3216-7-ch07.indd   163 04/17/18   12:50 am
164 Banai
converging anx i eties and diverging strategies in the face of the ISIS 
threat is truly remarkable. Much like the quip about the puzzling lon-
gevity of the Ottoman Empire well past its expiration date, ISIS’s staying 
power is ultimately a function of the surrounding states’ conflicting in-
terests in the fate of the failed states in which jihadist dystopic visions 
thrive. The regional malaise can also be blamed on the Global Co ali tion’s 
strategic goals, which scarcely address the incapacity of state institutions 
as a result of foreign interventions (Iraq and Libya, for example) and on-
going civil wars (in Syria and Yemen). Without a serious attempt to ad-
dress the maze of intertwined and conflicting interests of the major 
powers in the region, efforts at combating ISIS may well succeed in de-
grading the organ ization and its displacement from major urban areas, but 
they  will not bring about the end of transnational jihadist terror. This is 
already evidenced by the ISIS- devised and - inspired attacks carried out 
against governmental, religious, and civil society targets across the re-
gion, most notably in Iran and Egypt.
As with the transmutation of AQI to ISI to ISIS, in the absence of a 
comprehensive plan to address the regional security dilemma left  behind 
since the invasion of Iraq, as well as myriad crises of po liti cal legitimacy 
in the wake of the Arab Spring, even if ISIS’s military capacities are to-
tally degraded, its core ideology and raison d’être  will likely survive. The 
destruction of ISIS can only come about as a result of a synchronized 
regional and international commitment to achieve lasting peace set-
tlements in Syria and in Yemen, and to embark, then, on a regionwide 
postwar reconstruction and investment proj ect that would serve as a 
foundation for joint cooperation and dispute resolution between Sunni- 
and Shia- majority states. The next section lays out the broad outlines of 
this alternative framework.
The Path Thus Far Not Taken
The preceding two sections have laid bare the promises and perils of the 
joint international and regional approaches to tackling the threat posed 
by ISIS. Although some of the promises of the U.S.- led international re-
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sponse have been fulfilled, such as slowing the pro gress of ISIS military 
units and degrading some of its core capacities, the under lying conditions 
that led to the emergence of the group in the first place remain mostly 
intact. With the recapture of Mosul in July 2017, and repatriation of most 
operational bases of ISIS in Iraq nearly complete, it is abundantly clear 
that dreams of a sprawling Islamic caliphate that redraws the map of the 
 Middle East  were just that, a mere chimera. Yet military success against 
ISIS was never  really in dispute. It has no air force or navy; its supplies of 
weaponry and fighters  were paltry even at the height of the group’s power; 
and its leadership and command structure  were always built to function 
as a terrorist entity, not as a state.  These fundamental flaws became ex-
posed within days of sustained air attacks against ISIS’s leadership, supply 
routes, and weapons depots. As the previous section made clear, the re-
gional actors never doubted any of  these inevitabilities  either. Rather, the 
truly shocking aspect of ISIS’s expansion—to  these countries and in the 
view of veteran observers of the  Middle East— was what it revealed about 
the depths of decay and obsolescence of purportedly “robust” and “resil-
ient” authoritarian states in the region. ISIS’s rise, arriving on the heels 
of the Arab Spring, exposed the relative ease with which even the coercive 
powers of  these states could be challenged. What is more, it testified to 
the general impotence and ineptitude of regional organ izations such as 
the GCC, the Arab League, and the Organ ization of Islamic Coopera-
tion in the face of a transnational threat to their member countries.
ISIS’s emergence and expansion, therefore, must be placed squarely 
within the context of state failure and institutional ineptitude at the 
regional level. The internal and external circumstances that led to this 
permissive environment must be factored into any strategy designed to 
destroy transnational extremist movements bent on exploiting security 
vacuums and establishing alternative zones of authority.  After all, ISIS is 
not the only symptom of state failure. In Iraq and Syria, nonjihadist mi-
litias (for example, Iran- backed Shia militias such as the Mahdi Army in 
Iraq or the Defenders of the Shrine in Syria) have also taken advantage 
of the security vacuum to exact revenge on their enemies and pursue the 
interests of their foreign state sponsors. It follows, therefore, that efforts 
to rebuild state security and institutional capacities must be a top priority 
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for any counter- ISIS co ali tion. Yet  little to no mention of such priorities 
is made in  either of the strategic frameworks produced by the U.S.- led 
Global Co ali tion or its regional analogues. The omission is not terribly 
surprising, however. The counter- ISIS co ali tions  were assembled to 
merely address the symptom of the reigning disorder, not the permissive 
environment itself. In this re spect, the Global Co ali tion’s mission to “de-
grade, and ultimately destroy” ISIS and its global affiliates is commensu-
rate with its limited aims of simply neutralizing this par tic u lar menace at 
this par tic u lar time.
State- building is an expensive, labor- intensive, and extremely deli-
cate proposition even in times of relative peace and prosperity, so the 
reluctance of major powers to engage in such proj ects in a historically 
volatile region such as the  Middle East is understandable. Indeed, many 
assessments of the international response to the rise of ISIS begin with the 
obligatory acknowl edgment of the utter undesirability of such endeavors. 
But almost all of  these analyses overlook the enormous costs— both 
 human and material— associated with ignoring the permissive environ-
ments from which transnational and global jihadist threats have arisen. 
In the case of ISIS, the costs are almost immea sur able: the genocide of the 
Yezidi populations in Iraq; mass killings of captured Shia communities in 
Iraq and Syria; the forced internal displacement or mass exodus of mil-
lions of Syrians and Iraqis; a global refugee crisis; a wave of terrorist attacks 
around the globe— and  these are just some of the consequences that receive 
news coverage. ISIS’s actions also have had highly destabilizing effects in 
Western socie ties. The terror attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Orlando, 
and San Bernardino, for instance, resulted in calls to restrict immigration 
laws and the  free movement of  peoples, and also revived ethnonationalist 
movements in much of Eu rope and even in the United States.
Given the enormity of  these implications for the region and the West, 
it is striking that no systematic accounting of the costs associated with 
chronic state failure has been issued to date. This is all the more remark-
able given the long- established causal link—as identified by numerous 
studies by po liti cal scientists— between state failure and terrorism.25 That 
the consequences of state failure transcend borders and can cross vast 
oceans is a much-studied phenomenon by social scientists; and yet it is 
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increasingly overlooked by policymakers and state agencies burdened with 
overly specialized personnel, short- term mandates, and limited resources. 
Another key issue is the misunderstanding (or the conceit) that somehow 
only the United States or the  great powers can or should rectify state fail-
ures. Hence the conclusion that no pro gress can be made to  either build 
up state capacities or eradicate transnational terrorism without an explicit 
po liti cal, military, and economic commitment by a  great power. To be 
sure,  great power leadership is tremendously impor tant in corralling other 
states and international organ izations to share in the financial and military 
burdens necessary for successful state- building, but as the postinvasion pe-
riod in Iraq made abundantly clear, even a superpower as eco nom ically 
and militarily well endowed as the United States cannot by itself (or 
even in cooperation with the U.K.) address issues arising from power- 
sharing, institution- building, ethnic and religious strife, corruption, and 
economic degradation. State capacity- building is tough, multigenera-
tional work, which is why it must be entrusted to long- term institutional 
pro cesses that extend beyond the momentary concerns of the  great pow-
ers and policymakers.
Bearing in mind  these realities and limitations, a synthetic framework 
that bridges the gap between the international and regional responses 
would consist of three major components. First,  there must be an inter-
national commission tasked with investigating the permissive condi-
tions  under which ISIS first emerged and has since thrived. The com-
mission’s report should also provide empirical metrics for assessing the 
annual costs associated with the collapse of key state institutions and pro-
visions in Syria and Iraq since ISIS’s inception (including the losses of 
life,  human capital, public health, economic output, and foreign invest-
ment; international restrictions placed on the country; and the like). 
Second, the findings and recommendations made by the commission 
would form the basis of a “regional trusteeship” that could act as a co- 
operative among the major powers in the region— Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, and Egypt— for streamlining po liti cal, economic, military, and 
humanitarian policies. The objective  here would be to establish trust 
between Shia- and Sunni- majority states around the twin imperatives of 
deradicalization and state capacity- building. Last,  there should be a UN 
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Security Council resolution authorizing the establishment of a multina-
tional antiterror force for the  Middle East tasked with carry ing out the 
mission of the U.S.- led Global Co ali tion. The rationale for such an initia-
tive is to include major stakeholders— such as Rus sia, Iran, and China— 
that are excluded from the co ali tion’s military, po liti cal, financial, and 
anti- ISIS propaganda efforts.
 These proposals, to be sure, require a  great deal more reflection and 
elaboration. At any rate, they do not constitute the main purpose of this 
chapter, which is to provide an overview of the existing international and 
regional responses to ISIS and to cast a critical eye on the differences 
and contradictions between them. It is my hope that the preceding has 
shed light on some of the more glaring gaps between diagnostic analyses 
of ISIS’s rise and the policy prescriptions implemented or proposed. In 
par tic u lar, I have endeavored to demonstrate how the counter- ISIS cam-
paign, both internationally and regionally, is undermined by a muddled 
understanding of ISIS as both a symptom and a cause of state failure in 
the region. Just as the post-9/11 fascination with degrading and destroy-
ing al Qaeda unwittingly resulted in the neglect of under lying  causes and 
permissive conditions, so too, alas, have the current approaches to coun-
tering ISIS been too narrowly focused on merely removing the existing 
threat. It is high time that the corrosive consequences of dispossession 
and extremism that arise in failing or collapsed states are met with ap-
propriate remedies.
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Regional Constraints on the  
U.S. Confrontation of ISIS
Feisal al- Istrabadi
Perhaps no utterance by a president of the United States has been so quickly and so thoroughly proven wrong as when President Barack 
Obama asserted that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was a “jay-
vee team,” a locution that national security official Antony Blinken also 
used. It was telling that the man who described ISIS as a strategic threat 
to U.S. interests was fired as secretary of defense, while, by contrast, 
Blinken was elevated to the number two position at the Department of 
State. Within a  matter of months, ISIS rampaged through Iraq, occupy-
ing its second largest city, Mosul, in four hours. The Iraqi Army initially 
collapsed  under the onslaught, though the Americans would claim that 
the Iraqi prime minister ignored intelligence warnings delivered just days 
earlier.
The United States and regional powers began engaging in military 
operations in June 2014 to dislodge ISIS, first from Iraq, but also from 
Syria. The military campaigns to defeat ISIS and liberate lands it had oc-
cupied have been officially declared over in both Iraq and Syria, though 
ISIS cells continue to operate in both countries. Still, insufficient attention 
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has been paid to what a post- ISIS dispensation in Iraq and Syria might be. 
This is partly due to an incoherent alliance structure, in which the dispa-
rate states engaged to varying degrees in the fight do not share a strategic 
objective. While some of the international and regional powers  were gen-
uinely engaged in a fight to rid the region of this terrorist menace,  others 
had competing agendas that often superseded the fight against ISIS.  These 
competing interests often resulted in hampering the U.S. effort.
U.S. policy over the years, certainly throughout the Obama adminis-
tration, has also hampered the fight against ISIS by failing to consider 
adequately what a post- ISIS po liti cal settlement would consist of. Indeed, 
for more than a de cade U.S. policy has consisted of supporting person-
alities in Iraq, rather than pursuing good governance and the institutions 
of government. It also largely disengaged from Iraqi politics from 2012 
to 2014, except to the extent that it put its weight against a constitutional 
effort to engender a parliamentary vote of no- confidence in the then- 
incumbent prime minister. The United States did so not  because  there 
was any constitutional infirmity in the parliamentary move, but  because 
it supported the person who was then in office and could not conceive of 
a replacement. The blood of many Iraqis and American soldiers was spilled 
as a result of that decision, which drove many in the Iraqi Sunni commu-
nity to acquiesce—at least at a critical juncture—to ISIS as an alternative 
to the government in Baghdad. No more thought has since been given to 
a po liti cal settlement in post- ISIS Iraq. The same situation exists in Syria, 
where the United States has never had a cogent po liti cal strategy.
 After this introduction, the first section outlines the strategic inter-
ests of Iran, the Arab states, Turkey, and Rus sia. The competing motiva-
tions of  these players are considered, in contrast to U.S. interests with 
re spect to ISIS. Throughout this chapter it is assumed that the United 
States had a vital national security interest in defeating ISIS, both mili-
tarily and as an ideology. The latter, of course, is a much more difficult 
proposition and cannot be accomplished through military force. The 
chapter concludes by assessing the implications for  future U.S. policy. In 
the absence of inclusive po liti cal settlements in Iraq and Syria, new itera-
tions of ISIS are likely to appear in the  future, each of which  will require 
U.S. involvement.
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An Incoherent Alliance Structure and  
Constraints on U.S. Policy
The Obama administration left a legacy of a complicated, and at times 
irreconcilable, network of alliances and rivalries across the  Middle East, 
one that defies easy characterization. The United States is allied with the 
Baghdad government, which is itself allied with Iran in the fight against 
ISIS. In Syria, in contrast, the Obama administration took an exception-
ally hard rhetorical line against Iran’s long- term ally, Bashar al- Assad, 
whom both the Iraqi and Ira nian governments have supported with men 
and materiel. Turkey, a NATO ally, played an ambivalent role in both 
Syria and Iraq with re spect to ISIS, at least during the Obama adminis-
tration, though it has since adapted itself to Rus sia’s efforts in Syria. 
Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, initially demanded Assad’s 
departure, but now accommodates Rus sia’s support of him, more con-
cerned with Kurdish aspirations in Syria than with the fight against ISIS. 
Iran’s expanding influence in the region motivates Amer i ca’s Arab allies 
in the Gulf and beyond. For its part, the Trump administration encour-
aged an open rift in the delicate alliance structure of the Gulf states. A 
contretemps between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bah-
rain, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other, has erupted into a major 
diplomatic row, with Kuwait and Oman maintaining neutrality between 
the competing states. No clear U.S. strategy exists in the region unifying 
the vari ous players, even with re spect to ISIS and any of its  future 
incarnations.
Beyond the regional players, the United States was forced to confront 
the real ity of the Rus sian pro- Assad intervention in September 2015. 
Having failed to act in Syria over the span of five years, the United States 
may well have been frozen in contemplation of what a Rus sian reaction 
to U.S. intervention might entail. Instead, the United States was surprised 
that it may have encouraged Rus sian action by its own inaction. In the 
event, Rus sia initially intervened only to stabilize Assad, whose regime 
appeared to be on the verge of collapse. Once Assad was sufficiently se-
cure, Rus sia ceased its intervention. Only  later did it reengage, escalat-
ing its support for the Assad regime to ensure not merely his survival but 
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his control over significant parts of Syria. The second phase of Vladimir 
Putin’s intervention has put an end to talk of a post- Assad Syria— for now.
Candidate Donald Trump pledged to support whoever was fighting 
ISIS. That, of course, would include Iran, since  there is no doubt that 
Iran has been fighting ISIS in Iraq. Syria is more problematic  because, as 
several studies have shown, neither the Assad regime nor the Rus sians 
principally targeted ISIS. Instead, they have as a rule attacked the non- 
ISIS opposition to Assad in a transparent effort to ensure to the extent 
pos si ble that the choice remained between ISIS and an unrepentant Assad. 
That strategy has largely worked and more or less set the stage that con-
fronts U.S. policymakers in 2018 and  will do so  going forward. The 
complication from an American point of view, however, is that it ensures 
Iran’s longest- term ally in the region survives the civil war and continues 
to be a player, to the chagrin of most of Amer i ca’s Arab allies in the re-
gion. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia and its regional allies  will see Assad’s 
survival—in what ever form—as a win for Iran and concomitantly a loss 
for them.  These divergent concerns operate as a constraint on U.S. pol-
icy, making coherent choices very difficult. The interests and roles of each 
of  these countries are considered in detail in the rest of the chapter.
Iran
ISIS’s rise in Syria and Iraq challenged Iran’s regional hegemonic ambi-
tions directly. Although ISIS was never a threat to unseat the new dis-
pensation in Baghdad, where the Shia are a large majority, the minority 
Alawite government in Damascus could easily have been brought down 
by action,  whether coordinated or not, of non- ISIS and ISIS factions. 
Moreover, even if Baghdad’s government was unlikely to have fallen to 
ISIS, the total and complete chaos that would result from ISIS  going un-
challenged in Iraq would be dangerous to Iran’s own security, especially 
as ISIS gained a foothold in Diyala Governorate on the Ira nian border 
with Iraq. Aside from a direct danger to Iran, much of the so- called 
strategic depth that Iran has amassed since the overthrow of the Shah lay 
at risk.
Iran’s role in the region has under gone a remarkable metamorphosis 
since the Islamic revolution of 1979. At that time, Iran was isolated from 
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regional affairs, becoming rather a pariah  after being the first  Middle East-
ern state proper to legislate its version of po liti cal Islam. As a revolution-
ary regime it sought to export its revolutionary zeal to the region.1 It is 
worth recalling that Khomeini’s discourse in the early days of the revo-
lution was couched in terms of a more popu lar appeal to Islam generally, 
not Shiism as such. The response of the Gulf monarchies, as well as other 
Arab states, was to “brace for war” in the hope that Iraq could be an ef-
fective bulwark to restrain Iran.2 Thus, from the very beginning of the 
Ira nian Revolution, many of the Arab governments looked upon Iran as 
expansionist and sought to curb its ambitions.
Of the major Arab states in the region, only Syria’s Baathist govern-
ment,  bitter rival of its Iraqi counterpart by the time of the commence-
ment of hostilities, tilted  toward Iran.3 This set the stage for what has 
been a Syrian- Iranian alliance of nearly forty years’ standing. The ben-
efits, of course,  were mutual. Hafez al- Assad, Bashar’s  father, saw in Iran 
a counterpoise to two neighboring rivals, Israel on the one hand (this was 
in the days leading up to the Camp David Accords) and Iraq on the other. 
For his part, Khomeini found in Assad an ally who could act as a conduit 
for the Shia in Lebanon, including especially Hez bollah.4 Yet lest a sec-
tarian narrative be assumed, it should be recalled that Iran’s influence 
would extend into the Gaza Strip over Hamas, a Sunni religio- political 
organ ization akin to the Muslim Brotherhood.5
Thus, over the de cades  after the revolution, Iran slowly acquired 
greater regional influence. By 2003 the United States had removed 
Iran’s  bitter  enemy, Saddam Hussein, from power, and a Shia po liti cal 
class, much of whose leadership had spent de cades in exile in Iran or 
Syria, was ensconced in Baghdad. From 1979 to the time of ISIS’s spec-
tacular apogee in 2014, Iran went from an isolated, besieged revolution-
ary state to one that had regional influence that extended from the 
Persian Gulf through Baghdad, Damascus, southern Lebanon, and Gaza, 
the latter all on the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, to borrow a phrase from 
the geopolitics of another part of the world, Syria has remained Iran’s 
“near abroad,” an impor tant lynchpin in Iran’s rise and continued influ-
ence, and death and succession within the Assad  family did nothing to 
alter this relationship.
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Iran’s strategic interest in Syria in light of ISIS has been clear: it is to 
ensure not merely the survival of the Alawite dispensation in Damascus, 
but also the personal survival of Bashar al- Assad. In this re spect, at least 
considering the first incarnation of Rus sia’s intervention,  there was a rhe-
torical divide between Rus sia and Iran. Initially, Foreign Minister Ser-
gei Lavrov indicated that Rus sia did not have the personal survival of 
Assad as a strategic goal.  Whether that was mere rhe toric even at that 
stage,  there had been no indication that Iran would brook a change of 
personality that the Lavrov statement might have suggested. By the time 
of the second incarnation of Rus sia’s involvement, it seems both coun-
tries  were firmly on the same side: if Obama said Assad had to go, Rus sia 
and Iran agreed that Assad must stay. At this writing, they are attempting 
to return control over most, if not all, of Syria to Assad. For both Rus sia 
and Iran the ideal would be a return to a unitary state with Assad firmly 
at the helm.
Iran’s calculation in fighting ISIS in Iraq is quite diff er ent. The last 
 thing Iran wants is a stable, strong state.  Here, U.S. and Ira nian calcula-
tions diverge significantly and irreconcilably. It is in the U.S. interest to 
achieve a coherent, stable Iraq and its vari ous subparts, including the 
Kurdistan region of Iraq. Revanchist tendencies jeopardize American in-
terests by threatening to engulf the region in even greater wars in the 
 future, both among the new statelets and between new and precursor 
states.
For Iran, however, in contrast to its ideal resolution in Syria, a coher-
ent, stable Iraq approaches an existential threat. Much of the current po-
liti cal and military leadership in Iran was burnished during the Iran- Iraq 
War. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, for instance, was president of Iran 
throughout most of the war. The commander of the Quds Brigade of the 
Ira nian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major- General Qasem Soleimani, 
was a twenty- three- year- old officer when the war began. (How ironic it 
was that he assumed the responsibility of coordinating the defense of 
Baghdad against a feared ISIS attack in 2014. He did the same for Erbil, 
even as the United States bombed ISIS positions when the group sought 
to take the regional capital.) For the Ira nian leadership a reemergence of 
strong state institutions in Baghdad is a nightmare. American policymak-
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ers in the George W. Bush and Obama administrations seemingly never 
understood this real ity, assuming instead that if they accommodated Iran’s 
“legitimate” interests in Iraq they would work to strengthen Baghdad’s 
institutions. This was always an American fantasy.  Whether the Trump 
administration eschews it remains to be seen.
But the total collapse of the Iraqi state is not in Iran’s interest  either. 
ISIS’s obtaining a permanent foothold in Iraq threatens Iran in several 
ways. It does so directly in that ISIS would naturally regard Iran’s Shiite 
theocracy as apostate and could well take its campaign of terror across a 
rather porous border. The route for exporting such terror might not be 
so far- fetched. ISIS initially established a beachhead in Diyala Governor-
ate, on the Ira nian border with its Khuzestan Province. Khuzestan, of 
course, is a predominantly Arab province, where  there is a Sunni minor-
ity. ISIS might well think it could find supporters in that population and 
would no doubt look for  those who  were disenchanted with Tehran. In 
the event, Iran could not take that chance, and Diyala was one of the first 
and most active engagements of IRGC ground forces in Iraq, an area 
where the United States si mul ta neously targeted ISIS from the air, in ef-
fect supporting Ira nian ground action. While the total chaos of June 2014 
is anathema to Iran, as Denise Natali stated once in a panel on which this 
author also served, the ideal for Iran is Nuri al- Maliki’s Iraq in 2013: 
internecine fighting preventing the rise of rational and stable state insti-
tutions, occasional al Qaeda attacks to keep Baghdad off balance, but not 
total chaos.
While Iran’s policy has been to defend against the possibility that ISIS 
might genuinely threaten the predominantly Shii dispensation in Bagh-
dad, it has no necessary allegiance to one or another par tic u lar po liti cal 
figure in Iraq as it does in Syria. Any of a range of po liti cal actors would 
satisfy its strategic interests in Iraq, principally  because the major po liti-
cal figures from the Shii religious parties are not a threat to basic Ira nian 
interests in Iraq. To the contrary, they are willing to accommodate  those 
interests. Nothing exemplifies Iran’s flexibility more than its prior sup-
port for Nuri al- Maliki  until he became a liability when he proved wholly 
inadequate in the face of ISIS’s rise in 2014. With U.S. coordination, Iran 
dumped Maliki and supported the rise of Haider al- Abadi, who became 
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prime minister of Iraq in 2014. As Maliki tries to undermine his succes-
sor in order to return to power, it remains to be seen what Iran’s response 
 will be: to support him, Abadi, or some other candidate.
 There is perhaps an exception—or at least a codicil—to the proposi-
tion that Iran does not support any par tic u lar individual in Iraq. The 
IRGC clearly has its favorites in Iraq, most particularly in the Popu lar 
Mobilization Units (PMUs).  These individuals include Hadi Ameri, Abu 
Mahdi al- Muhandis, and Qais al- Khazali. It is likely that  these militia 
leaders, who operate within the established Iraqi chain of command of-
ficially but not in real ity, represent an insurance policy that the Ira nian 
regime maintains against less- than- compliant po liti cal figures. It is also 
pos si ble that Ira nian officialdom is itself divided on Iraq, with diff er ent 
Ira nian factions supporting diff er ent individuals within the Iraqi polity. 
It is quite likely that such a cacophony of voices exists in Ira nian policy 
 toward Iraq, though the overarching strategic interest against Iraq becom-
ing a stable, coherent state remains.
The Arab States
Much of what motivates current thinking in the Arab states is a desire to 
check perceived Ira nian dominance over what King Abdullah II of Jor-
dan once infelicitously described as a “Shia crescent.”6 The fear— a  great 
deal of it unfounded—is of a nascent neo- Persian empire that stretches 
through Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, and southern Lebanon. Thus, when 
members of the Shia majority in Bahrain demonstrated in Pearl Round-
about in Manama, Saudi Arabia sent troops—at the invitation of the king 
of Bahrain—to crush the protests. The Gulf states saw the hand of Iran 
in  these demonstrations, rather than a disenfranchised population seek-
ing its legitimate rights. Similarly, when a civil war between Yemeni fac-
tions resulted in the Houthis taking the capital, Iran’s sinister hand was 
seen in the region, and Saudi Arabia and its allies unleashed a war in 
Yemen that continues to pulverize that hapless country, though to what 
end is unclear.
In this context, most of the Arab states have been far less concerned 
with ISIS’s rise than with Iran’s. The most definitive action taken by Saudi 
Arabia in light of the rise of ISIS in the summer of 2014 was not to send 
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its ample air force to pound ISIS targets, but to build a wall on its border 
with Iraq.7 Lost, perhaps, on the Saudi leadership was that, while the bor-
der wall might prevent a land invasion by ISIS, it would do nothing to 
appease ISIS sympathizers who lived within the kingdom or reduce their 
ability to plan and carry out terrorist attacks  there. Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf states simply do not perceive the existence of ISIS as the existential 
threat that it is for Iraq. The congruence of much of Wahhabism and 
Salafism, ideologies pres ent throughout the Gulf states and elsewhere in 
the region, with that of ISIS and the ease with which the former could 
lead to the latter, has caused no urgency in  these states to defeat ISIS. If 
the defeat of ISIS is a  matter of priority to the Gulf states, they have kept 
the fact safely secret.
The Arab states generally do not appear to share Amer i ca’s concerns 
about the threat that ISIS poses. As the United States ramped up its fight 
against ISIS in Iraq, and as the Trump administration spoke of cooperat-
ing with Rus sia in the Syrian theater, the Arab states made no indication 
that they regard ISIS as a threat to their interests or to regional stability. 
Indeed, in chapter 7 of this volume Hussein Banai argues that the Gulf 
states regard ISIS as a positive, a check on Iran’s ambitions. The Trump 
administration has spoken of a need to accelerate the effort against ISIS 
in Iraq, and candidate Trump spoke of the possibility of creating safe ha-
vens in Syria. Both strategies would have entailed expending far greater 
resources in personnel as well as materiel, yet none of the Arab states in-
dicated a willingness to assist in the effort.
Instead, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, and their allies have fo-
cused their wrath on Yemen— with American logistical support— and 
the perceived Ira nian role  there. What the strategic objective of  these 
countries is seems opaque. If it is to restore the presidency of Abdrubbuh 
Hadi, the lit er a ture on restoring governments defeated in civil wars should 
not buoy the co ali tion’s hopes. It is more likely that they  will “prolong 
the conflict, producing more death and devastation” and “[overstress] the 
intervening state— especially when that state has limited capabilities and 
internal prob lems of its own.”8 This, of course, while draining their own 
resources. Notwithstanding  these dangers to the interveners, they none-
theless made intervening in Yemen a strategic priority over defeating ISIS.
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Saudi Arabia’s challenge to Iran has become so central to its regional 
policy that it has co- opted several competing imperatives of long stand-
ing. Acting with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia 
has shattered the veneer of unity, for de cades its hallmark, of the Gulf 
Co- operation Council (GCC), by confronting Qatar over its economic 
ties to Iran and its supposed support for Islamist extremists in the region. 
Qatar does indeed have to guard its economic relationship with Iran, with 
whom it shares its principal asset— other than the U.S. air base it hosts— 
the world’s largest nonassociated natu ral gas field. Qatar also does sup-
port Islamist militant groups in places like Syria, amongst  others, but 
 here its sin seems to be in choosing the wrong flavor of militants: the 
other Gulf states also support vari ous other Islamist groups in the re-
gion. Kuwait and Oman, the other two members of the GCC, have 
tried but failed to broker a compromise between the factions, again 
contributing to the evident fracturing of the GCC. The end result has 
been to push Qatar closer to Turkey and possibly to Iran, too. The 
other imperative shattered by the current Saudi leadership— though its 
implications are far beyond the scope of this chapter—is the all- but- 
open cooperation between the kingdom and Israel in their mutual 
confrontation with Iran, an effect that has been brewing since the 
Obama administration concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Ac-
tion with Iran.
Of course, it cannot be gainsaid that  these Arab states’ ignoring the 
ISIS threat is also in keeping with popu lar sentiment in their respective 
countries. Jordan’s example in actively and publicly participating in 
the initial days of the fight against ISIS is instructive. When ISIS burned 
Lt. Muath al- Kasasbeh alive, the immediate reaction in Jordan and the 
Arab states was fury, calling for quick and overwhelming retaliation.9 
But once tempers cooled (and Jordan initially did undertake massive 
retaliations that included the execution of ISIS members caught in Jor-
dan),  there was reporting to the effect that ordinary citizens had begun 
wondering out loud why Jordan was participating in the “West’s” war 
on ISIS.10 The Jordanian government for its part quietly dropped out 
of the co ali tion against ISIS and instead joined the Saudi- led effort in 
Yemen.
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Aside from domestic public opinion—no small consideration—it is 
curious that  these states so abandoned the fight against ISIS. The radical 
group surely represents as  great a threat to Jordan as it does to Iraq. Re-
calling that Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, a 
pre de ces sor organ ization of ISIS, was Jordanian, it is easily predictable 
that, in Jordan and other Arab states, ISIS’s nihilistic ideology  will find 
supporters. Although  these states are not weak like Iraq or Syria, still, as 
ISIS is defeated and predictably changes its tactics to  those of a classical 
terrorist organ ization,  these regional Arab states  will be no less suscep-
tible than Iraq to violent convulsions. It was shortsighted for  these states 
not to engage ISIS directly and in a sustained fashion, except that, per-
haps, they expected  Uncle Sam to do the heavy lifting—to their ulti-
mate benefit— while they engage in Yemen.
Above all, the co ali tion of states led by Saudi Arabia fears a new Sykes- 
Picot Agreement emerging a  century  after the original. Sykes- Picot, con-
trary to modern myths made a  century  later, did not devise the current 
borders of the  Middle East, nor did it purport to do so. Instead, in 1916 
it divided the  Middle East into spheres of influence between the pre-
sumptively victorious powers, though Rus sia dealt itself out of the deal 
through the intermediation of the revolution. The Arab states  today fear 
a de facto concession to Iran that it may reliably maintain its spheres of 
influence throughout the northern Gulf to the Mediterranean. Indeed, 
President Obama’s statement to the effect that Saudi Arabia must learn 
“to share” the  Middle East with Iran, could be interpreted in no other 
way in Riyadh and its allied capitals.11
From Obama’s perspective, the statement may have merely reflected 
real ity. The United States was unwilling to invest troops or resources to 
 counter Iran in Lebanon, Syria, or Iraq. It was, however, willing to do 
so in Yemen, presumably  because it is in the Saudi sphere of influence. 
The Saudis have not been sanguine about Obama’s remark, and some in 
the Saudi leadership view it as another example of Obama’s fecklessness 
or weakness, especially where Iran is concerned. Trump’s anti- Iranian 
expressions are thus  music to their ears.  Whether the new administra-
tion  will be any more willing to expend resources in the effort to dislo-
cate Iran from its sphere remains to be seen, although  whether the U.S. 
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taxpayer is  eager for another confrontation in the  Middle East is 
doubtful.
Iraq’s interests are treated very briefly in this section. It suffices now 
to say that Iraqis had few goals in common, even if they generally shared 
one impor tant one: to defeat ISIS. In this re spect Iraq was a much easier 
place in which to combat ISIS than Syria,  because all the players in the 
country  were shooting in the same direction, though  there  were rela-
tively minor skirmishes  after the referendum in Baghdad’s reassertion of 
its constitutional authority over disputed territories. The situation is dis-
tinctly diff er ent in Syria, where it has been by no means clear that all the 
vari ous factions are united in confronting ISIS. As noted, the Syrian gov-
ernment itself, along with its Rus sian allies, at least delayed confronting 
ISIS as it destroyed non- ISIS opponents. Iraq was diff er ent. All Iraqi 
forces— regardless of sect or ethnicity— were united in an offensive that 
has eliminated ISIS in Iraq, at least as a force capable of gaining and hold-
ing territory. The prob lems in Iraq relate to the inability of its politi-
cians, and repeated American policy failures over the years, to develop a 
po liti cal modus vivendi that allows a calming of fears and the reconstitu-
tion of a reasonably coherent state.
Turkey
It is not an exaggeration to say that, for Turkey, ISIS has been an after-
thought. Like the Arab states, it has been motivated by considerations 
other than the inherent dangers that ISIS poses to the region and the in-
ternational community. It is concerned by the possibility of Kurdish 
autonomy in Syria and what had been talk of Kurdish in de pen dence in 
Iraq. Turkey, in general, wholly failed to assist in the U.S. effort against 
ISIS, notwithstanding it being a NATO ally. It did cooperate with Rus-
sia in Syria,  after some earlier erratic be hav ior on its part.
Early in the Syrian civil war, when it looked as if the Assad regime 
was headed for a certain fall, Turkey announced its own version of the 
Obama statement that Assad had to go. This must have come as a sur-
prise in Damascus, as the Assads and the Erdoğans had been known to 
be friends and taken  couples’ vacations together. It was an unanticipated 
about- face, but it came at a time when Erdoğan seemed to be pining 
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openly for a reconstituted neo– Ottoman Empire  under his tutelage. 
Perhaps he sought to expand his regional influence, especially with 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, by getting out ahead of what at the time seemed 
inevitable.
Assad’s fortunes turned, of course. This was partly due to U.S. inac-
tion and its failure to support a moderate opposition at a time when it 
might have become an effective force. It was also partly due to the frag-
mentary nature of the opposition to Assad. Still, Turkey, like the rest of 
the world, was surprised when Vladimir Putin committed Rus sian mili-
tary forces to prop up Assad, the single most decisive  factor in Assad’s 
survival. But in the days of this first phase of the Rus sian intervention, 
Turkey remained implacably opposed to the Syrian tyrant. Signifi-
cantly, it downed a Rus sian Air Force jet that had strayed (perhaps in-
tentionally) over its airspace, the first time a NATO country had done so 
since the Korean War. Turkey remained defiant and obtained the public 
support of its NATO allies. ( There can be no doubt that Putin had been 
testing NATO defenses in Turkey and elsewhere, though one might still 
think it a foolhardy escalation to shoot to kill, even if Erdoğan has yet to 
suffer any comeuppance from Putin for  doing so.)
 Ankara changed its blustery tone in Syria when it became clear that 
the Rus sian strategy had metamorphosed into a second phase. By then 
Rus sia’s intervention was not intended merely to prevent Assad from fall-
ing, but to help him regain lost ground and hang on to power, even if in 
a de facto “rump” Syria. As the Rus sian strategy appeared to be work-
ing, Turkey recalculated its interests, too. If Assad was to survive, Tur-
key could not take a chance that he might make a peace with the Syrian 
Kurds that would be distasteful to Ankara and its decades- old fight with 
the PKK, allied with the Kurdish militias in Syria. If Turkey wanted to 
affect the status of the Syrian Kurds in a post– civil war dispensation 
that still included Assad, it needed to be a player on the winning side—
or at least not be associated with the losing side. Thus another Turkish 
about- face ensued with re spect to Rus sia (though not to Assad).
Turkey continues not to support Assad. It continues to support opposi-
tion groups on the ground. Its principal mission in Syria, however, is to 
ensure that Kurdish YPG forces allied with the PKK, which it considers a 
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terrorist organ ization, do not gain a foothold akin to that of Iraq’s Kurds. 
To that end, and no doubt giving in to the Realpolitik consideration that 
Rus sia has the muscle to ensure Assad’s survival, Turkey appears to have 
worked out an arrangement with Rus sia to ensure that Kurdish aspira-
tions in Syria are managed more to its satisfaction. The quid pro quo for 
Putin is that he has gained an ally in the effort to defeat ISIS as he fights 
to expand Assad’s control over territory he had previously lost.12 It is fair 
to say that Turkey had been fighting ISIS as such only episodically.
Any such agreement between Turkey and Rus sia puts Turkey on a 
direct collision course with U.S. policy. Inherent in the Turco- Russian 
understanding is that the Rus sians  will not arm YPG fighters. Turkey 
is adamant that YPG fighters not be armed or even used to fight ISIS.13 
For its part, the United States has committed to both arming and uti-
lizing the YPG in the confrontation with ISIS in Syria.14 This  will be 
a very difficult circle to square in US- Turkish relations, as the Trump 
administration has announced that fighting ISIS is its priority in the 
 Middle East. This fight simply has not been, and foreseeably  will not 
be, the top priority for Turkey. Keeping Kurdish separatism in Syria in 
check  will continue to be Turkey’s first priority. At this writing, Tur-
key is actively attacking U.S- supported Kurdish forces in Afrin and 
other areas, despite the (so far only rhetorical) objections of the Trump 
administration.
In Iraq, Turkey’s calculation is slightly diff er ent, though not altogether 
dissimilar. Before the 2003 downfall of the Saddamist regime in Iraq, 
Turkish foreign policy officials would become apoplectic at the mention 
of federalism in Iraq. Three successive Iraqi prime ministers from the Shi-
ite Dawa Party, however, have demonstrated to Turkey what it regards 
as Baghdad’s undue closeness to, and reliance on, Tehran. In this envi-
ronment Turkey has, at least at times, played Erbil, the Iraqi Kurdistan 
regional capital, off against Baghdad. The game is clear: Turkey is leav-
ing the option open to itself to create a buffer between it and a greater 
Iran, as Ira nian dominance over the politics and security of Baghdad and 
points south has grown.
As recently as 2012, Ankara was clearly toying with the idea of Iraqi 
Kurdish in de pen dence. It has since backed away, partly  under pressure 
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from the United States, but also as the realities of what an in de pen dent 
Kurdish state in northern Iraq might mean for Syrian Kurds, and ulti-
mately for Turkey’s own Kurdish population. Still, relations between Erbil 
and Ankara are outstanding, including both po liti cal and economic rela-
tions, though Iraqi Kurdistan’s abortive in de pen dence referendum severely 
tested  those relations. Indeed, Turkey has a dominant hand in the econ-
omy of Iraqi Kurdistan, with Turkish agricultural and manufactured 
goods flooding the market. Some in Iraqi Kurdistan see this as their in-
surance policy that Turkey  will have to maintain good relations with the 
regional government. Given the relative size of the two economies, how-
ever, it is certain that Turkey regards itself as having the upper hand, as 
any interruption of the trade between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan would 
have an immediate calamitous effect in the latter. Of course, Iraqi Kurd-
istan has two centers of power, one in Erbil, the other in Sulaimania. 
While Turkey enjoys good relations with Sulaimania too, it is evident 
that Iran has the lion’s share of influence  there.
Turkey has a third significant strategic objective in Iraq, one relating 
directly to its internal politics and security. Long before the fall of the 
previous regime in 2003,  there  were PKK bases in northern Iraq. Since 
that time, Turkey has undertaken periodic security operations in north-
ern Iraq to maintain what is essentially a cordon sanitaire on the Iraqi 
side of the frontier. Both Baghdad and Erbil look away when Turkey un-
dertakes  these operations. This puts the Iraqi Kurdistan regional govern-
ment in something of a delicate, even embarrassing, position. On the one 
hand, it allows Turkey to bombard PKK positions within Iraqi Kurdistan. 
On the other hand, it is allied with the PKK and its allies the PYG in 
Syria. It is not only the United States that has an intricate and sometimes 
contradictory web of alliances in the  Middle East.
Rus sia
Rus sia’s role in Syria is discussed at length in the earlier sections of this 
chapter, and  those points  will not be repeated  here. It is worthwhile not-
ing, however, that Rus sia’s entry into the Syrian civil war constitutes its 
first major and direct foray into  Middle Eastern politics since Anwar Sadat 
expelled the Soviet Union from Egypt in 1972. Clearly the Rus sian 
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Federation seeks to balance the United States and the other Western 
powers in the region. The Chinese have also joined this enterprise, 
though they have so far only used their weight against the United States 
and its allies in the corridors of the UN Security Council.15
It should be noted that the relationship between Rus sia and Syria has 
always been a mutually utilitarian one, at least according to one scholar, 
not one based on ideological empathy. Roy Allison has observed that the 
Soviets  were well aware— having penetrated the Syrian Foreign Minis-
try and the Syrian embassy in Moscow, and even by bugging Hafez 
al- Assad’s apartment on his visits  there— that the elder Assad was a com-
paratively unenthusiastic ally.16 Still, Syria gained arms and technical 
expertise while presumably the Soviet Union gained perceived benefit, 
including international prestige, by maintaining a foothold in the re-
gion. Allison is of the view that Rus sia and Syria now genuinely share a 
Weltanschauung regarding the sacrosanct nature of international borders 
and traditional concepts of sovereignty when it comes to regime change 
à la Iraq or Libya.17 Paradoxically, he says that Syria was among the first 
states to support the Rus sian incursion into Georgia. He might also have 
noted that Syria’s re spect for the sovereignty of Lebanon is roughly equiv-
alent to Rus sia’s re spect for Ukraine’s. Still, Allison’s larger point is intui-
tively correct that, at least in the  Middle East, neither state wants Western 
powers to intervene, and certainly not to redraw the political map.
That is not to say, however, that Rus sia necessarily intervened to save 
Assad personally. Instead, Allison, writing before the first phase of the 
Rus sian military intervention in Syria, notes that Putin wishes to dem-
onstrate personal steadfastness with his allies.18 That is no doubt correct; 
in addition, he may have wanted to frustrate the United States and its 
allies in the region. Although initially Lavrov made a point of not argu-
ing that it was necessary to keep Assad in power, that calculation might 
well have changed, at least for the nonce. In any case, more may be at 
play in Syria than Rus sia’s steadfastness and joy at frustrating U.S. policy.
Angela Stent maintains that Rus sia’s military intervention in Syria (she 
was writing during what this chapter refers to as the “first phase” of Rus-
sia’s intervention) demonstrates that Rus sia “once again intends to be 
accepted as a global actor and play a part in  every major international de-
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cision.”19 Rather disturbingly, she argues that Putin’s steps in Syria rep-
resent a sort of inferiority complex, a response to Rus sia’s “perceived ex-
clusion from the post– Cold War Eu ro pean security order.”20  Here she 
references specifically NATO’s expansion to include states once allied 
with—or part of— the Soviet Union. In her view, Putin’s moves in Syria 
signal a desire for Rus sia to establish a sphere of “privileged interests,” 
her explanation for his incursions into Georgia and Ukraine, too.21
In any event,  there is one significant and noteworthy achievement that 
Rus sia has realized, and policymakers in Washington would do well to 
take note of it. According to Jeffrey Goldberg’s interview with Obama,22 
administration officials  were constantly concerned that an intervention in 
Syria would spiral out of control, using Vietnam as a cautionary tale. They 
regularly debated the pros and cons of committing in excess of 100,000 
U.S. troops, à la Iraq, or standing by and  doing nothing. Vladimir Putin 
proved— despite the use of indiscriminate bombing of civilians that caused 
horrific casualties— that it is pos si ble for a power to intervene in the  Middle 
East for a limited strategic purpose, and to do so without committing mas-
sive numbers of ground forces or sustaining high levels of casualties. That 
has been true in both phases of the Rus sian intervention, both the initial 
intervention to prevent the fall of Assad and the second phase to ensure he 
regained control of territory. Of course, Rus sia achieved  these strategic 
aims in cooperation with Syrian ground forces (though that was almost 
certainly unnecessary in the first phase, where aerial bombardment was 
devastatingly sufficient). The point is that it is a strategy— now foreclosed 
 after five years of civil war— the United States could also have deployed: 
arm and train Syrian opposition forces and support them from the air, at 
least sufficiently to convince Assad that he needed to negotiate. The failure 
of the Obama administration to do so constitutes an opportunity lost.
Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy in the  Future
 There was much talk over the years about “degrading and destroying” 
ISIS in the Obama administration. The Trump administration changed 
the rhe toric to “demolishing and destroying” the terrorist group. Such 
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locutions suggest that what is required to destroy the group is mere 
martial vigor. Proponents of this language must think that an effort akin 
to that made in the Second World War, reduced in proportion given the 
threat,  will suffice to destroy this group. They are mistaken.
 To be sure, it was appropriate to destroy ISIS physically, to liberate 
the territories it once occupied, and to allow  people whose homes are in 
 those areas an opportunity to rebuild their lives. This is not merely ad-
vocacy of a philanthropic exercise on the part of the United States. It is 
a part of the vital national strategic interests of the country.  There can be 
no doubt that, if it could, ISIS would launch attacks against the United 
States in a manner similar to the September 11 attacks. Its maintaining 
territory in Iraq and Syria meant that a particularly virulent and violent 
terrorist group had freedom of movement and the ability to establish ter-
rorist training camps on a large scale to threaten the United States and its 
allies the world over. Indeed, the masses of refugees fleeing ISIS in Iraq, 
Syria, and elsewhere constitute a prob lem that has rocked the post– Cold 
War dispensation in Eu rope, with concomitant effects on U.S. foreign 
policy. Moreover, ISIS’s existence on territory it took from host states 
constituted a kind of success that could have bred other “successes” in its 
efforts to radicalize  others.
Still, it is well to recall that ISIS is quintessentially an ideology, 
however heinous and repulsive it may be. No ideology can be destroyed 
with guns and bombs alone. That much should be clear from the resur-
gence of neo- Nazi groups throughout Eu rope and, indeed, the United 
States. Its physical destruction, therefore,  will not rid the world of this 
menace.
Rather, po liti cal settlements in both Iraq and Syria  will be required 
to ensure that other iterations of ISIS do not arise again. As ISIS contin-
ues to lose ground, thus shrinking its so- called caliphate, it  will predict-
ably metamorphose into a classical terrorist organ ization that  will simply 
engage in what are effectively hit- and- run tactics, albeit with suicide 
bombers. Indeed, it has already carried out such attacks in Iraq, even in 
the wake of losing the territory it once controlled.
The danger of failing to engender post- ISIS polities in which politics 
takes the place of vio lence is that it risks new iterations of ISIS becoming 
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attractive again in the  future as a short- term tactic for dealing with po-
liti cal disenfranchisement. This is what occurred in Iraq in 2014. A suf-
ficient number of the Sunni  there deci ded to look the other way as ISIS 
began to infiltrate Anbar and Ninevah Governorates,  because they found 
Maliki’s authoritarian policies and practices intolerable. If the politics of 
the country are not settled well, that pro cess  will predictably recur, and 
the United States  will find itself back in the region fighting the next gen-
eration of terrorist organ izations.
All factions in Iraq  were clearly fighting against ISIS. That has been 
true since 2014. What is not clear, however, is what exactly the Iraqis 
have been fighting for. Certainly, ordinary rank- and- file soldiers in the 
Iraqi armed and security forces  were fighting for a re united Iraq. Just as 
certainly, Kurdistani Peshmerga forces  were not fighting for a unified 
Iraq. But what of the Shia PMUs?  Were they fighting to re unite Iraq  under 
Baghdad’s federal government or only to protect Baghdad and the pre-
dominantly Shia south from further incursions by terrorist groups?  These 
are fundamentally po liti cal questions, but they are absolutely essential, 
 because if the politics are not settled well, any military victory  will be 
entirely ephemeral.
The United States has thus far failed to articulate a strategic vision for 
a post- ISIS Iraq. The U.S. Iraq team, originally appointed by Obama and 
kept in place by Trump, has been focused like a  laser on retaking the next 
square meter from ISIS. It continues to believe in supporting individu-
als, rather than using the weight and expertise of the United States to 
help engender institutions of good governance. Current policy is and has 
been that, if Iraq’s current prime minister successfully retakes territory 
occupied by ISIS, then his po liti cal fortunes  will be strengthened and he 
 will be able to make agreements for the post- ISIS dispensation.
This reasoning ignores that the current Iraqi prime minister is being 
undermined from within his own governing co ali tion, even as Iraqi 
and U.S. forces succeeded in eradicating ISIS from territories it occu-
pied. Maliki, the former prime minister, clearly is moving to oust him, 
though even he is the object of jockeying for leadership. This is to say 
nothing of vari ous PMU leaders who clearly have ambitions to higher 
office. In any event, no po liti cal leader has the strength to dictate terms, 
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and if he could, he would merely ensure that another insurgency even-
tually emerges.
It is essential that U.S. policy identify a po liti cal settlement that is 
achievable in Iraq and that it pursue that settlement as diligently and me-
thodically as it has pursued the military objectives. A new team with 
fresh thinking and new ideas  will be necessary.
The United States periodically convinces itself that its influence in Iraq 
is diminished.  There is a familiar pattern to this cyclical thinking.  After 
the United States acts as if it has no influence, a crisis occurs. The Iraqis 
then turn to the United States to help solve it, and the United States re-
alizes that, in fact, it continues to wield considerable influence within the 
Iraqi po liti cal class. The events of 2014 are the latest example of this phe-
nomenon, when in May then- current and former U.S. officials argued 
that U.S. influence in Iraq was nearly non ex is tent. The United States must 
realize that, in fact, it is hard wired into the Iraqi po liti cal class, as former 
U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker once said. This does not mean that the 
United States can dictate terms to the Iraqis. It cannot. It is, however, an 
impor tant and influential player,  unless it chooses not to be, as it did in the 
period from 2011 to 2014, which led to disastrous consequences.
A number of items must top the agenda of U.S. policy in Iraq. First, 
Iraq’s vari ous constituent groups must be genuinely enfranchised— not 
only ethnic and sectarian minorities, but po liti cal minorities as well. Genu-
ine power- sharing is essential. The Iraqi population has grown impatient 
with the sectarian spoils system that has been in place since 2003. Com-
petent officials are a prerequisite— not merely technocratic ministers, 
but competent technocrats throughout ministry structures.  There is no 
point in appointing a competent minister if the rest of the ministry staff 
are incompetent po liti cal hacks.
Corruption must also top the U.S. agenda in Iraq. It is not lost on the 
ordinary Iraqi citizen that its government is one of the most corrupt in 
the world. In this connection, the United States should posit its further 
engagement and assistance to the Iraqis not only on relatively corruption- 
free institutions of governance, but on the provision of ser vices. The 
failure of successive Iraqi governments since 2004 (and the Co ali tion Pro-
visional Authority before that) to provide even basic ser vices has under-
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mined the legitimacy of the Iraqi state for years. Calls for autonomous 
regions in the south— the creation of which  will only further strengthen 
Iran— are not based on ideological or nationalists impulses (as they are in 
Iraqi Kurdistan), but on utter frustration with the corruption in Baghdad 
and the lack of basic ser vices.
If genuine reconciliation efforts are not undertaken in Iraq, the blood 
of Iraqi and American ser vice men and  women spilled since June 2014 
 will have been in vain.  There has been much talk about reconciliation 
from American officials since 2003. No action of any meaningful nature 
has actually obtained, however, and Iraqi politicians who ignore U.S. ad-
vice about reconciliation have never paid a price for  doing so. Indeed, 
the current leadership of the U.S. team on Iraq policy convinced the 
Obama administration to treat the arrests and  trials of se nior Sunni elected 
officials as an internal  matter in 2012. That neglect resulted directly in 
the rise of ISIS in 2014. If the lessons from the  mistakes of the past are 
not learned, the  mistakes  will be repeated.
The Iraqi armed and security forces may play a critical role in any rec-
onciliation effort.  After the U.S. administrator in Iraq disbanded  these 
ser vices in 2003, he put forward a plan for reconstituting them. The plan 
called for certain parties represented in the Iraqi Governing Council to 
put forward the names of the first set of recruits, both officers and en-
listed men. The parties asked to provide  these recruits  were the religious 
parties, both Sunni and Shii, and the two Kurdish parties. Predictably, 
this resulted in the nascent Iraqi Army and Security Forces, from their 
inception, being based on sectarian and ethnic considerations. It also 
meant that the first loyalty of  these officers and enlisted personnel was 
almost certainly to the parties that had nominated them, not to the state 
of Iraq.
The post- ISIS period  will be an opportunity to cleanse this original 
sin. It is true that  under Prime Minister Abadi, Iraqi Army units are far 
less likely to carry Shii sectarian banners than they  were  under his pre-
de ces sor, and that is a very positive development. Still, U.S. policy should 
insist on the continued professionalization of armed and security ser vices 
and the full integration of units from across ethno- confessional lines. Ideas 
floated in Washington about having only the ethno- confessional group 
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of a par tic u lar region secure that region are a  recipe for the continued 
Balkanization of the country. If ISIS proved one  thing in 2014 it is that 
such an insular approach to the security of the country is bound to fail. 
Only a truly integrated Iraqi force can maintain peace and public order 
in the country. Having fully integrated units—as existed in Iraq before 
2003— will promote further national cohesion and help bind the wounds 
of the past, contributing in no small part to national reconciliation.
On a related issue, it has already been noted that the Iraqi Army 
collapsed with incredible speed in the face of a force it vastly outnum-
bered. This collapse should not have been altogether surprising. Ameri-
can officials knew long before the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011 that 
Prime Minister Maliki was coup- proofing the army by cashiering expe-
rienced, professional officers and replacing them with cronies whose 
loyalty lay with him personally. He further weakened the regular army 
by undertraining and underequipping it. Moreover, units in Mosul 
had so abused the local population that, as ISIS began to advance into 
the city, the Maliki- loyalist officers fled, fearful of what might happen 
to them should they fall into the hands of the locals. Naturally, when 
ordinary soldiers saw their officers  running, they could not be ex-
pected to fight. Had this unfortunate chain of events occurred with 
any other army in the world, it is almost certain that the results would 
have been similar.
The U.S. response to Maliki’s dismantling of the regular Iraqi Army 
was to do precisely nothing. Indeed, it continued to support him, espe-
cially during the no- confidence effort in 2012. This was the case even 
though his coup- proofing efforts had been  under way for years by then 
and even though U.S. officials  were well aware of  those efforts. U.S. pol-
icy must mediate in  favor of creating cohesive, integrated armed and 
security forces that are strong enough to maintain public order, fend off 
threats from violent groups, and defend national borders, while si mul ta-
neously ensuring that  those forces are manned by professionals and not 
cronies who might support the rise of the next dictatorship.
Syria is a far more complicated  matter. The Trump administration 
speaks of cooperating with Rus sia in fighting ISIS. That is understand-
able, though it is also problematic. Assad  will never be an effective inter-
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locutor in putting the country back together. His personal survival means 
a fragmented Syria into the foreseeable  future. A fragmented Syria with-
out effective governmental controls  will be a cauldron for vio lence and, 
again, the pos si ble rise of other terrorist groups that  will have the ability 
to threaten U.S. and allied interests.
A U.S. policy that acknowledges that Rus sia has reasserted itself into 
the  Middle East  after an effective absence of more than four de cades is 
rational. But it  ought to extract a quid pro quo. The person of Assad has 
become so heinous to the broad range of Syria’s population that he sim-
ply cannot be a part of the solution to Syria’s prob lems. The United States 
should work with the Rus sian Federation to secure his retirement to a 
dacha in Rus sia. An acceptable interlocutor must be found who can en-
gage the regime’s non- ISIS- affiliated opposition if  there is any hope for 
reuniting the country.
One  thing must be recalled, however.  There is very  little doubt that 
Syria’s minority Alawi population has noted what happened in Iraq when 
the Sunni minority fell from power: it lost every thing. That lesson was 
not lost on the Alawi elites who govern, or on ordinary citizens. As in 
Iraq, genuine power- sharing and reconciliation  will be necessary to avoid 
repeating the past.
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Territorial Havens and the Risk of Complex 
Terrorist Attacks in the United States
Risa Brooks
When the 9/11 Commission issued its final report in July 2004, it offered several recommendations for how to prevent  future terror-
ist attacks against the United States.1 Foremost among them was elimi-
nating terrorist safe havens of the kind Al Qaeda enjoyed in Af ghan i stan 
before the 2001 attacks.2 Since that time, preventing terrorist sanctuaries 
from emerging in the  Middle East has been a central goal of U.S. foreign 
policy and a principal rationale for the country’s overseas wars.3 The 
George W. Bush administration’s war in Af ghan i stan and 2003 invasion 
of Iraq  were both fueled in part by concerns about terrorist sanctuaries.4 
President Obama similarly prioritized the threat posed by terrorist ha-
vens in his foreign policy and military actions in the  Middle East.5 Of-
ficials in the Trump administration have similarly cited the threat posed 
by havens, as have military leaders.6
 After its dramatic military gains in June 2014, ISIS’s control of terri-
tory in Syria and Iraq also raised the specter of a transnational group plot-
ting terrorist attacks in the United States from an overseas sanctuary.7 
Indeed, preventing ISIS from retaining a terrorist sanctuary soon emerged 
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as a major rationale for military action against the group  under both the 
Obama and Trump administrations.8 Since 2014  those efforts to retake 
ISIS- controlled land have diminished the territorial control of ISIS in Iraq 
and Syria considerably. Still, ISIS leaders show no sign of relenting in their 
pursuit of territory in support of their self- declared caliphate. In addi-
tion, many of their affiliates  today retain significant areas of territorial 
control in Asia, North Africa, the  Middle East, and beyond.
How does a militant group’s— and ISIS’s in particular— control of 
overseas territory affect its ability to engage in attacks against the United 
States? I argue that the threat is far more limited than is commonly ap-
preciated: control of territory enhances a group’s capabilities, but that ter-
ritory is not sufficient to allow it to carry out attacks from overseas in the 
United States, especially what I term “complex” terrorist plots. Not all 
sanctuaries are created equal. In par tic u lar, they vary in how close to or 
remote from the area of operations they are. That is, they vary according 
to  whether the sanctuary encompasses the area of attacks, or provides 
ready access to it, or is separated from the target by major logistical and 
security obstacles. Although the territorial basis of a sanctuary— the phys-
ical control of territory— can provide several advantages and contributes 
to a group’s orga nizational capacity and capabilities, without local access 
and security in the area of operations, it is limited in what it can do. 
Hence, as long as an ISIS haven is remote from the United States, the 
threat it poses is circumscribed.9 For this reason Americans should be cau-
tious not to overestimate the threat that an ISIS sanctuary in the  Middle 
East and North Africa poses to their security.
This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by defining and discussing 
the importance of “complex” terror attacks. I discuss the advantages ter-
ritoriality provides groups such as ISIS in planning terrorist attacks. I 
then analyze the disadvantages and obstacles the remoteness of that 
sanctuary poses to the group. In this regard, I highlight the inability to 
provide security for its operatives as they seek access to and then prepare 
plots within the United States, and the vital role the lack of “commu-
nity sanctuary” plays in insulating the country from complex attacks. I 
argue that, unlike in some parts of Eu rope, ISIS has been prevented 
from realizing impor tant synergies between its remote territorial sanc-
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tuary and a local community safe haven. Consequently, the group  faces 
several significant challenges in engaging in complex attacks in the 
United States. In the final section I review the implications of the analy-
sis and offer several practical guidelines for countering a resurgent ISIS 
sanctuary threat.
The Importance of Complex Terrorist Attacks
In recent years many terrorism analysts and officials in the United States 
have been heavi ly focused on preventing attacks perpetrated by “lone 
wolves.”10  These attacks, as usually conceived, are basic in nature: they 
are perpetrated in de pen dently by solo actors, or intimates ( brothers, mar-
ried  couples), against unsecured targets, using easily accessible weapons 
(vehicles, knives, and firearms). ISIS has regularly called on its sympa-
thizers to engage in such acts, and a small number have been perpetrated 
in recent years.11
Complex attacks are significantly more challenging to carry out than 
basic attacks.  These are attacks that exhibit one or more properties: a net-
work of operatives; targets that are hardened by security defenses; phased 
or simultaneous attacks or a campaign of temporally clustered attacks; and 
lethal and technically sophisticated weapons.  These attacks require tech-
nical ability as well as skills in terrorist tradecraft to execute successfully. 
 These include aptitude in surveillance, secured communications, tactical 
coordination, and often, fabrication of explosives.  Because of the num-
ber and nature of precursor steps required to plan and prepare them,  these 
plots also entail a high risk that they  will be detected and exposed to au-
thorities. They place considerable demands on a group’s capacity to re-
tain operational security and the ability to deny information about their 
plans to authorities.12
In comparison with the lone- wolf challenge, considerably less atten-
tion has been paid to the prospect that ISIS could engage in complex at-
tacks of this kind in the United States. This may reflect the country’s 
counterterrorism successes and al Qaeda core’s failure to execute any suc-
cessful spectacular attacks on the United States since 9/11.13 It may also 
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reflect ISIS’s own stated priority of establishing a caliphate in the  Middle 
East, which heretofore has required it to focus its energies on acquiring 
and protecting territory in the region.14
Avoiding complex attacks, however, remains vitally impor tant for 
the United States. Should ISIS redirect more of its energies  toward 
transnational attacks, the threat could in princi ple intensify. Indeed, 
 there may be incentives for ISIS to do this during the Trump adminis-
tration, given several of its officials’ hawkish views of the threat posed 
by “radical Islamic terrorism.”15 If the aim is to incite the United States 
into launching a ground war in the  Middle East, as ISIS’s ideology and 
propaganda suggest,16 then  there may be in the  future greater incen-
tives for the group to focus on provoking such a response with a ter-
rorist spectacular.
The po liti cal effects of a successfully executed complex attack are apt 
to be far- reaching. Complex attacks have impor tant propaganda value and 
may increase recruitment, sympathizers, and fundraising opportunities 
for militant groups. Complex attacks also signal a group’s capability and 
power to do harm to an adversary and its allied population. They may be 
strategically effective to the extent that they generate more intense levels 
of terror in the target audience. Research shows that the psychological 
consequences of a terrorist attack are affected by the “quality and extent” 
of exposure to the event.17 Complex attacks may incite enduring and in-
tense levels of fear in the target population. Indeed, terrorists rely on this 
in order to induce an overreaction from the state and capitalize on op-
portunities to mobilize new supporters in its wake.18
An ISIS- perpetrated complex attack is likely to further mobilize 
Americans who already profess elevated fears of terrorism.19 The 2015 
ISIS attack in Paris, for example, increased worries among Americans 
about terrorist attacks at home.20 Should an ISIS-coordinated complex 
attack occur in the United States, officials  will experience intense pressure 
to invest more heavi ly in the overseas military fight against the organ-
ization. A reasoned assessment of ISIS’s capacity to engage in such an at-
tack is essential.
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ISIS’s Sanctuary in Iraq and Syria
ISIS’s seizure of the Iraqi town of Mosul in June 2014 and its ensuing take-
over of large pieces of territory in Syria and Iraq took many analysts by 
surprise.21 Since a co ali tion of Western and regional actors  were mobilized 
to retake this territory,22 ISIS has lost control of much of it in both Syria 
and Iraq.23 Still, it is worth remembering that ISIS in its previous incar-
nation as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was once nearly defeated. Just as ISIS 
reemerged from its marginalized status to capture the world’s attention 
with its military successes in 2014, it is impor tant not to discount the po-
tential revitalization of the organ ization. The leadership and organ ization 
remain intact, if reduced in size. Barring some transformation in the po-
liti cal conditions that facilitated its revitalization, the entity is unlikely to 
go away and could regroup in some new form. Similarly,  there are places 
in the  Middle East and North Africa in which it has established strong-
holds and seeks to expand influence, most notably in Libya, but also in 
Af ghan i stan and in the Sahel. Hence concerns about overseas terrorist 
havens are likely to remain a major fixation of the United States, as they 
have been since 2001.
In this context it is useful to think carefully about the implications of 
territorial control for the group’s ability to mount complex terrorist 
attacks. Although control of territory provides several advantages to ISIS, 
such territory is still of limited benefit  because it is “remote” from targets 
in the United States.24
The Importance of Controlling Territory
The importance of territorial sanctuaries, or cross- border havens, for in-
surgents employing guerrilla warfare or tactics of conventional warfare 
has been well established.25 Perhaps less obvious is why holding territory 
is beneficial to groups employing terrorist tactics against an adversary. 
Strategically, terrorism does not directly challenge a state’s military or 
involve tactical engagements with it; terrorist organ izations do not re-
quire land to base an armed force. Rather, strategies of terrorism rely 
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on a coercive or punishment logic. A “provocation” strategy of terrorism 
uses attacks to incite fear and disorientation in a population, provoke an 
overreaction from the government, and capitalize on its ensuing dele-
gitimization to mobilize new supporters for the militants’ cause. An 
“armed pressure” strategy aims to generate costs that a target population 
must bear in order to coerce policy change from their state.26  Whether 
the aim is to elicit an overreaction or to generate costs, however, being 
able to perpetrate complex attacks is often strategically advantageous for 
groups employing terrorist methods.
Holding territory, in turn, can help facilitate the execution of com-
plex attacks by making it pos si ble for a group to strengthen its capabili-
ties.27 Camps within the zone of control can facilitate extensive training 
and preparation of operatives, as well as the cultivation of specialized ex-
pertise, such as engineers skilled in the fabrication of explosive devices.28 
The engineer who fabricated the explosives for the Paris (2015) and Brus-
sels (2016) attacks was apparently cultivated by ISIS in this manner.29 
Control of territory may also allow militants to exploit natu ral resources 
or operate illicit markets to raise funds, and in some cases to build com-
mercial or industrial enterprises. Many of  these activities have been ob-
served in regard to ISIS.30
Within a territorial sanctuary, leaders can also vet recruits, evalu-
ating their capacity to withstand the pressures of a complex plot by 
putting them in situations of intense stress.31 Camps provide for in-
doctrination and build cohesion within a group preparing a plot. As 
Thomas Hegghammer observes, for example, the militants engaged 
in a terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabia in 2003 had previously bene-
fited enormously from their experiences in Afghan camps, which pro-
vided for their “acculturation, indoctrination, training and relations 
building.”32 As other analysts put it, “Training camps provide more 
than seclusion and security. They also allow for the creation of a con-
trolled environment where the recruits can be immersed fully into the 
new group, continually evaluated and tested, and gradually initiated 
into the organ ization.”33 Bin Laden was able to evaluate recruits within 
the Afghan sanctuary, for example, and selected operatives for 9/11 in 
this way.34
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In addition, control of territory allows for the development of spe-
cialized expertise and leadership, which can provide essential support and 
guidance in planning and preparing a complex attack. ISIS has been able 
to vet operatives who have traveled to Syria, including the Eu ro pean ring-
leader of the Paris and Brussels attacks. ISIS’s leadership has been able to 
establish infrastructure and routines in support of external operations. In 
the Brussels and Paris attacks, for example, ISIS man ag ers provided con-
tacts and guidance to the local or ga nizer in Eu rope.35
The Limitations of “Remote” Sanctuaries
Although ISIS’s capacity to control territory in the  Middle East and larger 
region enhances its ability to engage in terrorist attacks, it would still  faces 
serious obstacles to executing complex attacks in the United States.  These 
obstacles stem from the fact that such havens are separated from the area 
of operations by security and logistical barriers that render the sanctuary 
“remote” from the United States. Physical obstacles such as the Atlantic 
Ocean, as well as security mea sures related to port security and signifi-
cant investments in intelligence and domestic counterterrorism initiatives 
by the United States complicate access to the country and the ability to 
engage in covert terrorist- related activities within it. Also crucial is the 
absence of local communities in the United States that would tolerate or 
support militant activities and provide the group security and resources. 
 These obstacles both complicate movement into the United States and 
increase the challenges and security risks of carry ing out the many ante-
cedent activities essential to a complex plot.
Specifically, the remoteness of a territorial sanctuary creates three sets 
of obstacles to engaging in complex attacks. A first obstacle is locating 
operatives within the United States who can prepare and execute the at-
tacks. In princi ple,  there are two ways that the group could do this. Each, 
however, poses challenges and creates obstacles to successfully executing 
an attack. First, ISIS might try to infiltrate the country with foreign op-
eratives (that is, trained and vetted foreign nationals sent to execute a 
plot).  Doing this, however, requires evading security barriers at ports 
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and borders as well as immigration controls. Second, the group can 
rely on self- recruits. Self- recruits include individuals in the United States 
who are recruited online by leaders located in the remote sanctuary but 
other wise operate autonomously. The track rec ord of aspiring militants 
in the United States who act without training and guidance, however, 
suggests that recruits of this kind would be hard-pressed to successfully 
or ga nize a complex attack. Such self- initiated plotters have trou ble fabri-
cating even  simple bombs, such as  those made from pressure cookers, and 
often have made egregious errors in operational security.36  There is  little 
evidence that self- recruits in the United States can on their own success-
fully or ga nize a network of operatives to attack a hardened target or mul-
tiple targets with sophisticated weapons.
Alternatively, residents with travel documents from the area to be 
targeted might on their own initiative travel to the remote sanctuary 
for training with the intention of returning home to plot an attack (or 
be recruited to do so by the militant group’s leaders).37 Individuals 
who self- select to join the militant group, however, are apt as a general 
pool to be inferior in skill and character to vetted recruits. The psy-
chological impulses that drive them to seek out the group may render 
them violent and difficult to manage.38  Those who travel to the sanc-
tuary zone to receive training and guidance may also be tracked by law 
enforcement.
Moreover, even if they avoid detection and scrutiny, it is unclear 
 whether the training they receive within the remote territorial sanctu-
ary  will be sufficient. Consider, for example, that in both of the most 
serious plots by al Qaeda involving sophisticated explosive devices post-
9/11, the individuals had been trained extensively by overseas militant 
organ izations. Faisal Shahzad, who sought to bomb Times Square in 
2009, was trained by the Pakistani group Tehrik e Taliban.39 Najibullah 
Zazi, who plotted in 2009 to bomb the New York subway, had received 
instruction from al Qaeda. Yet, once back in the United States, neither 
Shahzad nor Zazi successfully managed to manufacture their respective 
explosive devices. Shahzad’s fertilizer- based car bomb failed to explode, 
and Zazi was caught when he e-mailed an overseas contact seeking clari-
fication about how to construct his TATP bombs.40  These cases illustrate 
another difficulty facing militant groups that rely on infiltrators and self- 
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recruits within the United States:  because their operatives  will lack the 
help of man ag ers, experts, or mentors in the local environment, they  will 
have to rely on electronic communications, which may expose them to 
operational security detection.
A second prob lem relates to getting information about local targets 
essential to a plot.  These include details about security mea sures and ac-
cess to targets, escape routes, timing, and positioning of weapons. Once 
again, electronic resources might prove useful in this regard. Militants 
may be able to view online floor plans, live traffic feeds, or GPS and sat-
ellite data. But even when available,  these sources of information are 
likely to be insufficient to provide a complete survey of local conditions. 
Even basic plots, such as a foiled effort to bomb New York City’s Herald 
Square, require on- the- ground surveillance.41
A complex plot involves even more detailed information. Consider 
the surveillance undertaken by American David Headley as he prepared 
to execute the 2008 Mumbai attacks.  These attacks might not seem to 
have required extensive surveillance, given that they  were aimed at soft 
targets, such as a train station and  hotels. Headley, however, undertook 
five extended trips to Mumbai in order to scout targets, beginning in 
March 2008.42 He hired fishermen to take him on private tours of the 
Mumbai harbor and took surveillance video to determine landing points 
for the attackers.43 He also stayed in the Taj Majal Palace  Hotel (one of 
his main targets) at least twice. Like Headley, the 9/11 attackers also en-
gaged in scouting and surveillance of targets, including numerous rides 
on commercial aircraft to assess security conditions and a surveillance 
flight up the Hudson River corridor.44
A third prob lem afflicts both self- recruits and infiltrators: both  will 
have to retain operational security as they communicate, coordinate, 
undertake surveillance, fabricate weapons, and the like, in preparation 
for an attack. Foreign infiltrators who lack situational knowledge and 
familiarity with the local environment may raise suspicion.45 And local 
residents recruited for an attack  will lack experience and expertise in 
terrorist tradecraft related to counterintelligence.
 There is, despite  these obstacles, one pos si ble route for militants op-
erating from a remote sanctuary to overcome the lack of access and local 
security: vet and train infiltrators so well in terrorist tradecraft that they 
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are able to carry out all  these tasks without being detected and without 
any guidance and support from local handlers and mentors. In other 
words, in princi ple the training of recruits could be so comprehensive, 
and the operatives so talented and dispositionally suited to the task, that 
they could circumvent all the obstacles facing a group trying to plot an 
attack from a remote territorial sanctuary.
But given current security precautions in the United States, the ob-
stacles ISIS (or any other group for that  matter)  faces to thoroughly 
training recruits in this way remain extremely high. The 9/11 attacks are 
instructive in this regard. The attacks are commonly viewed as the most 
creative and skillfully executed attacks committed by a terrorist organ-
ization. The plot itself was years in the making. The nineteen men se-
lected to carry out the plot  were vetted. Before coming to the United 
States, they  were extensively trained by Khaled Sheikh Mohammed 
(KSM), the plot’s principal mastermind.
Despite all  these advantages, the al Qaeda operatives committed 
numerous errors in operational security in the months leading up to the 
attacks. Two of the hijackers, Nawaf al- Hazmi and Khalid Mihdhar, 
 were especially careless. When they sought to take flight lessons in San 
Diego, their be hav ior was so bizarre that the instructors became suspi-
cious. The men, for example, asked to skip training on small planes and 
instead focus on large Boeing aircraft; and they showed  little interest in 
learning how to take off or land.46 Mihdhar subsequently left without 
KSM’s approval to see  family in Yemen when he became homesick.47 
Hazmi bragged to his roommate that he would soon be famous.48 He 
also apparently told fellow employees at a gas station something about a 
potential plot. According to the 9/11 Commission report, some of  these 
station attendants  were expecting in August 2001 to be questioned in 
regard to Hamzi’s comments, and at least one individual is suspected of 
knowing some details about the plot.49 Zacarias Moussaoui, another al 
Qaeda operative in the United States, also raised suspicions at a flight 
school in Eagan, Minnesota, prompting the instructor to report him to 
authorities and leading to his arrest on immigration charges.50 Moham-
med Atta, the plot’s tactical ringleader,  violated his own admonitions to 
the other hijackers not to contact their relatives before the attack and 
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called his  father.51 In short, even  under nearly ideal circumstances, the 
militants made numerous errors in operational security— errors that if 
made  today would have been much more likely to expose the plot. For 
 these reasons, any plan by ISIS to rely on training to overcome the ob-
stacles presented by remoteness would be fraught with difficulty and 
perhaps impossible to execute.
The Absence of Community Sanctuaries in the United States
The United States has one other major advantage that limits the ability 
of ISIS’s leaders to engage in complex attacks within the country’s 
borders: it lacks “community sanctuaries.” Such sanctuaries could pro-
vide added security and help a group of infiltrators or self- recruits 
avoid exposure while they prepared complex plots in the United States. 
 These sanctuaries are unlike territorial sanctuaries, which are based on 
physical control of land and where the need to remain clandestine is 
mitigated. Community sanctuaries occur in areas where geo graph i-
cally concentrated populations (such as a neighborhood or town) toler-
ate or support militant activity for any number of complex reasons. A 
group operating within such an environment must remain clandestine 
to avoid detection by law enforcement or counterterrorism efforts by 
the state. But the added security provided by community members and 
by embedding in social networks insulates the militants against expo-
sure. Analysts of terrorist organ izations have long highlighted the im-
portance of social support of this kind in aiding clandestine terrorist 
groups.52
Less appreciated is the impact on militant groups of the opposite of 
community support: community opposition. Communities can be inte-
gral players in counterterrorism when they reject militancy and assist state 
authorities in exposing it. Dense social networks become dangerous to 
militants  because they make it easy to detect outsiders and aberrant be-
hav ior. Securing communities against the willingness of members to tol-
erate or support extremism is thus a vital means of safeguarding against 
terrorist attacks. When  those mea sures are combined with effective 
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security and intelligence efforts, the security environment becomes even 
more hostile to aspiring militants.
The United States has significant advantages on both fronts. The gov-
ernment has invested heavi ly in counterterrorism since 9/11, and although 
the efficacy and necessity of some aspects of  those investments may be 
debated, the infrastructure for detecting terrorist- related activity in the 
United States has been transformed.53 In addition,  there is  little evidence 
that ISIS militants benefit from security within community sanctuaries 
in the United States. Although  there are incidences of individual Mus-
lims engaging in terrorist vio lence, and some individuals may profess 
support for extremist  causes,  there is also evidence that the vast majority 
of American Muslims reject militancy and view ISIS with the same sus-
picion as other Americans.54 ISIS lacks geographic pockets of supporters: 
 there are no Molenbeeks, Bogsides, French banlieues, or Finsbury Park 
mosques in the United States that could provide the kind of cover and 
concealment that ISIS might seek.  There is considerable evidence that 
immigrant communities of Muslims are vibrant and integrated, especially 
in comparison with their Eu ro pean counter parts.55 Moreover,  there is 
evidence that the rejection of militancy has had a beneficial effect on 
counterterrorism. Muslim community members have provided tips that 
have exposed a significant percentage of extremists in the United States 
since 9/11.56 In fact, so wary was KSM of the dangers  these communities 
pose to aspiring militants that he warned the 9/11 hijackers to steer clear 
of them once they relocated to the United States.57
The absence of community sanctuaries in the United States is a vital 
source of resilience against the perpetration of complex attacks by ISIS. 
It prevents the group from benefiting from the synergies that emerge 
when militants combine a “remote territorial” with a “local community” 
sanctuary. To see this, consider patterns in the complex al Qaeda and ISIS 
attacks that have occurred in Eu rope since 9/11. In each case, individuals 
involved in the plots had been trained or received instruction in foreign 
sanctuaries. Militants also then benefited from the security they found 
within neighborhoods in Eu rope where many details of the plot  were 
worked out and preparations undertaken. In 2005 the 7/7 bombers in 
London found added security in areas of Leeds, and especially in social 
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networks centered on a local bookstore and community institutions. The 
attackers responsible for the 2004 explosions on Madrid trains prepared 
their plot in safe houses where some of their activities  were observed by 
outsiders. More recently, the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks  were 
facilitated by the security available to them in the Brussels neighborhood 
of Molenbeek.58 In fact, several of the perpetrators and weapons involved 
in attacks in Eu rope in recent years have been traced in one way or an-
other to Molenbeek, including the 2015 attack in Paris on the office of 
the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo.59
Revisiting the 9/11 attacks also provides reassurance that the con-
temporary threat of complex attacks posed by ISIS is limited. The tendency 
among observers is to focus on the advantages the group’s Afghan sanc-
tuary provided the group in preparing the plot. But equally impor tant to 
remember is how diff er ent the United States was domestically. This is 
critical to understanding al Qaeda’s success. Po liti cal mobilization against 
the threat posed by al Qaeda was limited, and significant investment in 
counterterrorism had not been forthcoming. Equally impor tant,  there 
 were weaknesses in intelligence and law enforcement. As is well known, 
prob lems within the CIA and FBI meant that breaches in operational 
security by the militants in the United States, and other opportunities 
for detecting the plot,  were not pursued.60 In addition, the militants op-
erated in an environment where  there was a lack of awareness about the 
possibility that malevolent actors might seek to prepare complex terror-
ist attacks. In other words, 9/11 is the product of both its external sanctu-
ary and the pre-9/11 security environment in the United States.
 Today, however, the United States is a diff er ent place. Not only have 
 there been the aforementioned improvements in counterterrorism, but 
American society (perhaps for better and for worse) has been transformed 
by the attack.  Today Americans are primed to identify aberrant be hav-
ior, and  there are numerous examples of individuals providing tips to au-
thorities.61 Consequently, it would be much more difficult for ISIS to 
infiltrate operatives or for self- recruits without extensive training to un-
dertake the steps necessary to prepare a complex attack without risk of 
exposure or failure. The  mistakes and errors made by the hijackers are 
vital to bear in mind ( mistakes that occurred despite their comprehensive 
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training). In  today’s environment, it is difficult to imagine that at least one 
of  those errors, if not the preparatory actions they undertook, would not 
result in the plot’s exposure.
Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy
The analy sis, in turn, has several implications for how we assess the ter-
rorist threat to the United States posed by an ISIS territorial sanctuary in 
Iraq should they succeed in reestablishing one in the  future, or the reten-
tion of a territorial haven elsewhere in the region.
First it suggests that the threat is more qualified than it is sometimes 
characterized. Control of territory provides a militant group such as ISIS 
opportunities to augment its capabilities. It can retain significant bureau-
cratic infrastructure and a leadership hierarchy that provides guidance, 
management, and training in support of a complex plot in the United 
States. In princi ple it could identify recruits, such as Americans or for-
eign infiltrators, who could travel from the region to the United States 
to prepare and plot such attacks. The threat seen from this vantage point 
certainly seems ominous.
Crucially, however, ISIS lacks the access and security in the United 
States that would allow it to capitalize on  those advantages. Recruiting 
trained or experienced operatives is one obstacle. Of the few dozen Amer-
icans who have successfully traveled to the  Middle East to fight with 
ISIS, a significant number have been killed or been arrested.62  Whether 
 those individuals who survive  will retain the ambition to engage in attacks 
in the United States, or could return and prepare a plot without having 
their actions monitored, is questionable.63 The latter constraint, in par tic-
u lar, requires ISIS to rely on individuals whose travels have not been 
monitored, which might be hard for it to verify; in any case, it also yields 
a finite pool of qualified recruits. Relying on foreigners poses its own dif-
fer ent and serious obstacles, as discussed earlier.
In turn, should a network coalesce and seek to prepare a complex plot, 
the group  faces a serious risk of exposure as it prepares to execute the 
attack. Carrying out pre- attack steps such as surveillance against hard-
ened targets, coordination, communication, fabrication, and practice with 
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sophisticated weapons generates opportunities for detection. ISIS lacks 
local community sanctuaries in the United States, which might provide 
added security and insulate against intelligence and law enforcement 
counterterrorism efforts. In fact, Muslim communities have in many doc-
umented cases proven to be hostile environments to extremists; and 
through some combination of community tips or intelligence and moni-
toring, all but a small number of attacks since 9/11 have been foiled or 
failed. And  these failed attacks  were all basic attacks requiring minimal 
coordination, premeditation and tradecraft, or technical expertise. The 
impermissive security environment in the United States is a major ob-
stacle to carry ing out complex attacks.
The analy sis has two final implications for what should be the strat-
egy and approach to countering the transnational terrorist challenge posed 
by ISIS. The first relates to the need to support Muslim communities’ dem-
onstrated willingness to expose suspected extremists in their midst. Some 
of the counterterrorism methods that law enforcement employs, such as 
the use of in for mants, monitoring of religious institutions, and the use of 
sting operations, are controversial in this regard.64 Although some con-
tend they are necessary expedients, they may also undermine the long- 
term resiliency of  these communities and therefore their capacity to ex-
pose extremism. A community’s ability to expose militancy depends on 
the maintenance of social trust and vibrant social networks within it. 
Initiatives aimed at outreach and support for communities may be less 
likely to corrode this social trust, and therefore ongoing investments in 
mea sures of this kind are essential.
Second, the analy sis bears on U.S. strategy  toward ISIS in the  Middle 
East. The analy sis suggests that eliminating ISIS’s territorial foothold through 
aggressive action by the U.S. military is not necessary to sharply limit the 
terrorist threat to the country. A strategy premised on rolling back territo-
rial gains through airpower and support to local armed forces has to date 
showed promise in eroding the amount and nature of territorial control.65 
Long- term occupation or a  future commitment of ground forces in a com-
bat role is not only unnecessary, but could be counterproductive if it gener-
ates more resilient community support in the region for the militants.
If ISIS’s top leadership is kept on the run and contained within a small 
territorial footprint, the United States can employ counterterrorism 
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methods that have been proven effective against al Qaeda’s core leadership, 
including the use of drones and special operations forces. As Daniel Byman 
has argued, drones and special operations troops can distract and degrade 
militant organ izations.66  These methods render the territorial sanctuary 
porous, degrading the security the militants employ. Without freedom of 
movement, investments in infrastructure and orga nizational stability are less 
 viable. The quality and utility of the territorial sanctuary is eroded and with 
it the benefits it has to the group. This is an impor tant strategic effect.
 These methods are not without downsides. The propaganda benefit 
of inevitable  mistakes and civilian deaths from drone attacks are serious 
prob lems.  These  mistakes can invigorate “community sanctuaries” in the 
region and beyond.  There is no obvious formula for mea sur ing the costs 
against the benefits of eroding the group’s territorial sanctuary. Still, the 
drones and special operations counterterrorism approach may be the best 
available, assuming it is married with a clear strategy for supporting com-
munity resilience against militancy in the United States. An ISIS with a 
weakened and attenuated territorial sanctuary  will be handicapped in its 
capacity to plan a complex plot against Americans at home. Without a 
local foothold and sympathizers in community sanctuaries in the United 
States, its ability to prepare and execute such an attack are further ham-
pered. For  these reasons, the ISIS “sanctuary threat” to the United States 
remains limited.
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A State, an Insurgency, and a Revolution
Understanding and Defeating  
the Three  Faces of ISIS
Peter Krause
The United States has been po liti cally, eco nom ically, and militarily involved in the  Middle East for over half a  century. Despite the war- 
weariness of the American public and growing support for a  grand strat-
egy of restraint, direct U.S. engagement in the region  will continue into 
the foreseeable  future.1 Notwithstanding the difficulties of identifying (let 
alone pursuing and achieving) the “least bad option” in the Syrian civil 
war, the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, and the unwelcome tension between 
supporting democ ratization and stability, the United States has a number 
of core interests in the  Middle East.  These include preventing the rise of 
a regional hegemon, nuclear proliferation, and significant terrorist attacks 
on the homeland, as well as ensuring access to oil and the security of re-
gional allies.
 These interests provide a backdrop for the most prominent regional 
threat to emerge in recent years: the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or 
ISIS. The good news is that ISIS poses  little threat to the most crucial 
U.S. regional interests, such as preventing the rise of a regional hegemon 
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and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The bad news is that ISIS still 
pres ents a significant threat to a number of other U.S. interests, such as 
the stability of regional allies and the prevention of terrorist attacks. Fur-
thermore, the group’s unique structure makes it more difficult for the 
United States and its allies to defeat, as ISIS is not simply a terrorist group. 
Rather, it is at once a state that has controlled and governed territory the 
size of Indiana, a transnational insurgency that seeks to spread chaos and 
overthrow regimes across the region, and a revolutionary movement that 
works to reshape socie ties and spread an extreme ideology and apocalyp-
tic vision.
A failure to understand and combat any one of  these parts of ISIS  will 
ensure a long, frustrating  future of tactical victories and strategic defeats, 
as ISIS uses any remaining part of its organ ization to prepare the ground 
to regenerate the  others. Therefore, although the recapture of territory 
from ISIS in Iraq and Syria from 2015 to 2018 is an impor tant and neces-
sary step  toward the group’s defeat, it is only the first of many.2 Nonethe-
less, the news is not all bad. Just as ISIS’s hydra heads reinforce each other, 
they also pres ent additional vulnerabilities for the group. By tying the 
attractiveness of a revolution to the fate of a fragile “state,” and by doom-
ing that state to economic and popu lar failure due to an extreme, apoca-
lyptic ideology, ISIS helps to sow the seeds of its own demise.
First, I detail U.S. interests in the region and discuss the extent to 
which ISIS threatens each of them. Next, I pres ent and analyze the 
three  faces of ISIS and how they help explain the group’s past and  future 
be hav ior. Fi nally, I conclude with prescriptions for how the United 
States and its allies can defeat ISIS and protect their core interests in the 
 Middle East.
U.S. Interests in the  Middle East
The United States has five primary interests in the  Middle East (see fig-
ure 10-1). First, the United States seeks to avoid the rise of a regional 
hegemon— a single strong state that dominates the region along with 
its military and economic resources.3 A regional hegemon could not be 
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balanced by its neighbors in the  Middle East alone, meaning that it 
would also pres ent a significant security challenge for the United States 
and its allies in Eu rope, Africa, and Asia given the  Middle East’s central 
geographic location. Furthermore, a hegemon in the  Middle East would 
control a significant portion of the world’s oil reserves, giving it the power 
to potentially destabilize the market or hold the United States and other 
nations hostage to high prices or low output. U.S. intervention against 
Iraq’s 1990–91 occupation of Kuwait and threat to Saudi Arabia was 
driven in part by  these concerns.
Second, the United States aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in the  Middle East. Despite some scholarly claims and historical 
evidence that the presence of nuclear weapons can help stabilize relations 
between enemies, the pro cess of creating a nuclear arsenal before the 
achievement of a secure second- strike capability is inherently destabiliz-
ing and dangerous. Furthermore, the stability- instability paradox suggests 
that even if multiple  Middle Eastern states  were to acquire secure nuclear 
arsenals without arms races and intentional or unintentional use, the num-
ber and intensity of conventional wars and insurgencies in the region 
could increase.
Primary Interests
• No regional hegemon
• Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
• Access to oil
• No significant terrorist attacks on the United States
• Security of U.S. regional allies
Secondary Interests
• Democracy promotion
















FIGURE 10-1 U.S. Interests and ISIS Threats in the  Middle East
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Third, the United States has a strong interest in ensuring access to 
the large oil supplies in the region, which are needed to power the 
U.S. and global economies. Although oil- rich states have an interest 
in exporting  these resources, some may also have an incentive to cut 
off the supply chain for po liti cal or economic leverage. Therefore U.S. 
military presence may be required to deter such blockades or swiftly 
remove them.
Fourth, the United States aims to prevent significant terrorist at-
tacks in general, and on its homeland in par tic u lar. Although nonnu-
clear terrorism is not an existential threat, history has shown that the 
impact of surprising and deadly attacks on civilians can have outsized 
economic, po liti cal, and social effects. Minimizing such attacks is thus a 
primary U.S. interest identified by leading politicians and the American 
public alike.
The fifth primary U.S. interest is ensuring the security of its key al-
lies in the  Middle East, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tur-
key, and the new Iraqi government. The domestic politics of  every one 
of  these countries has concerned Washington in recent years, from the 
jailing of academics and journalists to the spread of settlements and 
the promotion of sectarianism. Nonetheless, the United States has a long 
history of po liti cal, military, and economic support for  these countries 
and their  people, and they, not the United States, are the ones who  will 
largely determine  whether the region  will become stable, prosperous, 
and  free.
To a lesser extent, the United States also has an interest in peace and 
stability across the region, as well as in the promotion of democracy.4  These 
are certainly admirable objectives with a number of benefits, but their 
absence does not pose a significant threat to the United States. Fur-
thermore, democ ratization is often in tension with stability in the short 
term, and the United States has often not been consistent in its support 
for the former, especially in the  Middle East. Therefore,  these are still 
U.S. interests, but they are less impor tant and less pursued than the five 
primary interests previously identified.
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ISIS Threats to U.S. Regional Interests
ISIS threatens some U.S. interests, but the most significant U.S. inter-
ests face the least significant threat from ISIS, and vice versa. For start-
ers, ISIS poses  little to no threat to regional hegemony or nuclear pro-
liferation in the  Middle East. Despite its  grand territorial designs for its 
“caliphate,” the group has no chance of becoming as power ful as leading 
states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey, let alone surpassing them to 
become the hegemon that dominates the region. Furthermore,  because 
ISIS has been fighting a multifront war against almost  every state in the 
region si mul ta neously, the group is not hastening the rise of another 
hegemon through the disproportionate weakening of any of the regional 
challengers.
Similarly, as much as ISIS would like to obtain and employ a nuclear 
weapon, its chances of acquiring one are quite low, and its chances of 
building one are even lower.5 The threat ISIS poses does not significantly 
affect the desire of regional states to initiate or accelerate their own nu-
clear programs, which is driven more by regional and international ri-
valries with other states. Most states in the region desire nuclear weapons 
for regime security, but ISIS is unlikely to be deterred from attacking 
nuclear- armed states— indeed, it has already done so on numerous occa-
sions. Therefore nuclear weapons would hold  little deterrent effect on the 
group, and so ISIS does not increase the likelihood of nuclear prolifera-
tion by other state actors.
ISIS poses a small threat to the  free flow of oil and a small-to-medium 
threat to the security of U.S. regional allies. ISIS forces have controlled 
scattered oil fields in eastern Syria and western Iraq; however, they lost 
many of  those in late 2017 and are unlikely to capture larger, more lucra-
tive oil fields in neighboring areas, and they have sold oil from the fields 
they captured in any case (including to their enemies). They are very 
unlikely to carry out an operation that could significantly slow the flow 
of  Middle East oil, such as a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which is a 
questionable prospect even for far more capable and better- positioned 
states like Iran.6 At best, their major attacks could shake up oil markets, 
but they do not have the power to control them or shut them down.
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The threat to U.S. allies posed by ISIS differs. For Israel, ISIS poses 
no existential threat, but it may spark violent escalation spirals in Gaza 
and the Sinai as it attempts to expand its foothold  there by outbidding 
Hamas for leadership in the jihadi community. For Egypt, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, and Turkey, ISIS poses a threat to the stability of their regimes, 
not simply through vio lence, but also through the delegitimization of 
their forms and effectiveness of governance. ISIS has lost significant ter-
ritory, but it has a number of members in  these countries, which pose 
significant security threats and can polarize local politics.
Outside the  Middle East, ISIS poses a significant security and mili-
tary threat to Eu rope, and one that is likely to increase now that ISIS has 
lost territory and is shifting its focus to what it sees as a region rife with 
ethnic tension and disaffected Muslim populations.7 Despite increased se-
curity mea sures put in place  after attacks in Belgium, France, and else-
where, the presence of a significant number of trained ISIS operatives can 
ensure a series of deadly attacks and ethnic polarization. Beyond the vio-
lence, ISIS has already had a significant impact on the politics of Eu ro-
pean countries; its vio lence and the refugees it purposely helped create 
have pushed Eu ro pean politics to the right, and nationalist parties con-
tinue to win unpre ce dented support at the polls by espousing counter-
terrorism and nativist platforms.8
ISIS poses a significant threat to the U.S. interests of regional peace 
and stability and the prevention of terrorist attacks. Between 2014 and 
2016 the group committed nearly 3,000 terrorist attacks (nearly three per 
day), causing tens of thousands of deaths.9 From January 1, 2014, through 
October 31, 2015, in Iraq alone, ISIS killed 18,802 and wounded 55,047 
 people.10 ISIS has played a pivotal role in escalating the civil wars in Iraq 
and Syria, committing ethnic cleansing and genocide against minority 
populations and stirring up sectarianism that  will long outlast the con-
flicts themselves. Furthermore, ISIS has shown the willingness and abil-
ity to carry out and inspire terror attacks both inside and outside the 
 Middle East, including in Eu rope and North Amer i ca. The continued 
loss of territory  will likely increase  these risks, especially in the short term, 
as ISIS aims to demonstrate its continued vitality to supporters and de-
tractors alike and the group shifts its focus to new areas.
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The best way to remove the threat ISIS poses to U.S. interests is to 
destroy the organ ization itself. Its multifaceted nature makes that more 
easily said than done, however, especially given a lack of understanding 
of its component parts both by policymakers and by the American pub-
lic. In the next section, I detail the three  faces of ISIS and the best ap-
proaches to defeating each one.
ISIS’s Three Parts: Insurgent Group, State,  
and Revolutionary Movement
To defeat ISIS, it is necessary to understand each of its three  faces: insur-
gent group, state, and revolutionary movement.
ISIS as an Insurgent Group
Much of the confusion surrounding ISIS and how to defeat it stems from 
a misunderstanding of what exactly ISIS is. First, ISIS leads a transna-
tional insurgency that is actively fighting to overthrow regimes— not only 
in Iraq and Syria, but also in Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Paki-
stan, and Yemen, among  others.11 The thousands of ISIS fighters in Iraq 
and Syria have included a mix of former Iraqi military officers and battle- 
hardened insurgents from a de cade of fighting, as well as foreign fighters 
from abroad, many of whom came with  little or no military know- how 
or experience.12 The prominence of former Iraqi military and intelligence 
officers may seem surprising given the ideological disconnect between 
the apocalyptic Salafi jihadists of ISIS and the secular Arab nationalism of 
the Baath Party. However, their common  enemy (Shiite po liti cal parties 
and militias), common base of support (the Sunni heartland), and shared 
power position on the outside looking in  after the fall of Saddam Hus-
sein made for an initial marriage of con ve nience that, for many, became 
much more. For example, Abu Muslim al- Turkmani was an Iraqi mili-
tary officer who served  under Saddam Hussein and then became ISIS’s 
second- in- command and governor for all of its territories in Iraq  until 
he was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2015. In fact, former Saddam mili-
tary officers have run three of ISIS’s most impor tant ministries: security, 
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military, and finance.13 Ayad Hamid- Jumaili was a former Saddam- era 
intelligence officer from Fallujah.  Until his death in March  2017, he 
oversaw all of ISIS’s security and intelligence operations, which mirror 
 those of the Baathists with their reliance on an extensive network of in-
for mants and harsh reprisals for any act of disloyalty.
The combination of  these former Iraqi military officers and battle- 
hardened insurgents has led to impressive, innovative per for mances by 
ISIS on the battlefield. Its crowning success was the capture of Iraq’s 
second largest city, Mosul, in 2014 with as few as 800 fighters against 
30,000 Iraqi soldiers, many of whom fled in the face of ISIS fighters 
and their reputation for extreme brutality.14 ISIS’s desire and ability to 
take and hold territory allowed the group to gain control of more than 
9 million  people from Mosul in the east to the edge of Aleppo in the 
west, from the Turkish border in the north to Iraq’s Anbar Governor-
ate in the south—an area the size of  Great Britain at its peak in 2014.15 
The group’s reach expanded even further through its network of affili-
ates, which have often grown at the expense of its rival, al Qaeda. Itself 
a former affiliate of al Qaeda (al Qaeda in Iraq), ISIS has flipped major 
groups like Boko Haram into its network and set up affiliates of its 
own amidst ongoing conflicts in Egypt, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and 
elsewhere.16
The capture of Mosul and retreat of the Iraqi Army helped provide 
ISIS with the tools it needed for the group’s most deadly and effective 
tactic: mass suicide bombings. ISIS acquired 2,300 armored Humvees 
from fleeing Iraqi forces, more than two- thirds of the 3,000–3,500 Hum-
vees the United States had supplied to the Iraqi Army.17  These vehicles 
enable highly effective suicide attacks. Their chassis can support a tre-
mendous amount of weight, allowing for heavier explosive payloads and 
more power ful bombs. Their armored exterior makes them difficult to 
disable as they speed  toward their target, and their familiar appearance 
makes it difficult for Iraqi forces to recognize them as  enemy vehicles  until 
it is too late. ISIS has used  these weapons in conjunction with their large 
ranks of willing suicide bombers to devastating effect. The group took 
Ramadi in May 2015 by detonating thirty suicide car bombs in the cen-
ter of the city, “10 of which each  were comparable in power to the Okla-
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homa City truck bomb of 1995 [which killed 168  people].”18 In other 
cases, they have overrun Iraqi and Syrian army checkpoints by blasting 
through their defenses with multiple suicide car bombs.
Even as ISIS has faced a massive onslaught from a multinational co-
ali tion that has retaken over 70  percent of the territory captured by the 
group, surprise attacks revealed the enduring morale of its fighters and 
sophistication of its operations  under duress. In October 2016, ISIS at-
tackers pushed into the heart of the Iraqi metropolis of Kirkuk despite 
the ongoing siege against its stronghold in Mosul. Witnesses describe the 
attack as “ambitious and carefully planned,” as about 100 ISIS fighters 
gathered in nearby Hawija, an ISIS enclave, and entered the city by truck.19 
The ISIS fighters not only took over key parts of the city, but they also 
anticipated and set up ambushes for Kurdish reinforcements that responded 
to the attack. One hundred and sixteen  people  were killed and 265 
wounded in the fighting, including numerous police officers, Kurdish 
Peshmerga, and civilians. The commander of the Kurdish counterterror-
ism force, Polad Talabani, said, “What they did to us inside Kirkuk was 
by far the worst we have ever seen.”20 As ISIS’s territorial holdings con-
tinue to shrink in 2018, the group  will attempt to plan similar strikes to 
destabilize vulnerable areas and prepare to fill the vacuum created by weak 
states and polarized socie ties.
ISIS as a State
The capture and control of territory by ISIS allowed it to expand into its 
second sphere: statehood. Although no other state formally recognized 
the “Islamic State” declared in 2014, ISIS developed a state in practice, 
with a hierarchy of governing institutions and ministries, courts, schools, 
and other social ser vices. One ISIS fighter claimed, “You look only at 
the executions. But  every war has its executions, its traitors, its spies. We 
set up soup kitchens, we rebuilt schools, hospitals, we restored  water and 
electricity, we paid for food and fuel. While the UN  wasn’t even able to 
deliver humanitarian aid, we  were vaccinating  children against polio.”21 
The majority of the funds ISIS had to pay for such proj ects came not from 
oil or foreign donations, but from a variety of taxes the group imposed 
on the 3 to 4 million  people within the territories it controlled, from 
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commercial taxes on businesses to the jizya tax on non- Muslim 
individuals.22
According to some who lived  under its rule, ISIS was more efficient 
and effective at governing than its Baghdad or Damascus pre de ces sors. 
By instituting sharia and brutal punishments, the group claims to have 
largely eliminated corruption and kidnappings, while maintaining or im-
proving the distribution of resources and social ser vices.  Needless to say, 
its brutality is itself the cause of many civilian deaths, but it also can deter 
wrongdoing and convince  people to adhere to its rule.23 ISIS nonetheless 
continued certain practices of the pre- conflict Syrian and Iraqi regimes, 
especially concerning food distribution. The group continued to subsi-
dize the cost of flour and opened bakeries when necessary to ensure  there 
would be bread for the population  under its control.
Of course, the group claims that it is not just any state, but rather the 
Islamic Caliphate reborn  under the guidance of its leader, Abu Bakr al- 
Baghdadi. The vast majority of the world’s Muslim scholars and civilians 
reject the legitimacy of this “caliphate” and ISIS’s claims, including key 
religious leaders from Egypt’s Al- Azhar to Saudi Arabia’s  Grand Mufti. 
Nonetheless, the credentials of the declared caliph— al- Baghdadi is a 
descendant of Prophet Muhammad and has a PhD in Quranic Sciences— 
coupled with ISIS’s claims about fully instituting sharia law and a “pure” 
Islamic society have proven attractive to its members and some individu-
als both inside and outside of its territory.24 One need only watch a few 
segments of ISIS’s plentiful propaganda videos to realize that it was at 
pains to portray the “normal,” happy life inside its “caliphate” in order 
to keep its subjects content and try to attract more.
Indeed, the establishment of a “state” is ISIS’s most unique and signa-
ture accomplishment. Al Qaeda and like- minded jihadis always supported 
the concept of a caliphate and believed one should be established, but only 
far in the  future once the ground was prepared  after the expulsion of the 
“far  enemy” (that is, the United States and the West) and the conversion 
of more Muslims to their par tic u lar strain of jihadism. ISIS turned that 
conventional game plan upside down. The group argued that the gover-
nance of territory and the establishment of the caliphate  were both a re-
ligious duty and a strategic boon, as  these would attract recruits and 
10-3216-7-ch10.indd   232 04/17/18   12:50 am
 A State, an Insurgency, and a Revolution 233
provide a true base for expansion and the removal of foreign influence. 
Furthermore, ISIS exhibited far fewer qualms about using extreme force 
to establish and maintain its “state” than al Qaeda, whose leadership con-
stantly tried to restrain ISIS in its earlier guises before the rupture in 
2014.25 Although the significant loss of territory all but dissolved the Is-
lamic State “caliphate” by 2018, the fact that it emerged and functioned 
for multiple years  will serve as a milestone, a reminder, and a potential 
example for the  future.
ISIS as a Revolutionary Movement
Fi nally, ISIS represents a revolutionary movement that seeks to reshape 
socie ties in the  Middle East and beyond, as well as redefine what it means 
to be a Muslim.26 An insurgent group is a military entity, a state is a po liti-
cal entity, and a revolutionary movement is both of  these, as well as a social, 
cultural, and ideological entity. Revolutions do not simply seek to replace 
presidents and generals; they aim to overturn the existing social order 
and replace it with a new vision for how life should be for individuals, 
their community, and their polity. The nature of ISIS’s revolution can be 
seen in the other two spheres, as its “state” directly aims to upset the bor-
ders and bargains of the Westphalian nation- state system rather than 
integrate within it.27 Its insurgencies do not merely seek to replace an 
unfavorable leader with a favorable one, but to change the demographic 
makeup of the territory and the mores within it through ethnic cleans-
ing and “religious policing.” The loss of territory may help cripple ISIS’s 
state, but not necessarily its revolution, as former ISIS propaganda leader 
and or ga nizer of foreign operations Abu Muhammad al- Adnani ex-
plained: “Whoever thinks that we fight to protect some land or some 
authority, or that victory is mea sured thereby, has strayed far from the 
truth.”28 “O Amer i ca,” Adnani said. “Would we be defeated and you be 
victorious if you  were to take Mosul or Sirte or Raqqah? . . .  Certainly 
not! We would be defeated and you victorious only if you  were able to 
remove the Koran from Muslims’ hearts.”29
Indeed, ISIS’s position as a revolutionary movement goes far beyond 
its insurgent and statist cloaks. First, the group’s ideology sets it apart, as it 
not only aims to convert Muslims to its extreme interpretations but also 
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emphasizes apocalyptic Islamic themes that al Qaeda and other jihadi 
groups have downplayed. For example, ISIS preaches that the Mahdi  will 
come soon and that ISIS has to prepare to fight alongside him. A series 
of setbacks in 2006 and 2007 tempered ISIS’s use of apocalypse as a stra-
tegic blueprint, but the group still uses related language and ideas to 
motivate followers and change conceptions of the pres ent and  future.30 
This has significant implications for group be hav ior, as a world that is 
about to end in massive  battles between the forces of Islam and “Rome” 
is one in which extreme vio lence and degradation are not only accept-
able, but expected.
Second, ISIS has spent a  great deal of time and effort trying to incul-
cate youth with  these ideas and train the next generation of jihadis. ISIS 
has used its control of mosques and schools within its “state” to recruit 
and control  children, who are desensitized through exposure to behead-
ings and mass killings and initially used as in for mants and spies.31  Those 
selected to be “cubs of the caliphate” undergo training for months, take 
part in the killing of prisoners, and gradu ate to become suicide bombers 
and frontline fighters.32 Even  those not selected for such missions have 
ISIS’s worldview and ideology drilled into them. Like  children every-
where, not all  will remember or agree with what they are taught, but 
some  will, and even a small increase in the number of ISIS sympathizers 
can change the  future trajectory for the group and the region.
Third, to attract  those it cannot drill in person, ISIS has made more 
extensive use of social and conventional media to spread its message glob-
ally than any previous jihadi group. A 2015 report noted that ISIS “re-
leases, on average, 38 new items per day—20- minute videos, full- length 
documentaries, photo essays, audio clips, and pamphlets, in languages 
ranging from Rus sian to Bengali.”33 This propaganda helped the group 
attract more foreign fighters (approximately 30,000) than any other in 
history, including more than the combined total of al Qaeda and other 
insurgent groups during the war in Af ghan i stan against the Soviet 
Union.34 ISIS’s open approach to media and vio lence is also revolution-
ary. It crowd- sources the creation and distribution of its propaganda, 
and it makes attacks by lone wolves in distant lands a key part of its strat-
egy. ISIS claims credit for  these unaffiliated but inspired individual at-
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tackers, honoring them as soldiers of ISIS in a way that other jihadi 
groups have not and using them to polarize their socie ties and lay the 
groundwork for ISIS’s ideas to take root.35
How to Defeat ISIS in Three- Level Chess
The challenge for analysts and states alike is not simply that ISIS has three 
 faces, but rather that ISIS is si mul ta neously an insurgent group, a state 
government, and a revolutionary movement (see figure 10-2). Under-
standing and defeating any one of  these entities is challenging; effec-





FIGURE 10-2 The Three  Faces of ISIS
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in priorities and policies between them. For its part, the United States is 
far better positioned to defeat some aspects of ISIS than  others. The mar-
ginalization of ISIS  will therefore require a multilateral, multistage ef-
fort across a number of fronts: a war of bombs, a war of governance, and 
a war of ideas. I offer a series of policy recommendations for how  these 
three separate strug gles can be pursued in complementary fashion, rather 
than in isolation or contradiction.
Defeat Sectarianism and Polarization
Polarization is the engine to ISIS’s growth and success in all three areas. 
ISIS launches attacks across ethnic lines to generate animosity and provoke 
reactions by the local government and targeted groups, which further 
inflame sectarian tensions. This strategy polarizes communities and makes 
individuals less likely to challenge ISIS’s authority and warped ideology 
and more likely to join the organ ization itself. The vio lence also helps 
create a new set of po liti cal grievances against the existing government, 
opening a vacuum for ISIS to fill with its own governance. The initial 
rise of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its comeback as ISIS  were not random 
events: the organ ization’s surge was due in large part to the ramping up of 
the civil war in Iraq from 2004 to 2006 and the civil war in Syria from 
2011 to 2014, as well as the group’s ability to plug into both as engines 
for growth. ISIS has followed this blueprint of vampyric radicalization 
and “demographic engineering” from its days as AQI to  today in Iraq, 
Eu rope, and beyond.36 Indeed, ISIS details this strategy explic itly, not-
ing that it aims to eliminate the “gray zone” between true Muslims and 
non- Muslims by violent provocation and polarization.37
END REGIONAL CIVIL WARS: To lessen the polarization and sectari-
anism that ISIS feeds off of, the United States and its allies in the  Middle 
East must first work tirelessly to end regional civil wars. Nothing radi-
calizes populations and marginalizes moderates more than  these conflicts 
 because it is most dangerous for individuals to be neutral in civil wars, as 
all sides target such  people as a threat.38 The United States and its allies 
might believe they have an interest in keeping  these wars at a slow burn 
in order to bleed and bankrupt rivals like Iran and Rus sia. However, what 
strength is sapped from problematic but deterrable state rivals is trans-
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ferred to dangerous and less deterrable jihadis, not to mention the radi-
calization of the states themselves who become embroiled in long- term 
sectarian civil conflicts. Given that over 85  percent of all terrorist attacks 
globally occur in five countries experiencing ongoing civil wars (Iraq, 
Syria, Af ghan i stan, Nigeria, and Pakistan), ending  these wars would be 
the single most effective counterterrorism tactic.39 Since many of  these 
civil wars have become proxy wars as part of a new  Middle East cold war, 
U.S. diplomacy with allies and rivals alike at the state level can have major 
downstream effects on the power and threat posed by nonstate actors like 
ISIS.40
FIGHT THE WAR OF IDEAS INDIRECTLY: Second, the United States 
must fight the war of ideas against ISIS, but it must do so indirectly.41 
ISIS fights its own war of ideas across multiple levels. Its victories on the 
battlefield allow it to capture territory; it then uses  these victories to trum-
pet its ideology online and in the classroom within its newly acquired 
state; this spreading of the message attracts more supporters to its revolu-
tionary movement and insurgency, and the cycle continues. As a secular 
government the United States does not win by— and should avoid— 
engaging in theological debates with ISIS, just as it does not expound on 
Chris tian ity, Judaism, or other religions. The U.S. brand is so poor in 
the  Middle East that attempts to actively lead a debate against ISIS would 
only hurt  those in the region who are able to engage and discredit the 
organ ization. Instead, the United States can help the vast majority of Mus-
lims who reject ISIS more effectively win the debate by shaping the en-
vironment in which it takes place.
In addition to ending civil wars to sap radicals and empower moder-
ate voices, the United States can also topple and prevent the reemergence 
of the physical “caliphate.” Although not normally thought of as a step 
in the war of ideas, all of the major transnational revolutionary move-
ments in the region centered on states who drove them— and faltered 
when  those states collapsed. Communism in the region— which sup-
ported and was championed by numerous po liti cal parties and rebel 
groups— faced major setbacks with the fall of the Soviet Union, while 
Arab nationalism  rose and fell with the fortunes of the United Arab Re-
public (Egypt). On the other hand, the modern Shia Islamist movement 
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that ISIS finds itself fighting directly was driven by the Ira nian Revolu-
tion, and the current state’s decades- long push to spread its ideas and in-
fluences throughout the region sustains it. Should Iran’s Islamic regime 
fall, the impact on its revolutionary ideas across the region would be tre-
mendous. In this sense, ISIS’s tying of its fortunes to a physical state cre-
ates significant vulnerabilities for the group, and its toppling delegitimizes 
it in the minds of many. The United States may do many  things poorly 
in the region, but if  there is one  thing it has proven to be good at it is 
overthrowing regimes. A slow squeeze of the caliphate in which ISIS 
gradually lost funds, could not provide social ser vices, and ruled over an 
increasingly insecure and unruly population may have been strategically 
beneficial by further discrediting the group and leaving memories of dis-
order rather than of effective governance that was swiftly pulled away by 
outsiders.
On the Internet, it is far less impor tant (and wise) for the U.S. gov-
ernment to directly respond to ISIS propaganda than to work with 
private corporations to weaken their message and allow other critics to 
defeat them. Twitter’s commitment to banning ISIS accounts that advo-
cate vio lence and violate their terms of ser vice help weaken the group’s 
message. Google’s Jigsaw program places counter- ISIS websites at the top 
of searches alongside pro- ISIS ones, which help ensures that any aspiring 
supporters  will be exposed to criticisms and failures alongside any praise 
and successes.
FIGHT POLARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: Given the signifi-
cant polarization in American society  today, defeating sectarianism in the 
 Middle East is easier said than done. However, U.S. attempts to address 
polarization in American society can represent an example of  humble self- 
criticism and solidarity, as well as a bulwark against ISIS attempts to gain 
a foothold on U.S. shores. President George W. Bush was criticized for 
not asking Americans to make any sacrifices in the strug gle against 
terrorism. U.S. leadership should change course and ask Americans to 
improve social bonds in their communities across ethnic and religious 
lines. Not only are such actions in line with American values, but they 
also help to prevent social alienation, which is one of the most common 
 causes of individuals lashing out and responding to ISIS’s attempts to re-
cruit lone wolves.
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Roll Back ISIS Territorial Control with a Revised “Afghan Model”
ISIS has proven that it is often at its best on the battlefield. ISIS not only 
conquered territory the size of Indiana, but it si mul ta neously fought nearly 
 every state and group in the region for years and is still standing. None-
theless, the group can lose, and has lost, territory when facing versions of 
the “Afghan model” of warfare, where indigenous ground forces partner 
with U.S. advisers and air strikes to degrade and defeat it. The key to 
this approach is not simply the capability of  these combined forces, but 
also how their makeup thwarts ISIS’s designs on the battlefield and the 
“day  after” it retreats.
ISIS cared so much about the supposed coming apocalyptic  battle in 
Dabiq, Syria, that it named its English- language magazine  after the town. 
Then, when the invading forces came, ISIS was swiftly removed with 
 little fanfare on the group’s part. Why? It was in part  because the attack-
ing forces  were Syrian Arabs backed by Muslim Turks, rather than non- 
Arab, non- Muslim Westerners as anticipated and hoped for. ISIS may be 
somewhat flexible in its religious prophecies, but it is difficult for ISIS to 
sell a narrative of Islam versus the West when Arab Islamic forces are the 
ones directly fighting and defeating them.42
As the situation in Af ghan i stan reveals, the “Afghan model” has a 
number of shortcomings. Initial battlefield gains have not translated into 
a stable, cohesive state despite a de cade and a half of effort.43 Many of 
 these failures stem from an inability to appreciate the significant regional 
interests  behind the Taliban (such as Pakistan), however. Although col-
lective action challenges remain, ISIS lacks a similar regional backer and 
is an avowed  enemy of all states in the region.44 ISIS can therefore be 
pushed back more easily. However, the greater prob lem of the “Afghan 
model” with both the Taliban and ISIS is the failure to provide credible, 
effective governance  after battlefield success.
Help Allies Win the War of Competitive Governance
Defeating ISIS as a state requires far more than removing them from con-
trol of territory. To ensure that the “Islamic State” does not come back— 
and is not welcomed back by civilians on the ground— regional powers 
need to engage in and win at competitive governance.45 Local govern-
ments need to demonstrate to their citizens that they can provide public 
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goods like security and transportation, and private goods like jobs, health 
care, and schools. On top of this, they need to make citizens feel that 
they have a stake in the state and its  future, especially if they are a mi-
nority ethnic or religious community. If and when governments fail to 
do one or more of  these  things,  those affected individuals  will become 
more susceptible to an extremist group like ISIS that promises safe 
streets,  free schools, and an end to corruption, which some are willing 
to tolerate in exchange for increased restrictions on freedom. As for-
mer U.S. ambassador to Syria Robert Ford explained, “If the new rulers 
 don’t have local support, the Islamic State  will always be able to recruit 
 people, especially if the  water  isn’t turned on, the schools  aren’t open and 
the electricity is off.”46
As much as media coverage focuses on ISIS’s extreme vio lence, the 
group  rose to power in Syria from 2011 to 2014 by focusing on building 
and governing a state in the Sunni borderlands, while Bashar al- Assad 
focused on destroying  those groups that focused on overthrowing him. 
Operations that aim at degrading the “Islamic State” and its resources 
should therefore be understood in the context of delegitimizing its gov-
ernance in the eyes of its population as much as loosening its physical con-
trol of territory. The “economic war” waged on ISIS in 2015 and 2016 
forced the group to significantly increase taxation of its constituents and 
cut its military salaries in half, which led to increased unrest and de-
fections.47 Even though many residents liked the ser vices that ISIS pro-
vided, they did not like the increasing amount of money they had to 
pay for them. In this sense, the slow squeeze before the recapture of 
Mosul and Raqqah may prove to be a positive. It forced ISIS to provide 
poorer governance with fewer resources and so degraded perceptions of 
its rule in the eyes of civilians over time, rather than disappearing in one 
fell swoop while memories of reliable, incorruptible ISIS governance re-
mained fresh.
The fact that ISIS is a transnational organ ization unfortunately means 
that this competition over governance must be won not just in one place, 
but in countries across the region. Other wise the group  will certainly 
try to capitalize on any weak link where  there are discontented Sunnis. 
The discussion of a “ghost caliphate” relies precisely on this concept of 
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ISIS biding time before seeping back into cracks left by failing local gov-
ernance, as the group did once before in Iraq and Syria.
Although the strug gle over governance is central to defeating ISIS on 
multiple fronts, it is one in which the United States cannot play the lead 
role. Nonetheless, the United States can and should set the stage by pro-
viding po liti cal, economic, and— when needed— military heft to help 
enact power- sharing deals both within and between  Middle Eastern 
states. The key challenges to quality and inclusive governance in the re-
gion are the strug gles between groups and states over the distribution of 
resources and power. The United States can provide incentives and in-
ternational pressure to help regional states reach and enact deals that give 
all ethnic and religious communities a seat at the  table and a stake in the 
country. They can also work with key allies like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
and Egypt and key rivals like Rus sia and Iran to establish realistic agree-
ments on power- sharing and spheres of influence in the region. Conflicts 
and disagreements  will remain, but the sobering costs of endless proxy 
wars that go nowhere and help strengthen a common threat like ISIS 
should help  these negotiations move  toward a more stable regional order.
Match Means to Ends
All of the greatest failures of U.S. intervention in the  Middle East can be 
traced back to a mismatch between available means and desired ends. De-
spite coming to office having criticized President Bush for his failed in-
tervention in Iraq  after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, President 
Obama noted that his biggest foreign policy  mistake was failing to ade-
quately plan for the “day  after” Gaddafi was overthrown in Libya.48 
Nonetheless, the Obama administration called for the end of the Assad 
regime in Syria, yet only devoted enough resources to prevent the rebels 
from losing, rather than actually winning.  After initially criticizing the 
Obama administration for its Syria policy, the Trump administration sim-
ilarly stated in April 2017 that Assad should go, but did not subsequently 
devote resources adequate to the task.49 Scholars and policymakers de-
bate the merits of intervention and restraint, but  there should be no de-
bate over the folly of pursuing the goals of the former with the resources 
of the latter. The United States has received a dose of humility, having 
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experienced how  little even the world’s superpower can do in a distant 
region of proud, capable individuals and states with their own interests, 
about which the United States exhibits  little understanding. ISIS can be 
defeated, but only with strong regional partners and only if the fight is not 
folded into broader proj ects of foreign- imposed regime change and poorly 
formulated plans for democ ratization. The key to defeating ISIS is to rec-
ognize and understand its three  faces and capitalize on the vulnerabilities 
such a multifaceted group pres ents.
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